the healthful eye? nor wringing a man's nose the cause of its spouting blood?

Besides, when the vulgar are deceived in the cases above mentioned, what is it that deceives them? Is it believing the report of their senses? and are they undeceived at last by rejecting that report? Nothing can be wider from the fact. Their senses have not reported falsely, nor have they fallen into error by receiving that report, and receiving it with the most unqualified confidence-a thing, by the way, which no man can help. Their error originated in an entirely different source—in the inferences they drew from the natural appearances of objects. These appearances were correctly reported, so far as the senses simply were concerned; or rather these appearances are nothing different from the report of sense, and are, in all cases doubtless, the same to the philosopher and to the peasant. The aspect of the sun, for instance, is not different to the eye of the one, from what it is to the eye of the other, but the difference lies in their individual and separate conclusions. And wherefore this difference? Not because the philosopher questions the testimony of sense, for that he cannot do; but because he compares this testimony in different cases and circumstances, and comes to a conclusion which the comparison, in his judgment, authorizes.* He believes in natural appearances as much as the vulgar, and his sensitive impressions are in no respect different from theirs. Were it not thus, he would have no means of detecting erroneous conclusions concerning outward objects, whether made by himself or by others. This is too obvious to require farther elucidation, and therefore we remark that it is not difficult to distinguish between what are sometimes called illusions of the senses, or more properly, incorrect inferences from the testimony of sense, and those commonsense notions, or primary beliefs, which no man can shake

* Beattie on Truth. Part I.

off, if he would. The former admit of correction, from new observation, or from careful comparison of various observations, whether in relation to the same or different objects. The latter remain firm and unalterable, whatever pains may be taken to annihilate or modify them. Place their objects in what light you will, raise your doubts, and bring forth your strong reasons, still nature is true to her purpose, and these instinctive principles maintain their ground. Now, what we contend is, that a belief in the efficiency of second causes is one of these principles. It is early, deep, universal, and incapable of being eradicated-just as really and truly as the belief of causation, and of an external world. Men can be found, indeed, who deny them all; but do they not contradict the voice of nature, if that voice can be learned from the sentiments of mankind in all ages and nations? Nay, do they not contradict the inward convictions of their own minds, if their actions can be taken as a true index of their convictions?

That fire fuses metals, and water melts salt, are facts, we have said, which no man can disprove; but are we not entitled to say, that they are facts which every man, from the very constitution of his mind, is compelled to believe? Can he any more doubt, that it is a quality of fire to fuse metals, and of water to melt salt, than he can doubt the existence of the substances of which these qualities are predicated? But Berkeley, it may be said, doubted both; he believed in no material substances or qualities, nor in anything which may be denominated an external world. True, such was his theory; but what was his practice? Did he act upon his own principles ? His philosophy said there was no external world; that what we call sensible things are merely our own sensations, produced by no external object, but by the immediate agency of God. But did he believe this when he attempted to argue with his fellow-men, whom he must

have considered as existing without, while yet he had no greater evidence of their existence than of other physical objects around him, and no evidence at all, but upon the testimony of sense.

Into a like inconsistency do they fall, who deny the efficiency of second causes; for, while they profess to regard them as powerless, they act towards them every moment as if they believed them possessed of an inherent and unremitting energy.

The whole of the preceding argument goes upon the principle that the efficiency of second causes is a commonsense notion, deeply engraven upon the human mind, and showing itself in the very structure of language, not only in modifying some of its less essential forms, but in giving birth to first principles, and shaping the very groundwork. Nor can we readily be persuaded that a sentiment at once so radical and universal can be accounted for, but by supposing it a dictate of nature, the result of that reason and common understanding which God has bestowed upon mankind.

[NOTE A.] The sentiment advanced in this place, and in other parts of the Lecture is, that whatever is regarded as the regular antecedent of any change, is instantly recognized by the mind as the efficient cause of the change; and that this is the unbiased voice of reason, or the dictate of common sense, from which there lies no appeal. If this statement be correct, it cannot fail to be perceived, that the efficiency of second causes is placed on as firm a basis as the doctrine of cause and effect, or the fact of an external world. To this statement, however, it has been objected that the supposed antecedent is not always the real antecedent; of course, that the mind is sometimes mistaken in its reference, regarding that as the proximate cause which, in fact, is not that cause. Will not this abate our confidence in the argument for the efficiency of second causes, drawn from the common and prevailing sentiment, that the known or supposed antecedent is truly an efficient cause? If the mind may mistake in its reference in one case, why not in another? if it does not intuitively and universally detect the true efficient in the case, how can we be sure that its dictates are not wholly fallacious?

Our reply is, that though the mind may mistake as to the proximate cause of a change, it does not thence follow, that it mistakes as to the efficiency of the cause to which the change is referred. The mistake lies in the proximity of the cause to the effect, not in the productive power of the cause, to which the effect is attributed. The common opinion is, that fire fuses metals, and water melts salt; but suppose it was ascertained that these substances produce their respective results through

the intervention of a medium or principle not heretofore discovered? Their powers would not be less real, but their agency would be less immediate than is now generally supposed.

Or take another example. Every man believes that his will is concerned as a cause in the free and unconstrained motion of his hand. He considers the muscles of this organ as obedient to his will, and subjected to his control. Nor is his belief, as to the efficiency of his will, in any measure altered, when he learns that the affection of the nerves connected with the organ constitutes another link in the chain. According to his first impression, his volition was the immediate antecedent to the contraction of the muscles which give motion to the hand. Now he finds the affection of the nerves as prior to that contraction, and necessary to its occurrence. But though the train is lengthened, the causes concerned are not less efficient, nor does he ascribe less power to his will.

LECTURE VII.

ON SECOND CAUSES.

ARE SECOND CAUSES EFFICIENT CAUSES?

In the preceding Lecture, we adverted to the different answers which had been given to this question; and stated that before the time of Descartes, all mankind, both learned and unlearned, believed second causes to be efficient, producing the changes which they seem to produce that since that period, many philosophers have professed to regard them as powerless, and the mere antecedents or signs of change.

We examined, at some length, the opinion of Dr. Reid and Professor Stewart, who maintain the efficiency of second causes in the moral, but deny it in the physical world. We attempted to show that their doctrine was unsupported by facts, and incompatible with itself; and that, to be consistent on this subject, we must adopt one of two propositions, either that second causes have power in both worlds, or in neither world; or, which comes to the same thing, either that God is the only efficient cause in the universe-producing by his immediate agency all the changes we see-or that second causes have power, and as truly in matter as in mind.

We adopted the latter proposition, and alleged in favor of it the well-known fact that mankind, from the