so often admired in classic sculpture, and to ask themselves whether the same gestures, &c. would be beautiful in all characters, (as would necessarily be the case, if Beauty in this respect arose from any definite conformations) :—whether the gesture of the Apollo would be beautiful in the Hercules, or in the Jupiter; or the attitudes of the Venus beautiful in the forms of Juno or Minerva? Even in the lowest employment of the art of painting, (in portrait-painting) we feel the necessity of this correspondence of attitude to character; and we blame the painter whenever he chooses any attitude or position which appears to us inconsistent with the character of mind which is expressed by the Countenance. In feeling and in expressing, on the contrary, this correspondence; in selecting the attitude or gesture which suits best with the character he repregents, consists one of the chief evidences of the genius of the artist; and by this means the portrait of an obscure individual

may sometimes possess the value of an original composition.

I shall only add to these illustrations, by requesting my readers to observe, in the last place, that in a great variety of cases, our sense of the Beauty of the same attitude or gesture in the same individual, is actually determined, not by the appearances which are exhibited to the eye, but by our opinion of the propriety or impropriety of the emotion which it expresses. Indignation, for instance, or rage, or revenge, are passions capable of producing very sublime attitudes and gestures; and when these passions arise from great or noble motives, the attitudes by which they are expressed are felt as sublime. Let us witness the same attitudes when they are expressive of little, or trivial, or degrading sentiments, and they immediately become painful or ridiculous. The gestures of Don Quixote in encountering the windmills, or in routing the flock of sheep, are precisely the same with those that must

have been employed by the Amadises or the Orlandos of romance; yet they would be beheld certainly with very different emotions. The attitudes of grief, of sorrow, of melancholy, are beautiful in an extreme degree, particularly in the female form. Tell us, however, that they arise from some trifling cause, from the disappointment of a party, the loss of a trinket, or the success of a rival Beauty, and we feel no emotion but those of contempt or ridicule. The gestures of almost all the gay and exhilarating passions are beautiful; and our sympathy with happiness is so great, that we never observe them without the disposition to believe that they are just. Inform us, however, that all these expressions of happiness arise from some childish, or some worthless motive; that the philosopher has only discovered a new butterfly; or that the warrior has only got a step in the army; that the joy of the youthful Beauty is only occasioned by the present of a new dress, and that of the

matron by a fifty pound prize in the lottery, &c., and the gestures we formerly admired become at once either ludicrous or disgusting. Observations of this kind may be extended to every emotion or passion; and I think it will be found, in every case, that no gesture or attitude expressive of such passions or emotions, is permanently and originally beautiful; that our opinion of this Beauty varies according to circumstances; and that the circumstance, in every case, which determines our sentiment of Beauty, is our opinion of the justness or propriety of the emotion which such attitude or such gesture signifies.

SECTION V.

Of Grace.

THE preceding illustrations are intended to shew, that the Sublimity or Beauty of attitude and gesture, arises not from any causes of a material kind, nor from any law by which certain material appearances are immediately productive of these sentiments, but from their being adapted to express, and being felt as expressive of amiable, or interesting, or respectable qualities of the Human Mind. In concluding those illustrations, I have completed all that I had properly in view in that investigation.

There is, however, a quality of which the Human Form is susceptible, and which is occasionally found both in its positions and in its motions, which is not sufficiently accounted for by this theory. This quality is