was meant.

word reason.' Reason has been used by philosophers as a name to stand for those intuitive judgments of the mind among which the principles of the moral faculty take their place, and accordingly with them the authority of reason in matters of religion has been spoken of when that of conscience But this was, I fancy, misleading with many ordinary persons. Their notion of a thing being according to reason, was that it could be explained according to natural laws, physical or mental, could be shown to be part of the natural course of events. Now, our notorious experience of many things which cannot be thus explained, at all events at present, not to mention our just feeling that there must be in the doings of one so far above us as God, much that we cannot understand in this way, has hindered a want of conformity to reason, when thus understood, from appearing a great objection to anything in religion. But if the philosophical meaning of the word 'reason' had been thought of, if it had been distinctly understood that what was objected to was contrary to our conscience, to our natural feeling of right and wrong, the objection would have assumed a more serious and weighty appearance. We certainly have no right to refuse our belief to an event, even so contrary to the known course of nature as the general resurrection of the dead, merely on the ground of its being so contrary.

But the case stands differently with objections on moral grounds. Surely we must feel a difficulty in attributing to God conduct which, even when we have made all allowance for his peculiar relation to us, our moral feelings instinctively condemn. If my reasoning in these essays has been just, no possible evidence from miracles, or from any other source, could justify us in doing so.

Now let us consider, first, the conformity to the moral faculty of those doctrines of religion which Christianity has in common with natural religion. By these I understand the existence of a God of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, his perfect though mysterious government of this present world, his designing for man a future state, his dealing with each individual throughout both here and hereafter as a moral ruler and a loving father, punishing or rewarding so as to secure man's lasting good. It will be noticed that the idea of punishment is here reformatory, not retributive. That seems to me the notion which the moral feeling of this age suggests. It is, I allow, inconsistent with the doctrine of the everlasting punishment of the wicked, a doctrine which I will consider at more length hereafter, but which I may say at once that I for one do not see how to defend on grounds of moral science. Our conscience may also be thought by some opposed to any sharp and determinate separation of mankind

X

hereafter into two classes, the one happy, and the other unhappy, on the ground of their conduct in this life, because that conduct is of too mixed a character to admit of such exact discrimination. Are not the degrees of merit or demerit in individuals, it may be said, insensibly graduated? But this latter objection will, I think, upon consideration, be found to rest upon assumptions as to the uniformity and constancy of happiness and misery in the two classes which have no adequate support, even in the commonly received doctrine of future punishment, much less in the reformatory view. A distinct classification is compatible with perfect gradation in reward, retribution, or discipline. If the doctrines which Christianity and natural religion have in common, be stated as above, there is not, I think, any real question as to discrepancy between them and the witness of conscience. They are expressly made conformable to that witness. But a deeper question may still be raised, viz., whether the belief in such a God, and in his so dealing with us, does or does not give a better character to man? Strange as it may appear, this is gravely questioned. It has been thought that such a belief makes virtue selfish. It leads us to do good for what we shall gain by it, to keep from evil lest we should suffer by it. And this we are told is not so high and pure a view of human duty as that which makes us act

aright merely from a wish to do so. Nay, it has even been attempted, in modern days, to preserve the moral benefits of enlightened worship, without admitting, or at least without building upon, the idea of God. Something certainly of those benefits may arise from the presenting of pure and good thoughts and examples to the mind, and the kindling and calling forth of moral sympathy, apart from the thoughts and feelings immediately directed towards. God. This might be true of praise, thanksgiving, religious contemplation. There is certainly much in the universe itself to raise in the mind feelings of wonder, awe, even reverence. We see such feelings, for instance, in a mind as little influenced by religious belief as was that of the late Dr. Strauss.1 Further, the sense of blessing, when thought of as derived only from inanimate nature, may still be cherished with profit. Nay, even in the case of prayer, that case in which the selfish ingredient of religious feeling does most largely enter, and in which we most obviously need an Almighty hearer and giver, it is still true that so far forth as the direction of the will is, that of aspiration towards moral good, the practice might be perpetuated, and that with happy effect even when the belief in a God had been relinquished. These are, I conjec

1 'The Old Faith and the New,' by D. F. Strauss, authorised translation by M. Blind, 2nd edit., p. 164.

ture, the psychological principles at the bottom of the worship actually practised by the disciples of M. Comte. I admit the good so far as it goes. But I think that a further, and a very great, good is obtained by the belief in God. All the sentiments just named assume a deeper and stronger, a more living and influential, character, when our thoughts are directed towards a Being of infinite perfections as an objective reality. There is in that ideal, even if it be no more than an ideal, and if there be no direct action of that Being in response upon the soul, a power to quicken, encourage, and strengthen man's spirit in all good ways, by the admiration, love, and devotion which it calls forth. And I for one must also contend that there is in this belief in God, his protection, and care, a support which our weak nature compounded of selfish as well as generous feelings needs. I am aware that in these last words I expose myself to the imputation named a little while back of making virtue selfish. But I should contend with Butler that there is a right as well as a wrong care for self. It is but a romantic scheme of life, which does not take account of those self-caring instincts. I know that the moral reformer may hope to diminish their power, perhaps to take away their supremacy. Human nature is plastic. It has been modified greatly. Nay, if modern theories be true, it has been built

up,

and fashioned,