is a perception of obligation; and the perception of conformity, or non-conformity, is a perception of having done good or evil.

[NOTE A.] But some may suppose that this writer makes moral evil to consist in two things, and not in one; namely, in a man's doing wrong, when he does as he pleases, and his pleasure's being wrong; or, in other words, in having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart: and by the same rule, that virtue must consist in two things-in a man's having his heart right, and doing right from his heart. He admits, indeed, that such are the common notions of mankind, who do not always carefully separate their conceptions on this subject. There are certain actions, overt actions, which they esteem right or wrong, but not as separate from the deliberate choice of the mind from which they proceeded. These actions must be voluntary in their judgment, or they would be neither blame nor praise worthy: of course, their moral character, so far as they have any, must be derived from the fact that they were deliberately chosen; and when they come to inquire into the character of this choice, which they pronounce either good or bad, they take into view the principle or motive from which it originates. It is a good choice, or a bad choice, as it was moved or excited by a good or bad feeling. This alone marks its intent or design; and on this the mind fixes as that which is essential to its moral character. If the intent be good, the choice was good; if the intent be evil, the choice was evil. And though the vulgar do not ordinarily separate their conceptions in this manner, yet they show, by their language, in a thousand forms, that they have such conceptions; and that they trace all moral good or evil up to the heart, or the state of the affections; and that, in their judgment, there is neither virtue nor vice apart from these. That this was the sentiment of Edwards himself, there can be no doubt, since he repeatedly intimates that it is the disposition of the man which gives character to the man; and since it is one of his cardinal points, "that principles do not derive their goodness from actions, but actions from principles," while he expressly declares that a good choice is no farther good than the disposition from which it flows.

LECTURE IV.

ON CREATION.

In our examination of the Divine decrees, we have seen that they are necessarily universal, reaching alike to all beings and events, and through all time; that in the order of nature, they precede whatsoever comes to pass through the agency of God, whether that agency be exerted either more immediately or remotely. The works of God are, of course, the development of his decrees, and may be comprehended under two grand divisionsthe works of creation, and the works of providence. Nothing which God does, or in any way causes to be done, but may be included under one or the other of these divisions.

As to the work of creation, it has been defined, "God's making all things of nothing, by the word of his power, in the space of six days, and all very good." No objection can be taken to this definition, if it is intended to comprehend the whole of God's work, in giving birth to materials, as well as in giving form, for it is manifest that animals and vegetables were created from matter already in existence.

The original word to create, as well as its kindred forms, is used with considerable latitude in the Scriptures, as may be seen by referring to Lexicographers.

According to Parkhurst, this word denotes the production of either substance or form-the creation, or accretion of substance or matter.

(1.) He gives it the sense of creating, or producing into being, Genesis, i. 1, where it is said, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." This cannot relate to form, he remarks, because it follows in the next verse, that the earth was without form, or in loose atoms. He assigns to it the same meaning in the twentyseventh verse, where man is said to be made in the image of God, because this had respect to the spiritual and immortal part of man.

(2.) He gives it the sense of forming by an accretion or concretion of matter, Genesis, i. 21, where God is said to create the monsters of the deep.

(3.) A third sense which he ascribes to it, is to perform somewhat that is wonderful, or extraordinary-to make, as it were, a new creation; Numbers, xvi. 30: "But if God create a creation"-that is, "if he shall work an unprecedented miracle." See also, Exodus,

xxxiv. 10, and Jeremiah, xxxi. 22.

*

(4.) He gives this word the sense, also, of renewing, or making anew; of preparing and adorning, which shows that the sacred writers have used it with considerable variety of meaning.

Gesenius gives much the same account as to the import of this word. Its first sense, he remarks, is to hew, or hew out; and that in some of its forms, it is used to signify being born. He allows it the sense of smooth, and to make smooth, but more commonly to form, or to make, though he says nothing as to the mode of forming, whether with, or without, pre-existing materials.

Pictet has endeavored to show that there are only two senses in which the word create can be understood strictly and properly; the one, when it describes that work of God by which he drew something from nothing,

and the other, when it marks that operation by which God makes a thing different from what it was before-and where there was no previous disposition to the change.

It is a marvelous thing, he remarks, that a small nut should produce a great tree-nevertheless, because the nut contains the semen or germ of the tree, we do not call this a creation, but a generation. But to make a living man from a dead stone, would be a creation. It is a thing which surpasses the powers of nature, and there is none but God, who could, of stones, raise up children to Abraham. In the last sense, he supposes it is said that God created man of the dust of the earth, and that he formed Eve from one of Adam's ribs. For neither the dust nor the rib was naturally capable of receiving the form which God subsequently gave. There was here no germ, no previous disposition to the change which was produced; no such preparation as nature demands in her subjects, when she would exhibit them in a new form. Whence it would appear, that no less power is required in this second kind of creation, than in the first; and that both demand a power which is infinite."

Such works we cheerfully concede, are properly denominated a creation, and clearly indicate a power no less than infinite. But we see no reason for limiting the word create, or creation, to such extraordinary operations. Most certainly, neither in the Scriptures, nor in the customary forms of speech, is the term thus limited. Not unfrequently is it used by the sacred writers to express God's works of providence, where no extraordinary change is produced, but only such modification, or disposition of things, as occur in a regular train of his operations. At the same time, it is not to be doubted, that it is sometimes used to signify the production of something out of nothing, or giving existence where previously there was none. It has this meaning, most obviously, when Moses says, "In the beginning God

created the heavens and the earth, and the earth was without form, and void." (Genesis, i. 1.) Here we are directed not only to the cause, but to the beginning of things; not to that state which they afterwards assumed under the forming hand of their Creator, when the work was complete, but to the bringing into existence the first principles of things—the materials, so to speak, of which the several forms of organized being were fashioned by the Almighty.

Other passages of Scripture point us to the same fact, no less obviously, though not perhaps with the same clearness and precision. When St. John says, “In the beginning was the word, or the λoyos; the word was with God, and the word was God. All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made," he plainly carries us up to the same high original of created existence, as Moses had done before him. The λoyos who was in the beginning with God, is spoken of as the immediate and efficient cause of all things that were made, or began to be. Paul, also, in distinctly ascribing to Christ the creation of all things in heaven and earth, whether they be visible, or invisible, clearly indicates a production from nothing. He declares, moreover, "that Christ was before all things, and that by him all things consist."

To understand this passage with reference to the mere organization of things, would not only be an unreasonable limitation of the Apostle's meaning, but would suppose a sense which could have no application to the invisible part of Christ's workmanship, to wit, his creation of angels, as is commonly understood by thrones, dominions, principalities and powers. Besides, how could Christ be before all things, if some things existed antecedent to his creative act, and existed as the materials upon which his power was exerted?

That the Apostle intended to speak of a creation from