Of the influence of fortune upon the fentiments of mankind, with regard to the merit or demerit of actions.

INTRODUCTIO N.

W

HATEVER praise or blame can be due to any action, muft belong either, first, to the intention or affection of the heart, from which it proceeds; or, fecondly, to the external action or movement of the body. which this affection gives occafion to; or laft, to all the good or bad confequences, which actually, and in fact, proceed from it. These three different things constitute the whole nature and circumstances of the action, and must be the foundation of whatever quality can belong to it.

That the two laft of these three circumstances cannot be the foundation of any praise or blame, is abundantly evident; nor has the contrary ever been afferted by any body. The external action or movement of the body is often the fame in the most innocent and in the most blameable actions. He who shoots a bird, and he who fhoots a man, both of them perform the fame external movement: each of them draws the tricker of a gun. The confequences which actually, and in fact, happen to proceed from any ac M tion,

tion, are, if poffible, ftill more indifferent either to praife or blame, than even the external movement of the body. As they depend, not upon the agent, but upon fortune, they cannot be the foundation for any proper ́fentiment, of which his character and conduct are the objects.

The only confequences for which he can be answerable, or by which he can deferve either approbation or difapprobation of any kind, are thofe which were fome way or other intended, or thofe which, at least, fhow fome agreeable or difagreeable quality in the intention of the heart, from which he acted. To the intention or affection of the heart, therefore, to the propriety or impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulnefs of the defign, all praife or blame, all approbation or difapprobation of any kind, which can juftly be beftowed upon any action, must ultimately belong.

When this maxim is thus propofed, in abftract and general terms, there is no body who does not agree to it. It's felf-evident justice is acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a diffenting voice among all mankind. Every body allows, that how different foever the accidental, the unintended, and unforef en confequences of different actions, yet, if the intentions or affections from which they arofe were, on the one hand, equally proper and equally beneficent, or, on the other, equally improper and equally malevolent, the merit or demerit of the actions is ftill the fame,

and

and the agent is equally the fuitable object either of gratitude or of refentment.

But how well foever we may feem to be perfuaded of the truth of this equitable maxim, when we confider it after this manner, in abstract, yet when we come to particular cafes, the actual confequences which happen to proceed from any action, have a very great effect upon our fentiments concerning its merit or demerit, and almost always either enhance or diminish our sense of both. Scarce, in any one inftance, perhaps, will our fentiments be found, after examination, to be entirely regulated by this rule, which we all acknowledge ought entirely to regulate them.

This irregularity of fentiment, which every body feels, which fcarce any body is fufficiently aware of, and which no body is willing to acknowledge, I proceed now to explain; and I fhall confider, firft, the cause which gives occafion to it, or the mechanifin by which nature produces it; fecondly, the extent of its influence; and, laft of all, the end which it answers, or the purpose which the Author of nature feems to have intended by it.

T

HE causes of pain and pleasure, whatever they are, or however they operate, seem to be the objects, which, in all animals, immediately excite thofe two paffions of gratitude and refentment. They are excited by inanimated, as well as by animated objects. We are angry, for a moment, even at the ftone that hurts us. A child beats it, a dog barks at it, a choleric man is apt to curfe it. The leaft reflection, indeed, corrects this fentiment, and we foon become fenfible, that what has no feeling is a very improper object of revenge. When the mifchief, however, is very great, the object which caufed it becomes difagreeable to us ever after, and we take pleasure to burn or destroy it. We should treat, in this manner, the inftrument which had accidentally been the caufe of the death of a friend, and we fhould often think ourfelves guilty of a fort of inhumanity, if we neglected to vent this abfurd fort of vengeance upon it.

We conceive, in the fame manner, a fort of gratitude for those inanimated objects, which have been the caufes of great, or fre quent pleasure to us. The failor, who, as foon as he got afhore, fhould mend his fire with the plank upon which he had just ef

caped

caped from a fhipwreek, would seem to be guilty of an unnatural action. We should expect that he would rather preferve it with, care and affection, as a monument that was, in fome measure, dear to him. A man grows fond of a snuff-box, of a pen-knife, of a staff which he has long made use of, and conceives fomething like a real love and affection for them. If he breaks or lofes them, he is vexed out of all proportion to the value of the damage. The house which we have long lived in, the tree, whofe verdure and fhade we have long enjoyed, are both looked upon with a fort of refpect that seems due to fuch benefactors. The decay of the one, or the ruin of the other, affects us with a kind of melancholy, though we fhould fuftain no lofs by it. The Dryads and the Lares of the ancients, a fort of genii of trees and houses, were probably first fuggefted by this fort of affection, which the authors of thofe fuperftitions felt for fuch objects, and which feemed unreafonable, if there was nothing animated about them.

But, before any thing can be the proper object of gratitude or refentment, it must not only be the cause of pleasure or pain, it must likewise be capable of feeling them. Without this other quality, thofe paffions cannot vent themselves with any fort of fatisfaction upon it. As they are excited by the causes of pleasure and pain, fo their gratification confifts in retaliating those fenfations upon what occafion to them; which it is to no purM 3

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