because it may no doubt have been added afterwards; and the word partitionem at the end of the paragraph in page 443 may seem to imply that it was meant for the Partitiones Scientiarum, and therefore written after the plan of the Instauratio Magna had been laid out in its ultimate form.

The miscellaneous character of these meditations makes the loss of the rest of less consequence. It is easy to strike into the argument of each, and to refer it to its proper place in Bacon's philosophy. It may be convenient however, as they are for the most part without explanatory titles, to give here a list of the several pieces, with a note of the subjects to which they refer.

FIRST FRAGMENT.

1. (Cog. 3.) Of the limits and end of Knowledge: the same argument which is handled in the first chapter of Valerius Terminus, and the opening of the Advancement of Learning. (The beginning wanting.)

7. (Cog. 9.) Of the error in supposing a difference in point of eternity and mutability between things celestial and things sublunary.

8. (Cog. 10.) Of Natural History considered as the groundwork of Natural Philosophy. (Imperfect

at the end.)

SECOND FRAGMENT.

1. (Cog. 8.) That general consent affords no presumption of truth in matters intellectual.

2. (Cog. 9.) Of the error of supposing that conversancy with particulars is below the dignity of the human mind.

3. (Cog. 10.) The exposition of the fable of Midas. (Not included in the De Sapientiâ Veterum.)

THIRD FRAGMENT.

1. Of wisdom in the business of life. (The beginning wanting.)

2. That the quantum of matter is always the same. 3. Of the sympathy between bodies with sense and bodies without.

4. Of apparent rest, and solidity and fluidity.

The notes to these pieces, and the explanatory remarks within brackets, are mine.

J. S.

VOL. V.

28

COGITATIONES DE SCIENTIA HUMANA.

THE FIRST FRAGMENT.1

Quod

a Deo defectionem homini insinuavit. vero ad terminos sobrietatis attinet, eos demum legitimos et veros esse censemus, qui sensus aditum ad divina prohibeant; ut jam dictum est. Si enim per alas sensus male conglutinatas ad Dei naturam, vias, voluntatem, regimen, et reliqua mysteria, tanquam ex propinquo audacius conspicienda, superbo volatu efferamur, præcipitium certum nos manet. Atque hoc est quod per fallaciam philosophice et gloriæ oppressionem cavere jubemur. Quicquid vero non est Deus, sed pars Universi aut Creatura, hujus certe contemplatio et scientia obscuritate sæpius et difficultate removetur, sed nullo edicto separatur. Certe Scriptura, post vicissitudines rerum et temporum commemoratas, ad extremum subjungit: Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo, et mundum tradidit disputationibus eorum; ut tamen non inveniat homo quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem ubi satis aperte significat, tradi certe mundum hominum contemplationibus et controversiis, et infinitas

1 Additional MSS. Brit. Mus. 4258. fo. 219.

2 He has been speaking, probably, of the nature of the temptation which led to the fall of man; viz. the promise that he should be as God, knowing good and evil.

et abditas Naturæ operationes posse erui; opus autem quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem, id est legem Naturæ summariam, quæ instar puncti verticalis Pyramidis est, in quo omnia coeunt in unum; hoc inquam, non aliud quicquam, ab Intellectu humano seponi. Nam ut idem Author affirmat, Lucerna Dei est spiraculum hominis quo quæque interiora pervestigat; et rursus ait, Gloriam Dei esse rem celare, gloriam Regis autem rem investigare; non aliter ac si Divina Natura innocenti ac benevolo puerorum ludo delectaretur, qui ideo se abscondunt ut inveniantur, ac animam humanam sibi collusorem in hoc ludo pro sua in homines indulgentia et bonitate elegerit. Itaque Deum Fidei, mundum sensus et scientiæ humanæ, vera objecta esse ponimus. Quod vero ad artificium illud attinet, ut ex ignoratione causarum major sit manus divinæ recognitio et veneratio; hoc nil aliud est quam Deo per mendacium gratificari velle, quo ille prorsus nostro non eget. Etiam et illæ cogitationes parum piæ sunt, si quis Dei vicem timeat, ne religio detrimentum accipiat. Nam hæc rationem animalem et fidei inopiam sapiunt, et religionem tacite quodammodo imposturæ insimulant [ac] si periculum ei ab inquisitione veritatis subsit. Neque metuat quisquam ut Sensui Fides magis ex diametro opponi possit quam per ea quæ nunc, virtute afflatus divini, creduntur; mundi creationem ex nihilo; Dei incarnationem; carnis resurrectionem. Atque nobis certe perfectissimum est, Naturalem Philosophiam, post verbum Dei, certissimam superstitionis medicinam, eandem (quod mirum videri possit) probatissimum fidei alimentum esse; quantoque altius penetret, tanto fortius animos hominum religione perfundere. Nam in limine philosophiæ, in causis proximis moram faciendo,