Expressions more definite and precise. I am unwilling, however, to swell these very imperfect remarks, by illustrations which every one can so easily prosecute for himself. From the whole, I am induced to conclude, that Music is productive to us of two distinct and separate Pleasures:

1. Of that mechanical Pleasure, which by the constitution of our nature accompanies the perception of a regular succession of related Sounds.

2. Of that Pleasure which such composi tions of Sound may produce, either by the Expression of some pathetic or interesting Affection, or by being the sign of some pleasing or valuable Quality, either in the Composition or the Performance.

That it is to this last Source the Beauty or Sublimity of Music is to be ascribed, or that it is Beautiful or Sublime only when it

expressive of some pleasing or interesting Quality, I hope is evident from the preceding observations.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Objects of Sight.

THE greatest part of the external objects, in which we discover Sublimity or Beauty, are such as are perceived by the Sense of Sight. It has even been imagined by some Philosophers, that it is to such objects only that the name of Beauty is properly applied, and that it is only from analogy that the same term is applied to the objects of our other Senses. This opinion, however, seems at first sight ill-founded. The terms Beauty and Sublimity are applied by all men to Sounds, and even sometimes to smells. In our own experience, we very often find, that the same Emotion is produced by Sounds, which is produced by Forms or Colours; and the nature of language sufficiently shows, that

ence.

this is conformable also to general experiThere seems no reason therefore for limiting the objects of Sublimity or Beauty to the sole class of visible objects.

It must however be acknowledged, that by far the greatest number of these objects are such as we discover by means of this Sense; nor does it seem difficult to assign the reason of this superiority. By the rest of our senses, we discover only single qualities of objects; but by the Sense of Seeing, we discover all that assemblage of qualities which constitute, in our imaginations, the peculiar nature of such objects. By our other senses, we discover, in general, such qualities, only when the bodies are in contact with us; but the Sense of Sight affords us a very wide field of observation, and enables us to make them the objects of attention, when they are at very considerable distances from ourselves. It is natural, therefore, that the greater power of this Sense should dispose us to greater confi

dence in it, and that the qualities of bodies which we discover by means of it, should more powerfully impress themselves upon our imagination and memory, than those single qualities which we discover by the means of our other Senses. The visible qualities of objects accordingly, become to us not only the distinguishing characteristics of external bodies, but they become also in a great measure the Signs of all their other qualities; and by recalling to our minds the qualities signified, affect us in some degree with the same Emotion which the objects themselves can excite. Not only the smell of the Rose, or the Violet, is expressed to us by their Colours and Forms; but the utility of a Machine, the elegance of a Design, the proportion of a column, the speed of the Horse, the ferocity of the Lion, even all the qualities of the human mind, are naturally expressed to us by certain visible appearances; because our experience has taught us, that such qualities are connected

with such appearances, and the presence of the one immediately suggests to us the idea of the other. Such visible qualities, there fore, are gradually considered as the Signs of other qualities, and are productive to us of the same Emotions with the qualities they signify.

But, besides this, it is also to be observ. ed, that by this sense, we not only discover the nature of individual objects, and therefore naturally associate their qualities with their visible appearance; but that by it also we discover, the relation of objects to each other; and that hence a great variety of objects in nature become expressive of qualities which do not immediately belong to themselves, but to the objects with which we have found them connected. Thus, for instance, it is by this sense we discover that the Eagle inhabits among Rocks and Mountains; that the Red-breast leaves the Woods in Winter, to seek shelter and food among the dwellings of men; that the song of the