Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or diffonance with our

own.

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HEN the original paffions of the perfon principally concerned are in perfect concord with the fympathetic emotions of the spectator, they neceffarily appear to this laft juft and proper, and fuitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing the cafe home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they neceffarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unfuitable to the caufes which excite them. To approve of the paffions of another, therefore, as fuitable to their objects, is the fame thing as to obferve that we entirely fympathize with them; and not to approve of them as fuch, is the fame thing as to obferve that we do not entirely fympathize with them. The man who refents the injuries that have been done to me, and obferves that I refent them precifely as he does, neceffarily approves of my refentment. The man whofe fympathy keeps time to my grief, cannot but admit the reasonablenefs of my forrow. He who admires the fame poem, or the fame picture, and admires them exactly as I do, muft furely allow the juftnefs of

my

my admiration. He who laughs at the fame joke, and laughs along with me, cannot well deny the propriety of my laughter. On the contrary, the perfon who upon these different occafions, either feels no fuch emotion as that which I feel, or feels none that bears any proportion to mine, cannot avoid difapproving my fentiments on account of their diffonance with his own. If my animofity goes beyond what the indignation of my friend can correspond to; if my grief exceeds what his most tender compaffion can go along with; if my admiration is either too high or too low to tally with his own; if I laugh loud and heartily when he only smiles, or, on the contrary, only smile when he laughs loud and heartily; in all these cafes, as foon as he comes from confidering the object, to obferve how I am affected by it, according as there is more or less difproportion between his fentiments and mine, I muft incur a greater or lefs degree of his disapprobation and upon all occafions his own fentiments are the ftandards and measures by which he judges

of mine.

To approve of another man's opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of them. If the fame arguments which convince you convince me likewife, I neceffarily approve of your conviction; and if they do not, I neceffarily disapprove of it; neither can I poffibly conceive that I should do the one without the other. To approve or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of

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others

others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to obferve their agreement or difagreement with our own. But this is equally the cafe with regard to our approbation or difapprobation of the fentiments or paffions of others.

There are, indeed, fome cafes in which we feem to approve without any fympathy or correfpondence of fentiments, and in which, confequently, the fentiment of approbation would feem to be different from the perception of this coincidence. A little attention, however, will convince us that even in thefe cafes our approbation is ultimately founded upon a fympathy or correfpondence of this kind. I fhall give an inftance in things of a very frivolous nature, becaufe in them the judgments of mankind are lefs apt to be verted by wrong fyftems. We may often approve of a jeft, and think the laughter of the company quite juft and proper, though we ourfelves do not laugh, because, perhaps, we are in a grave humour, or happen to have our attention engaged with other objects. We have learned, however, from experience, what fort of pleafantry is upon moft occafions capable of making us laugh, and we observe that this is one of that kind. We approve, therefore, of the laughter of the company, and

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feel that it is natural and fuitable to its object; becaufe, though in our prefent mood we cannot eafily enter into it, we are fenfible that upon most occafions we should very heartily join in it.

The

The fame thing often happens with regard to all the other paffions. A ftranger paffes by us in the ftreet with all the marks of the deepest affliction; and we are immediately told that he has just received the news of the death of his father. It is impoffible that, in this cafe, we should not approve of his grief. Yet it may often happen, without any defect of humanity on our part, that, fo far from entering into the violence of his forrow, we fhould scarce conceive the first movements of concern upon his account. Both he and his father, perhaps, are intirely unknown to us, or we happen to be employed about other things, and do not take time to picture out in our imagination the different circumstances of diftrefs which muft occur to him. We have learned, however, from experience, that such a misfortune naturally excites fuch a degree of forrow, and we know that if we took time to confider his fituation, fully and in all its parts, we should, without doubt, moft fincerely fymphathize with him. It is upon the consciousness of this conditional fympathy, that our approbation of his forrow is founded, even in thofe cafes in which that fympathy, does not actually take place; and the general rules derived from our preceeding experience of what our fentiments would commonly correfpond with, correct upon this, as upon many other occafions, the impropriety of our prefent emotions.

The fentiment or affection of the heart from which any action proceeds, and upon which

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which its whole virtue or vice muft ultimately depend, may be confidered under two different afpects, or in two different relations ; firft, in relation to the caufe which excites it, or the motive which gives occafion to it; and fecondly, in relation to the end which it propofes, or the effect which it tends to produce.

In the fuitableness or unfuitableness, in the proportion or difproportion which the affection feems to bear to the cause or object which excites it, confifts the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the confequent action.

In the beneficial or hurtful nature of the effects which the affection aims at, or tends to produce, confifts the merit or demerit of the action, the qualities by which it is entitled to reward, or is deferving of punish

ment.

Philofophers have, of late years, confidered chiefly the tendency of affections, and have given little attention to the relation which they ftand in to the caufe which excites them. In common life, however, when we judge of any person's conduct, and of the fentiments which directed it, we conftantly confider them under both these afpects. When we blame in another man the exceffes of love, of grief, of refentment, we not only confider the ruinous effects which they tend to produce, but the little occafion which was given for them. The merit of his favourite, we fay, is not fo great, his misfortune is not fo dreadful, his

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