ESSAY II. OF THE SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY OF THE MATERIAL WORLD. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. Ir the illustrations in the preceding Essay are just, if that exercise of mind which takes place when the Emotions of Beauty or Sublimity are felt consists in the prosecution of a regular train of Ideas of Emotion, and if no other objects are in fact productive of the Emotions of Taste, but such as are fitted to produce some simple Emotion, there arises a question of some difficulty, and of very considerable importance, viz. What is the source of the SUBLIMITY and BEAUTY of the MATERIAL WORLD? It cannot be doubted, that many objects of the Material World are productive of the Emotions of Sublimity and Beauty: some of the fine arts are altogether employed about material objects; and far the greater part of the instances of Beauty or Sublimity which occur in every man's experience, are found in matter, or in some of its qualities. On the other hand, I think it must be allowed, that Matter in itself is unfitted to produce any kind of emotion. The various qualities of matter are known to us only by means of our external senses; but all that such powers of our nature convey, is Sensation and Perception; and whoever will take the trouble of attending to the effect which such qualities, when simple and unassociated, produce upon his mind, will be satisfied, that in no case do they produce Emotion, or the exercise of any of his affections. The common language of mankind upon this subject, perfectly coincides with this observation. Such qualities, when simple, are always spoken of as producing sensation, but in no case as producing emotion; and although perhaps the general word Feeling (as applied both to our external and internal senses) may sometimes be used ambiguously, yet if we attend to it, we shall find, that, with regard to material qualities, it is uniformly used to express Sensation, and that, if we substitute Emotion for it, every man will perceive the mistake. The smell of a rose, the colour of scarlet, the taste of a pine-apple, when spoken of merely as qualities, and abstracted from the objects in which they are found, are said to produce agreeable Sensations, but not agreeable Emotions. In the same manner, the smell of asafoetida, or the taste of aloes, when spoken of as abstract qualities, are uniformly said to produce unpleasing Sensations, but not unpleasing Emotions. If |