the common degree of excellence which is ufually attained in this particular art; and when he judges of it by this new measure, it may often appear to deserve the highest applause, upon account of its approaching much nearer to perfection than the greater part of those works which can be brought into competition with it.

SECTION

SECTION II.

Of the degrees of the different paffions which are confiftent with propriety.

INTRODUCTIO N.

T

HE propriety of every paffion excited by objects peculiarly related to ourfelves, the pitch which the fpectator can go along with, must lye, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity. If the paffion is too high, or if it is too low, he cannot enter into it. Grief and refentment for private misfortunes and injuries may eafily, for example, be too high, and in the greater part of mankind they are fo. They may likewise, though this more rarely happens, be too low. We denominate the excess, weakness and fury: and we call the defect, ftupidity, infenfibility, and want of fpirit. We can enter into neither of them, but are aftonished and confounded to fee them.

This mediocrity, however, in which the point of propriety confifts, is different in different paffions. It is high in fome, and low in others. There are fome paffions which it is indecent to exprefs very strongly, even upon those occafions, in which it is acknowledged that we cannot avoid feeling them in the highest degree. And there

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there are others of which the ftrongest expreffions are upon many occafions extremely graceful, even though the paffions themfelves do not, perhaps, arife fo neceffarily. The first are those paffions with which, for certain reasons, there is little or no fympathy: the fecond are those with which, for other reafons, there is the greateft. And if we confider all the different paffions of human nature, we fhall find that they are regarded as decent, or indecent, juft in proportion as mankind are more or lefs difpofed to fympathife with them,

CHA P. I.

Of the paffions which take their origin from the body.

1.

IT

T is indecent to express any ftrong degree of those paffions which arife from a certain fituation or difpofition of the body; because the company, not being in the fame difpofition, cannot be expected to fympathife with them. Violent hunger, for example, though upon many occafions not only natural, but unavoidable, is always indecent, and to eat voraciously is univerfally regarded as a piece of ill manners. There is, however, fome degree of fympathy, even with hunger. It is agreeable to fee our companions eat with a good appetite, and all expreffions of loathing

are

are offenfive. The difpofition of body which is habitual to a man in health, makes his ftomach eafily keep time, if I may be allowed fo coarse an expreffion, with the one, and not with the other. We can fympathife with the diftrefs which exceffive hunger occafions when we read the defcription of it in the journal of a fiege, or of a fea voyage. We imagine ourselves in the fituation of the fufferers, and thence readily conceive the grief, the fear and confternation, which must neceffarily distract them. We feel, ourselves, fome degree of those paffions, and therefore fympathife with them: but as we do not grow hungry by reading the description, we cannot properly, even in this cafe, be faid to fympathife with their hunger.

It is the fame cafe with the paffion by which nature unites the two fexes. Though naturally the most furious of all the paffions, all ftrong expreffions of it are upon every occafion indecent, even between perfons in whom its most compleat indulgence is acknowledged by all laws, both human and divine, to be perfectly innocent. There seems, however, to be fome degree of fympathy even with this paffion. To talk to a woman as we fhould to a man is improper: it is expected that their company fhould infpire us with more gaiety, more pleasantry, and more attention; and an intire infenfibility to the fair fex, renders a man contemptible in fome meafure even to the men.

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Such

Such is our averfion for all the appetites which take their origin from the body: all ftrong expreffions of them are loath fome and difagreeable. According to fome antient philofophers, thefe are the paffions which we fhare in common with the brutes, and which having no connection with the characteristical qualities of human nature, are upon that account beneath its dignity. But there are many other paffions which we share in common with the brutes, fuch as refentment, natural affection, even gratitude, which do not, upon that account appear to be fo brutal. The true caufe of the peculiar disgust which we conceive for the appetites of the body when we see them in other men, is that we cannot enter into them. To the perfon himfelf who feels them, as foon as they are gratified, the object that excited them ceafes to be agreeable even its prefence often becomes offenfive to him; he looks round to no purpose for the charm which tranfported him the moment before, and he can now as little enter into his own paffion as another person. When we have dined, we order the covers to be removed; and we should treat in the fame manner the objects of the most ardent and paffionate defires, if they were the objects of no other paffions but those which take their origin from the body..

In the command of those appetites of the body confifts that virtue which is properly called temperance. To reftrain them within. hofe bounds, which regard to health and for

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