Nature, however, when the implanted the feeds of this irregularity in the human breast, feems, as upon all other occafions, to have intended the happiness and perfection of the fpecies. If the hurtfulness of the defign, if the malevolence of the affection, were alone the causes which excited our refentment, we fhould feel all the furies of that paffion against any perfon in whofe breaft we fufpected or believed fuch defigns or affections were harboured, though they had never broke out into any actions. Sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of punishment; and if the indignation of mankind run as high against them as against actions; if the bafeness of the thought which had given birth to no action, feemed in the eyes of the world as much to call aloud for vengeance as the baseness of the action, every court of j dicature would become a real inquifition. There would be no fafety for the most innocent and circumfpect conduct. Bad wishes, bad views, bad defigns, might ftill be fufpected; and while thefe excited the fame indignation with bad conduct, while bad intentions were as much resented as bad actions, they would equally expofe the perfon to punishment and refentment. Actions therefore which either produce actual evil, or attempt to produce it, and thereby puts us in the immediate fear of it, are by the Author of nature rendered the only proper and approved objects of human punishment and refentment. Sentiments, defigns, affections, though it is

from

from these that according to cool reason human actions derive their whole merit or demerit, are placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every human jurifdiction, and are referved for the cognizance of his own unerring tribunal. That neceffary rule of juftice, therefore, that men in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not for their defigns and intentions, is founded upon this falutary and ufeful irregularity in human fentiments concerning merit or demerit, which at firft fight appears fo abfurd and unaccountable. But every part of nature, when attentively furveyed, equally demonftrates the providential care of its author, and we may admire the wifdom and goodness of God even in the weakness and folly of men.

4

Nor is that irregularity of fentiments altogether without its utility, by which the merit of an unfuccefsful attempt to ferve, and much more that of meer good inclinations and kind wishes, appears to be imperfect. Man was made for action, and to promote by the exertion of his faculties fuch changes in the external circumftances both of himself and others, as may feem moft favourable to the happiness of all. He must not be satisfied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind, because in his heart he withes well to the profperity of the world. That he may call forth the whole vigour of his foul, and ftrain every nerve, in order to produce thofe ends which it is the purpose of his being to advance, nature has

taught

taught him, that neither himself nor mankind can be fully fatisfied with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full measure of applause, unless he has actually produced them. He is made to know, that the praife of good intentions, without the merit of good offices, will be but of little avail to excite either the loudeft acclamations of the world, or even the highest degree of felf-applaufe. The man who has performed no fingle action of importance, but whofe whole conversation and deportment exprefs the jufteft, the noblest, and most generous fentiments, can be intitled to demand no very high reward, even though his inutility fhould be owing to nothing but the want of an opportunity to ferve. We can still refuse it him without blame. We can still ask him, What have you done? What actual service can you produce, to intitle you to fo great a recompence? We esteem you, and love you; but we owe you nothing. To reward indeed that latent virtue which has been useless only for want of an opportunity to ferve, to bestow upon it those honours and preferments, which, though in fome measure it may be faid to deserve them, it could not with propriety have infifted upon, is the effect of the most divine benevolence. To punish, on the contrary, for the affections of the heart only, where no crime has been committed, is the moft infolent and barbarous tyranny. The benevolent affections feem to deferve moft praife, when they do not wait till it becomes almoft a crime for them not to

exert themselves.

The malevolent, on the contrary, can scarce be too tardy, too flow or deliberate.

It is even of ufe that the evil which is done without defign fhould be regarded as a misfortune to the doer as well as to the fufferer. Man is thereby taught to reverence the happinefs of his brethren, to tremble left he should, even unknowingly, do any thing that can hurt them, and to dread that animal refentment which he feels is ready too burst out against him, if he should without defign be the unhappy instrument of their calamity. togel mus Notwithstanding, however, all these feeming irregularities of fentiment, if man fhould unfortunately either gives occafion to thofe evils which he did not intend, or fail in producing that good which he intended, nature has not left his innocence altogether without confolation, nor his virtue altogether without reward. He then calls to his affiftance that juft and equitable maxim, that thofe events which did not depend upon our conduct ought not to diminish the esteem that is due to us. He fummons up his whole magnanimity and firmness of foul, and ftrives to regard himself, not in the light in which he at present appears, but in that in which he ought to appear, in which he would have appeared had his generous defigns been crowned with fuccefs, and in which he would still appear, notwithstanding their mifcarriage, if the fentiments of mankind were either altogether candid and equitable, or even perfectly confiftent

with themselves. The more candid and humane part of mankind intirely go along with the efforts which he thus makes to fupport himself in his own opinion. They exert their whole generosity and greatness of mind, to correct in themselves this irregularity of human nature, and endeavour to regard his unfortunate magnanimity in the fame light in which, had it been fuccefsful, they would, without any fuch generous exertion, have nat turally been difpofed to confider it.

PART