and moulded, in the course of ages. It may be modified much more hereafter. However widespread and powerful are the workings of self-interest, we know that there are certainly other principles also at work in man's heart, and hereafter they may become more powerful than they are now. But it seems to me that we cannot reasonably anticipate a state of human progress in which the self-regarding instincts, including the family affections, will not be strong. Mr. Darwin's principle, the survival of those who succeed in the struggle for life, would not lead us to that expectation, since those instincts are plainly concerned in the preservation, both of the individual and the offspring. Mr. Mill has instanced the patriotism of the ancient Romans as an example of the strength which an unselfish sentiment may attain.1 No doubt this is an instance, and others may be found of an individual virtue fostered into unusual strength. But it is plainly much short of universal benevolence. We have no reason to think that the influences which produced this as well as some other virtues in the early Romans could have brought about a complete ascendancy of unselfish feelings. And whatever those.influences were, their effect was not permanent. There was a great decay of Roman virtue. The general failure of socialist 2

1 Essay on the Utility of Religion,' p. 107.

6

2 See Mill's Political Economy,' book ii. chap. i.

schemes, apart from religious influences, and indeed the modifications in principle of those schemes, which their most intelligent advocates adopt, seem to prove that the permanent principles of human nature and the conditions of human life forbid us to expect a state of things in which the self-regarding sentiments, including the family affections, will be permanently subordinate to the sentiments which are wholly unselfish. At least such a state of things is not within our present horizon of prospect. Whosoever admits this, and considers how often these feelings tempt man to deal unkindly, untruly, or unjustly, with his fellow man, will acknowledge the value of a belief in a God, the righteous ruler of the world. And even if that unlooked-for state of human nature had come, even if man had learned to carry out love to his fellow man, at the cost of sacrifice to himself, still this belief in God would have its use. Would it not support and comfort us in pain, anxiety, bereavement, and especially death? To use again the words of Pope, of how large a part of mankind will it always be true that they have 'too much weakness for the stoic's part'? Can we look to see it otherwise with women or children, with the gentle or the timid? I think that we may often notice a certain gloom in the view of life taken by those who reject these ideas.1 Surely, the cheer

1 See the character of Mr. James Mill in the Autobiography of his

fulness, hope, and comfort of religious faith are a source not of present happiness only, and that is something, but also of strength to do good, which is still further to be esteemed. This truth, indeed, seems to be admitted by Mr. Mill in his essay on Theism.1 But I am bound to add this qualification, that faith in God has all this power for good, only in proportion as the idea of God becomes more perfectly and truly good.

I have next to say something as to the doctrines distinctively Christian, and, first, I would speak of the doctrine most characteristic of the religion, the worship of Christ. I contend that herein is one of the moral excellences of Christianity. The moral influence of worship depends, as I have just said, upon the character of the being who is worshipped, and it is one great merit of our religion that it has held up for the worship of the world a character morally worthy of that homage. I find this merit admitted by a critic as free and independent as Mr. J. S. Mill.2 No one can deny the love, and patience, and purity, and self-sacrifice, and zeal to do good, which shine forth in the Gospel histories of Christ. I do not hold that these histories give a perfect likeness. If they are fairly and critically Son, p. 48. Also Mr. Congreve's Essay, 'The New Religion in its Attitude towards the Old,' p. 296.

1 See Mill'sEssay on Theism,' part v. General Result. 2 Ibid. p. 253.

judged, we must, I think, allow that their probable origin, their style, their discrepancies, suggest that they do not give with complete exactness the words and actions of our Lord. But still, in spite of their imperfections, we recognise an unrivalled image of goodness. It seems to me worthy of note that the most widely read, and perhaps the most deeply influential, of the many pious books which Christendom has produced, has been the 'Imitation of Christ.' I do not think it needful to dwell upon this point, for I suppose that few if any candid men would contest it. I will go on to speak of another great characteristic doctrine of the Gospel, the doctrine of grace. Understood in its broadest and deepest sense, and considered merely as setting forth an act of God to be judged of from a moral point of view, we may think of this doctrine as the assertion of God's love to man in spite of sin-the assertion that God has made in Christ a provision for the remedy of sin, and the lasting good of men. This will still appear the essential character of the doctrine, when we call to mind that there is a discrimination in the distributing of this mercy, or, in other words, in the language of theology, that justification is by faith. For this faith or condition of mercy is also said to be a grace or gift. Ultimately, then, the doctrine morally considered amounts to a belief that God is not merely a righteous judge, but

also a loving father; that he has interfered in Christ for the good of the sinful. He may not, indeed, be represented as doing so to an equal extent, or with an equal efficacy for all. But there is the great and significant assertion that he has mercy for the unworthy. And if there be many who do not seem now to come within the comprehension of his grace, we, who cherish the hope of a better life, may hope to see there that even these are ultimately brought to goodness and to happiness.

This doctrine appears to me the most precious in the whole of religion. There is a great deal in our knowledge of the world and our experience of life to try our faith in the goodness of God. But here it shines out clear and bright, speaking to the heart of man, and calling him to love his heavenly father. This is beyond doubt a higher moral view of God than the bare notion of a judge. And the state of the soul, and of the life which it is fitted to produce, is a higher and a better state than that which the bare idea of a righteous law could bring about. No truthful conscience can fail to witness that we can make no claim upon God on the score of merit-that our best services are too imperfect to give a pretext for such an idea. Unquestionably that passage from a purely legal idea of our dealings with God, to the idea of grace on his part and gratitude on ours, which has so often been