I cannot but suspect some mistake here. For no en lightened advocate for the doctrine in question would be apt to say that sin was hereditary, and yet not hereditary; that it comes to all by generation or natural descent, and yet that natural descent has nothing to do with it, as surely it cannot have, if the depravity of the child is no way connected with the depravity of the parent from whom he has descended. The truth unquestionably is, that we are all connected with Adam, and that his one offence brought sin upon us all; "for by the disobedience of one, many were made sinners." But how are we connected with him, unless by the fact of our being his posterity-his natural descendants? But can we be his descendants, without descending from him through the medium of intervening generations, and consequently without derivation from our immediate parents, one of those generations? It must be strange, therefore, to say that our depravity depends on our connection with Adam, but not on our immediate ancestor, when it obviously depends on both; seeing our very connection with Adam depends on the relation we hold to our immediate ancestor, as one of his descendants. But if any inan has been incautious or absurd enough to make the statement objected to, the doctrine of native depravity itself ought not to be drawn into question in consequence of it. It needs no such statement for its defence, nor is it in the remotest degree connected with any such view of the case.

Fifth. Another objection to this doctrine is found in the language of those who describe the depravity of our nature as something uniform and invariable in all circumstances, ages and individuals, implying, as the objector supposes, that this depravity is equal in all cases, and strictly immutable, being incapable either of addition or diminution. But the whole difficulty here lies in giving an extent of meaning to the terms uniform and

invariable, which nobody ever dreamed of or imagined but the objector himself. Were I to say that reason or conscience, or natural affection, is a uniform and invariable characteristic of man, found in all circumstances, ages and individuals, where the proper period has arrived for its development, would any person understand me to assert that reason, or conscience or affection, was precisely the same thing in all men, at all times and in all circumstances, so that no diversity whatever could exist as to modification or extent? Nothing, surely, could be more strained or absurd than such a construction of my words.

Objection sixth. We are told, says an objector, that original sin is the cause and ground of all actual sin; and yet that original sin is equal, uniform and invariable, in all. Of course that all are equally depraved, and under like temptations must exhibit the very same degree of wickedness, a thing which every one knows is contrary to fact. This is another appalling objection; but the whole force of it depends upon the strained interpretation put upon the words equal, uniform and invariable. Give them the import which, in all such connections, they are manifestly designed to have, and no such absurd or contradictory consequence as the objection contemplates will ever follow. Natural affection, in a very important sense of the term, is uniform and invariable-that is, it belongs to all as a constitutional principle, provided for in the very elements of their being; but it does not always exist with the same strength or intensity. It is, moreover, equally true of all, so that there is an equality in men in this respect, and not a disparity. Nobody contends that it has exactly the same force in all, and at all times; nor is there a man on earth, I presume, that contends that original sin has the same force in all, and at all times, if by original sin be meant depravity of heart, and depravity by nature. It is true that men are

equally destitute of original righteousness. Here there is no disparity; but as to their readiness and eagerness to sin, and to sin in a gross and high-handed manner, there is undoubtedly a difference, which the abettor of original sin may as cheerfully and frankly admit as his opponent.

Seventh. We are asked, too, and with an air of triumph, "If Adam's sin be propagated in the way of natural generation, why were not his other sins, (as well as his first one,) committed before the procreation of his children, propagated to his descendants? and so his penitence and pardon in like manner?

Whether such a question was put from oversight or design, it may be hard to say; but that the point in debate is overlooked is most certain. The question in dispute is, not whether a single act, or more acts than one, are transmitted by propagation, but whether a similar nature, as the cause of similar acts, is so transmitted? When we speak of reason or conscience, as born with a man, or propagated from father to son, we have no reference to this or that particular act of reason or conscience, but to the principles from which such acts flow, and by consequence to the acts themselves, Reason or conscience, we say, is propagated, because involved in that very constitution which appertains to a rational and moral being, and which every man derives from his birth; and having this constitution he is sure to develop it, not in another's acts but his own, and in such acts as correspond to the powers of reason and conscience which he has received. In like manner, those who believe that sin is propagated, do not believe that this or that sin, considered as the personal act of another, is propagated, but only a moral nature, so circumstanced as to secure a sinful conduct in those to whom this nature appertains.

With this explanation of the true nature of the case, it will be easily seen that the objection implied in the

above question has no foundation, but in the abuse of terms.

Eighth. And the same may be said of another objection, taken from the same author, namely: "If propagation be the ground of transmitting sin, then why are not all the sins of all our ancestors, from Adam down to ourselves, brought down upon us, and propagated to us ?" Sure enough. But here the mistake is the same as before; individual acts are supposed to be propagated from one person to another, and not constitutional principles with their attendant circumstances, from which like or similar acts flow. A nature may be transmitted by propagation, along with the being who inherits it; but not the personal act of one, so as to become the personal act of another. This would be to confound all notions of personal distinction, and individual responsibility. No defender of the doctrine of native or hereditary depravity, has occasion to resort to any such absurdity. And to suppose that he has, is to misinterpret the doctrine, and to apply to it language which it neither justifies nor employs.

LECTURE XIII.

EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

WHETHER Christ died for all men, or for a part only? is a question which has been much agitated, since the Reformation, though, according to Milner, the Church, from the earliest ages, rested in the opinion that Christ died for all. He does not except even Augustine, whom Prosper, his admirer and follower, and a strict Predestinarian, represents as maintaining that Christ gave himself a ransom for all;* so far, at least, as to make provision for their salvation, by removing an impediment which would otherwise have proved fatal. The early Christians seemed to go upon the principle, that as salvation was indiscriminately tendered to all, it must have been provided for all, and thus made physically possible to all, where the Gospel comes; otherwise, the Deity would be represented as tendering that to his creatures which was in no sense within their reach, and which they could not possibly attain, whatever might be their dispositions. Among those who leaned strongly to what are called the doctrines of grace, the maxim was adopted, "That Christ's death was sufficient for all, and efficient for the elect." By which they seem to have intended, that while Christ's

• Vol. II., page 445.