tions allied to this peculiar emotion. Whatever may be the character of the original emotion, the images which succeed seem all to have a relation to this character; and if we trace them back, we shall discover not only a connection between the individual thoughts of the train, but also a general relation among the whole, and a conformity to that peculiar emotion which first excited them.

The train of thought, therefore, which takes place in the mind, upon the prospect of objects of sublimity and beauty, may be considered as consisting in a regular or consistent train of ideas of emotion, and as distinguished from our ordinary trains of thought, 1st, In respect of the Nature of the ideas of which it is composed, by their being ideas productive of Emotion: and 2dly, In respect of their Succession, by their being distinguished by some general principle of connection, which subsists through the whole extent of the train.

The truth of the account which I have

now given of the nature of that train of thought which attends the emotions of sublimity and beauty, must undoubtedly at last be determined by its conformity to general experience and observation. There are some considerations, however, of a very obvious and familiar kind, which it may be useful to suggest to the reader, for the purpose of affording him a method of investi gating with accuracy the truth of this ac

count.

If it is true that the ideas which compose that train of thought, which attends the emotions of Taste, are uniformly ideas of Emotion, then it ought in fact to be found, that no objects or qualities are experienced to be beautiful or sublime, but such as are productive of some simple Emotion.

If it is true that such trains of thought are uniformly distinguished by some general principle of connection, then it ought also to be found, that no Composition of objects or qualities produces such emotions,

in which this Unity of character or of emotion is not preserved.

I shall endeavour, at some length, to illustrate the truth of both these propositions.

SECTION II.

THAT no objects, or qualities in objects, are, in fact, felt either as beautiful or su blime, but such as are productive of some Simple Emotion, seems evident from the following familiar considerations.

I.

Wherever the Emotions of Sublimity or Beauty are felt, I believe it will be found, that some affection is uniformly excited by the presence of the object, before the more complex Emotion of Beauty is felt; and that if no such affection is excited, no Emotion of Beauty or Sublimity is produced. The truth of this observation may be illus trated, both from common language, and common experience.

1. If

any man were to assert, that some object, though positively indifferent or un

interesting, was yet beautiful or sublime, every one would consider it as asserting an absurdity. If, on the other hand, he were to assert, that the object had neither beauty nor sublimity to him, because there was no quality in it which could give him any emotion, I apprehend we should not only clearly understand his meaning, but very readily allow his reason; and if the object were such as appeared to us in the light either of Sublimity or Beauty, and we wished to make him sensible of it, the way that we should naturally take, would be to point out to him some affecting or interesting quality, which we imagined he had overlooked, and which we felt was the foundation of our own emotion.

There is undoubtedly a very great difference between the Emotion of Taste, and any Simple Emotion, as of Cheerfulness, Tenderness, Melancholy, Solemnity, Elevation, Terror, &c. as such emotions are frequently felt without any sentiment of Beauty