σε ποια τα

circumstance, and of these
law to be, that
precise truth of all recited circumstances is not re-
quired.

But in such things er multitudine signorum colligitur identitas vera, therefore though my box were not sealed, and although the arras had the story of the nativity, and not of the passion, if I had no other box, nor no other suit, the gifts are good; and there is certainty sufficient, for the law doth not expect a precise description of such things as have no certain denomination.

Secondly, Of such things as do admit the distinc tion of name and addition, but the notes fall out to be of equal dignity all of name or addition.

As, prata mea juxta communem fossam in D. whereof the one is true, the other false; or tenemen tum meum in tenura Guilielmi, quod perquisivi de R. C. in predict' indent' specificat', whereof one is true, and two are false; or two are true, and one false. So ad curiam quam tenebat die Mercurii tertio die Marti, whereof the one is true, the other false. In these cases the former rule, er multitudine ne signorum, etc. holdeth not; neither is the placing of the falsity or verity first or last material, but all must be Vide livers true, or else the grant is void; always understood, avant dit that if you can reconcile all the words, and make no falsity, that is quite out of this rule, which hath place only where there is a direct contrariety or falsity not to be reconciled to this rule.

pur cest

auxi.

As if I grant all my land in D. in tenura I. S. which I purchased of I. N. specified in a demise to I. D. and I have land in D. whereof in part of them all these circumstances are true, but I have other lands in D. wherein some of them fail, this grant will not pass all my land in D. for there these are references, and no words of falsity or error, but of limitation and restraint.

REGULA XXV.

Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur.

THERE be two sorts of ambiguities of words, the one is ambiguitas patens, and the other latens. Patens is that which appears to be ambiguous upon the deed or instrument: latens is that which seemeth certain and without ambiguity, for any thing that appeareth upon the deed or instrument; but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth the ambiguity.

Ambiguitas patens is never holpen by averment, and the reason is, because the law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment, which is of inferior account in law; for that were to make all deeds hollow, and subject to averments, and so in effect, that to pass without deed, which the law appointeth shall not pass but by deed.

Therefore if a man give land to I. D. et I. S. et hæredibus, and do not limit to whether of their heirs, it shall not be supplied by averment to whether of them the intention was the inheritance should be limited.

So if a man give land in tail, though it be by will, the remainder in tail, and add a proviso in this manner: Provided that if he, or they, or any of them do any, etc. according to the usual clauses of perpetuities, it cannot be averred upon the ambiguities of the reference of this clause, that the intent of the devisor was, that the restraint should go only to him in the remainder, and the heirs of his body; and that the tenant in tail in possession was meant to be at large. eft of these infinite cases might be put, for it holdeth generally that all ambiguity of words by matter within the deed, and not out of the deed, shall be holpen by construction, or in some case by election, but never by averment, but rather shall make the deed void for uncertainty.

But if it be ambiguitas latens, then otherwise it is: as if I grant my manor of S. to I. F. and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all; but if the truth be, that I have the manors both of South S. and North S. this ambiguity is matter in fact; and therefore it shall be holpen by averment, whether of them ́ was that the party intended should pass.

So if I set forth my land by quantity, then it shall be supplied by election, and not averment.

As if I grant ten acres of wood in sale, where I have an hundred acres, whether I say it in my deed or no, that I grant out of my hundred acres, yet here shall be an election in the grantee, which ten he will take.

And the reason is plain, for the presumption of the law is, where the thing is only nominated by quantity, that the parties had indifferent intentions which should be taken, and there being no cause to help the uncertainty by intention, it shall be holpen by election.

But in the former case the difference holdeth, where it is expressed, and where not; for if I recite, Whereas I am seised of the manor of North S. and South S. I lease unto you unum manerium de S. there it is clearly an election. So if I recite, Whereas I have two tenements in St. Dunstan's, I lease unto you unum tenementum, there it is an election, not averment of intention, except the intent were of an election, which may be specially averred.

Another sort of ambiguitas latens is correlative unto these for this ambiguity spoken of before, is when one name and appellation doth denominate divers things, and the second, when the same thing is called by divers names.

As if I give lands to Christ-Church in Oxford, and the name of the corporation is Ecclesia Christi in universitate Oxford, this shall be holpen by averment, because there appears no ambiguity in the words for this variance is matter in fact, but the averment shall not be of intention, because it doth stand with the words.

For in the case of equivocation the general intent includes both the special, and therefore stands with

the words: but so it is not in variance, and therefore the averment must be of matter, that do endure quantity, and not intention.

As to say, of the precinct of Oxford, and of the University of Oxford, is one and the same, and not to say that the intention of the parties was, that the grant should be to Christ-Church in that University of Oxford.

VOL. IV.

[8]

THE

USE OF THE LAW;

FOR

PRESERVATION

OF OUR

PERSONS, GOODS, AND GOOD NAMES.

ACCORDING TO THE

PRACTICE OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS

OF THIS LAND.

The use of the THE use of the law consisteth principally in these

law,and where

in it principal- three things:

ly consisteth.

Surety to keep the peace.

Action forslan

etc.

I. To secure mens persons from death and violence.

II. To dispose the property of their goods and lands.

III. For preservation of their good names from shame and infamy.

FOR safety of persons, the law provideth that any man standing in fear of another may take his oath before a justice of peace, that he standeth in fear of his life, and the justice shall compel the other to be bound with sureties to keep the peace.

If any man beat, wound, or maim another, or der, battery, give false scandalous words that may touch his credit, the law giveth thereupon an action of the case (for the slander of his good name; and an action of battery, or an appeal of maim, by which recompence shall be recovered, to the value of the hurt, damage or danger.

Appeal of murder given to the next of kin.

If any man kill another with malice, the law giveth an appeal to the wife of the dead, if he had any, or to the next of kin that is heir, in default of a wife; by which appeal the defendant convicted is to suffer death, and to lose all his lands and goods: but if the wife or heir will not sue, or be com