wider view of the possible supernatural. He must not confine himself to the diabolic agency which the statements of Scripture do no doubt require him to consider. If we give up the universality of law, and admit personal supernatural agency in physical nature, we have to show that there can be no such agency, in this matter at least, except that of God on the one hand or of evil spirits on the other. Apart from the reign of law, it is not true that the aspect of nature excludes the supposition of other supernatural interference. To the polytheist we know that it suggests it, and so also, as it seems, to the modern Spiritualist.

We may ask, might not the Christian miracles have proceeded from some supernatural beings of imperfect goodness, not of unqualified wickedness? And it seems to me that in order fairly to put aside this hypothesis, we should have to try to estimate the actual results of Christianity in the world; not to consider simply its intrinsic beauty or goodness, as it was originally propounded, but its effects in man's history as corrupted and perverted by human ignorance and sinfulness; and to endeavour at least to show that it was, in spite of these abatements and qualifications to its success, after all the very best means for promoting man's good possible under the restrictions morally necessary from man's freedom at the time of its promulgation. Nothing short of this

would, I think, make it worthy of a divine interference. A lower view would suggest an author less perfect, or wise, or powerful than God. I am quite aware that many instances may be pointed out in God's natural works, or in his providence, where we cannot trace this perfect adaptation to the end. But these things are seen, it must be noticed, in his natural administration. They are not, therefore, fair analogies for a supernatural interference. In this last case we might, as has been pointed out, expect to see the apparent moral purpose fully carried out. We ought to have, as I have elsewhere expressed it, Design triumphing over Law. Now I am far from saying that Christianity was not this best possible remedy for human evils; but at the same time I am so conscious of the difficulty of the inquiry, that I do not believe it possible to present our conclusion sustained by what would be in the eyes of a sceptic a convincing argument. Of course upon the assumption of uniform law in the divine action these embarrassing considerations do not enter in. No particular event can then claim that character of being an exceptional and special act of God, which gives a miracle its evidential force, and which makes it so important to show that the miracle is not the work of any creature agent. God does not appear as one of many unseen personal agents interfering with the eourse of the world, and we are

not embarrassed to determine which interferences are his.

After these last remarks we may now draw to a close our consideration of the argument from the Christian miracles. The original question, I would once more repeat, was not whether certain events in the life of Christ, commonly taken to be miraculous, actually occurred, but whether the evidence which we have for them is so much better than that for other seemingly miraculous events that we may believe the former and reject the latter. After considering the critical tests by which other miraculous stories are put aside, and applying them to the evangelical miracles, I concluded that the resurrection of Christ himself was the only case which could fairly claim this advantage. Even as to this I was led to think that different minds would with equal honesty estimate this superiority differently. Further, we have seen that the religious interpretation of anomalous events by referring them to a direct special personal action of God, brings with it some uncertainties and difficulties. My conclusion accordingly is, that the argument from the miracles cannot in these days be relied upon as the foundation for Christian belief. This, I would once more point out, is not by any means the same thing as concluding that nothing of the nature of the true supernatural has occurred in connection with Christianity. This, I must not be

understood to assert. The Christian religion, and indeed even natural religion, clearly assert a great deal of the supernatural, as that word is generally understood, though this truth, I may repeat, does not require us of necessity to set aside the doctrine of continuity, as has, I think, been shown. I would yet again repeat that it is not miracles, not even in the strictest sense of the word, which I now call in question, but the evidential argument founded upon them. That argument has not lost all its value, but it has lost some. It may claim a place, but not the first place in Christian evidences. It is auxiliary rather than fundamental, fitted, as matters stand, rather to confirm the believer than to convince the sceptic.

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The question arises, If you value low the ment from miracles, upon what do you rest the truth of Christianity? Other arguments from matters of fact have been brought forward. I may mention two such arguments, one drawn from the fulfilment of prophecy, the other from the part which Christianity has actually had in the progress of man. I do not purpose here to enter on the discussion of these arguments, but I will give my own opinion. As regards the former, the cases cited are not so clear and conclusive as may, I think, be reasonably required for so important an end, and the argument is further exposed to some of the objections which beset all

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arguments from miracles, such as uncertainty as to the divine purpose. The latter argument also cannot be put in a fully convincing form. I allow at once that being an argument as to the divine purposes from general considerations it is not open to some of the criticisms as to miracle testimony. Further, no doubt Christianity has conferred very great blessings on mankind. But these advantages have had drawbacks from man's perversion, religious wars, and secutions and quarrels, support to mischievous superstitions, as in the case of witchcraft, the maintenance of an oppressive and reactionary hierarchy, hindrances to the progress of thought and knowledge, consecration of secular despotisms. If we look at the matter merely in the light of history, it seems an exaggeration either to represent Christianity as the turning point of God's dealings with man, or, again, as the one grand source of human improvement. Nominally, the religion has not yet extended over much more than a fourth of mankind, and really it has effectually leavened an incomparably smaller number with its influence. So, again, we cannot deny that other very powerful agents are at work for the improvement of man's character, as the wonderful growth of natural science with its reflex influence on the human mind itself, the improvements in government, the diffusion of knowledge, the increased intercourse of nations, the growth of material resources and comfort. I