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them not, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned; but the spiritual man judgeth all things. Being enlightened from above, he can discern the things of the Spirit so as no natural man can discern them; their intrinsic beauty and glory beam upon his eye, and call forth the purest and warmest feelings of his heart. This constitutes a radical and wide distinction between the natural and spiritual man-a distinction which holds not only between the enewed man and the sensualist, but equally between the renewed man and the unrenewed, however intellectual, moral or refined the latter may be. To this no Calvinist will object; and with the Pelagian we have at present no controversy. I ask, then, what is the import of the term natural as here applied to the unrenewed man, or man as he is by nature? It will doubtless be conceded that it marks in him a state of deep and entire depravity, and that from the commencement of his moral existence. But is this all? Does it not point us to the source of this depravity in the very nature he received at his birth? It cannot for a moment be denied that he received a nature then, both physical and moral, whether all the powers and susceptibilities of it were developed at once or not; nor can it be questioned that this nature laid a foundation both for the existence and the character of his moral acts. The fact, therefore, must be as the Apostle's words here seem to intimate, that man's aversion to spiritual things, nay, his blindness to their intrinsic beauty and excellence, is attributable to the nature he received at his birth, and consequently that he is, as the Apostle teaches elsewhere, by nature a sinner or a child of wrath.

Nor will it avail, by way of objection, to say that the original word here translated natural is xixos and not Queixos, the more common and appropriate term for that which is natural-for xos itself, like xn, from which

it is derived, has often a meaning sufficiently broad to cover the intellectual and moral, as well as the animal part of man, and according to Schleusner, is so employed in the passage before us. Besides, if xxos were more directly and properly descriptive of the animal part of man, it is not supposed by my opponents to be confined to his animal part, but like dag and dagxixos to be comprehensive of the whole man, and designed to mark his moral depravity, consist in what it may-whether in indulgence of animal appetite, or in any of the selfish and malignant passions. But the point to be looked at is, is man xos by nature? Was he born such? Every animal is surely born, whether rational or irrational; everything which has a soul, and which lives by breathing, as the original word signifies, came into being with all its natural powers and propensities through the medium of birth. What more appropriate term, then, could the Apostle have used than he has used, to express the depravity of man, and to indicate that this depravity is original or derived from his birth?

It might be easy to show, that such phrases as the old man, contrasted with the new man-the law of sin, which is in the members, with the law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus-the mind of the flesh, with the mind of the spirit-and other kindred forms of expression, derive a peculiar significancy and force, from the fact of man's inborn or native depravity. This fact supposed, and we see why these terms are employed, and whence they become so full of import on the pages of Revelation. But without this, it is not easy to see how they came into use, and by what means they acquired that significancy which every sound interpreter gives them. But our limits will not allow us to go into a particular illustration. We conclude our examination of Scripture testimony on the subject of man's native depravity, by refer

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ring to some passages which fairly presuppose this, though they do not distinctly assert it.

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This doctrine is involved in the proposition, that like begets like, and the Scripture recognizes the truth of this proposition in the following passages: 1 John v. 1. Every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him." Why so? How does this appear to be a natural and just consequence? Because, like begets like. This is a universal law; and therefore he who is begotten of God is like God. Consequently, if we love the former we shall love the latter also. The propriety and force of this language depends wholly on the admitted fact of like father like son. See also the second chapter of this epistle, verse twenty-ninth. "If ye know that he is righteous (in God), ye know that every one that doeth righteousness is born of him." How should they know this, but upon the supposition that he who is begotten will bear the image of him who begat, and vice versa? As if the Apostle had said, ye may know who the righteous man is born of, from the very fact of his being righteous. His character is proof of his origin—that he was born of God. To the same effect is chapter third, verse ninth: "Whosoever is born of God cannot commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of God." But why cannot he who is born of God commit sin? Because a holy disposition is imparted to him by this new and heavenly birth. He is made to resemble God in his moral feelings and character. So also, chapter fourth, verse seventh: "Let us love one another, for every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God." But how does it appear that every one that loveth is born of God? Because God himself is love, and he that is born of him must be like him, if it be true, as the Apostle seemed to suppose, that like begets like, in things spiritual as well as in things natural.

But to all this it may be said, that mere moral resemblance of one person to another, may lay the foundation for saying that one is the child of the other, and that on this principle it is men are sometimes called the children of God, and sometimes the children of the devil, without any reference being had to the derivation of this resemblance. We cheerfully grant it. But this makes nothing against the argument, that derivation by birth, whether natural or spiritual, is regarded in the Bible as a grand source of moral likeness. If mere resemblance calls up the relation supposed between a parent and his offspring, as we admit is sometimes the case, it is only because it is a known fact, that where this relation actually exists the resemblance is to be looked for, as a matter of course.

In short, there could be no propriety in saying that men are the children of God, or the children of the devil, on the ground of resemblance, were it not an admitted fact that where the relation of parent and child is actually found, there strong points of resemblance are supposed to be found also; in other words, that like begets like. Lay this supposition out of view, and the figure has no foundation in nature, nor out of it.

We have now finished our reference to the Scriptures, on the subject of like begetting like, and more especially as this proposition stands connected with the doctrine of man's native depravity.

That the proof exhibited will be found satisfactory to all can hardly be expected; but that it is both clear and abundant I have, for myself, no sort of doubt. And here I should rest, without adding a word more, were it not that there are some popular objections, to which I wish to make a brief reply.

LECTURE XII.

ON NATIVE DEPRAVITY.

OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

Objection First. To suppose that sin is propagated through the medium of birth or that man is born a sinner, is inconsistent with the very nature of sin. Sin is an act, and can an act be born? It is easy to conceive that a man may be born, with all the elements of his being; but not his acts, and especially his free, moral acts. This objection, as old as Socinus, and perhaps as Pelagius himself, we have always regarded as a mere quibble, intended chiefly for the purpose of throwing dust into the eyes. It is either a play upon the word born, or a total misconception of the meaning of that word. It goes upon the principle that nothing can be born which is not coeval with birth, and nothing in which the subject is not altogether passive. But I ask, where do we learn that nothing can be born with us, which is not coeval with birth? We have shown, in preceding observations, that such a limitation of the phrase is not authorized by the current use of language in the Bible, or elsewhere. On the contrary, that whatever is provided for in our birth, and as a natural and unfailing consequence flows from it, may justly be said to be born, and born with us. And let me here add, that in conformity with this extended

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