one's own hand? To this we reply, that the difference is great, in our apprehension; first, as it relates to a matter of fact—and secondly, as it concerns the moral character of God.

(1.) It makes a great difference in point of fact, or as it respects the nature and order of the universe. In the one case we have creatures who are distinct and separate from their Creator-real, positive beings, with their appropriate powers--beings which are not God, but the workmanship of God, called into existence by his sovereign power, and continued in existence by his almighty agency immediately exerted, or by the constitution given to them in the very act of creation. In the other case, we have, strictly speaking, no creatures, but only a succession of events, immediately produced by the agency of the Deity; a supposition full of inexplicable difficulties, overturning all our notions of matter and mind, and of the relations which subsist between creatures and their Creator; a supposition equally incompatible with the physical and moral government of God, and which, if pursued to its legitimate results, could scarcely fail to land us in the most absolute and deplorable scepticism.

(2d.) It makes a great difference, also, as it concerns the moral character of God. For if second causes have no power, then they do nothing, and all is done by the immediate agency of the Great First Cause; or, which is the same thing, God is the doer of all that is done in the universe, whether it be good or evil. But can such a doctrine be received for a moment? Who is prepared to say, that the action of every moral being, if being there can be, other than God himself, is only the action of the Great Supreme? that nothing is done in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth, but what is done by his power immediately ex

erted; and when done, is referrible to him as its only efficient cause? Surely, there must be some things done which neither God nor holy creatures can do. There are many falsehoods told, many deceitful and ensnaring motives presented, many. acts of injustice and cruelty performed, any one of which, to ascribe to God, would be little less than blasphemy. Take the case of falsehood. Does it make no difference, whether God or man pronounce it? Man may, and often does pronounce it ; but with God it is impossible, as it is in direct opposition to his immutable rectitude. We want no assistance from metaphysics to perceive in a moment that it is not the same thing for an act to be done by a creature of God, and to be done by God himself. The things are as widely separated, as if the creature was underived in his being, or as if, in his actions, he accomplished no design of the Almighty, or was able to defeat his purposes. He acts by virtue of his own powers, and under his own proper responsibility; and the morality of his actions is ascribable to himself, and to himself only. But there could be no truth in this statement, if the creature were not an agent distinct and separate from God, and a moral agent possessing powers adapted to moral action. Say that the creature has powers, and he will certainly do something, unless his powers are powerless powers, which is an absurdity. Deny that he has powers, and you assert that God does all-all that is right, and all that is wrong in the universe. If an ensnaring motive is presented, be it ever so false or so foul, it is God who presents it, for the creature can do nothing, because he is powerless. If this motive is cherished or embraced, it is not the creature who cherishes or embraces it, for this is to do something, and something, of course, which requires power of some kind; but the creature has absolutely none, and he, it would seem, must be absolutely

nothing, God and his acts constituting the sum of all being.

NOTE. It should be stated, in justice to the author, that to the original manuscript was prefixed the following note:

"There may be natural power to a thing, where there is not all the power necessary to the existence of that thing. In some instances, moral power also is requisite, and where this is the case, natural or physical power, be it ever so great, is but a conditioned power, and cannot, of itself, be a power absolute or an adequate cause. It is only a power if. Enough it may be, of that sort of power, but not enough, in all the circumstances of the case, to make sure of the proposed or contemplated effect."

LECTURE IX.

ON THE FALL OF MAN.

WERE it possible to consider the scriptural account of the fall, apart from all human philosophy, I should think it extremely desirable. First, it would evince a proper disposition on our part to submit to the testimony of God; and, secondly, it would be likely to conduct us to a true and safe result. But in present circumstances, I know not that this can well be expected. Every man has his own philosophy, and he can hardly escape its influence if he would. Insensibly to himself, and almost necessarily, he brings it to bear on the interpretation of the sacred text, and hence such a variety of interpretations of passages relating to the subject before us. God speaks plainly enough, not, indeed, in the language of a deep and recondite philosophy, but in a language adapted to the common apprehension of men, as all parties admit; and hence all parties appeal to the Sacred Word as both obvious and decisive. It requires but little observation, however, to perceive the influence of a previous philosophy in giving meaning and emphasis to the Divine record. If its literal sense does not accord with the doctrine or opinion to be supported, then it must be understood figuratively. If the figurative sense be obnoxious, then a literal sense must be maintained, whatever seeming probabilities lie against it. Sometimes the untoward

passage must be treated as elliptical, and sometimes as redundant, as the necessity of the case may seem to demand. Nor does the ingenious expositor find it difficult to show that the soundest rules of criticism have provided for exactly his mode of interpretation. The consequence is, it avails little for two theorists to sit down and shoot texts at each other, while each is strong in (the principles of) his philosophy, and possessed of the ordinary skill of modifying and interpreting the language of Holy Writ. The free and popular language of the Bible, though the best that could be devised for the purposes intended, gives ample scope for this species of dialectics. A mere glance at the controversies which have been going on in the Christian world, from time immemorial, is abundantly sufficient to justify these remarks. Their correctness, indeed, is evinced from our every days' experience, where any religious topic is made the subject of debate. Nor is it probable that soon, if ever, it will be otherwise. Our philosophy, right or wrong, takes a powerful hold of us, and gives complexion to the results of our theological inquiries. We may regret that it is so; we may put ourselves upon our guard against it; but while we have the common infirmities of humanity, I fear we shall never be willing, with the perfect simplicity of children, to hear God speak, and to take our notions of revealed truth exclusively from his lips.

We might derive an argument from this statement to review our philosophy, and to do our very utmost to place it upon a sure foundation, knowing the influence it is likely to exert, imperceptibly to ourselves, in our interpretations of the Book of God. But I choose only to say, let us beware of that philosophizing and speculative spirit which sometimes renders us proud and unteachable, unwilling to submit our understandings to the clear and unequivocal voice of Scripture, unless it happen