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ence of advantage in the choice and constitution of the two habits will shew itself. Solitude comes to the one clothed with melancholy; to the other it brings liberty and quiet. You will see the one fretful and restless, at a loss how to dispose of his time, till the hour come round that he can forget himself in bed; the other easy and satisfied, taking up his book, or his pipe, as soon as he finds himself alone; ready to admit any little amusement that casts up, or to turn his hands and attention to the first business that presents itself; or content without either to sit still, and let his trains of thought glide indolently through his brain, without much use, perhaps, or pleasure, but without bankering after any thing better, and without irritation. A reader, who has inured himself to books of science and argumentation, if a novel, a well written pamphlet, an article of news, a narrative of a curious voyage, or the journal of a traveller, fall in his way, sits down to the repast with relish; enjoys his entertainment while it lasts, and can return, when it is over, to his graver reading, without distaste. Another, with whom nothing will go down but works of humour and pleasantry, or whose curiosity must be interested by perpetual novelty, will consume a bookseller's window in half a forenoon; during which time he is rather in search of diversion than diverted ; and as books to his taste are few, and short, and rapidly read over, the stock is soon exhausted, when he is left without resource from this principal supply of harmless amusement.

So far as circumstances of fortune conduce to hap piness, it is not the income which any man possesses, but the increase of income that affords the pleasure. Two persons, of whom one begins with an hundred and advances his income to a thousand pounds a year; and the other sets off with a thousand, and dwindles down to an hundred, may, in the course of their time, have the receipt and spending of the

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same sum of money yet their satisfaction, so far as fortune is concerned in it, will be very different: the series and sum total of their income being the same, it makes a wide difference at which end they begin. FOURTH, Happiness consists in health.

By health I understand, as well freedom from bodily distempers, as that tranquillity, firmness, and alac rity of mind, which we call good spirits; and which may properly enough be included in our notion of health, as depending commonly upon the same causes, and yielding to the same management, as our bodily constitution.

Health, in this sense, is the one thing heedful. Therefore no pains, expense, self-denial, or restraint, to which we subject ourselves, for the sake of health, is too much. Whether it require us to relinquish lu crative situations, to abstain from favourite indul gences, to control intemperate passions, or undergo tedious regimens; whatever difficulties it lays us under, a man who pursues his happiness rationally and resolutely, will be content to submit to.

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When we are in perfect health and spirits, we feel in ourselves a happiness independent of any particu lar outward gratification whatever, and of which we can give no account. This is an enjoyment which the .Deity has annexed to life; and probably constitutes, in a great measure, the happiness of infants and brutes, especially of the lower and sedentary orders of animals, as of oysters, periwinkles, and the like; for which I have sometimes been at a loss to find out amusement.

The above account of human happiness will justify the two following conclusions, which, although found in most books of morality, have seldom, I think, been supported by any sufficient reasons.

First, That happiness is pretty equally distributed amongst the different orders of civil society.

Second, That vice has no advantage over virtue, even with respect to this world's happiness.

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CHAPTER VII.

VIRTUE.

VIRTUE is," the doing good to mankind, in obe

dience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."

According to which definition," the good of mankind" is the subject, the "will of God" the rule, and "everlasting happiness" the motive of human virtue. Virtue has been divided by some moralists into benevolence, prudence, fortitude, and temperance.

Benev olence proposes good ends; prudence suggests the best means of attaining them; fortitude enables us to encounter the difficulties, dangers, and discouragements, which stand in our way in the pursuit of these ends; • temperance repels and overcomes the passions that obstruct it. Benevolence, for instance, prompts us to undertake the cause of an oppressed orphan; prudence suggests the best means of going about it; fortitude enables us to confront the danger, and bear up against the loss, disgrace, or repulse, that may attend our undertaking; and temperance keeps under the love of money, of ease, or amusement, which might divert us from it.

Virtue is distinguished by others into two branches only, prudence and benevolence; prudence attentive to our own interest; benevolence to that of our fellow creatures: both direct to the same end, the increase of happiness in nature; and taking equal concern in the future as in the present.

The four CARDINAL virtues are, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.

But the division of virtue, to which we are now-adays most accustomed, is into duties.

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Towards God; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude, &c.

Towards other men (or relative duties ;) as justice, charity, fidelity, loyalty, &c.

Towards ourselves; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, preservation of life, care of health, &c.

More of these distinctions have been proposed, which it is not worth while to set down.

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I shall proceed to state a few observations, which relate to the general regulation of human conduct unconnected indeed with each other, but very worthy of attention; and which fall as properly under the title of this Chapter as of any other.

I. Mankind act more from habit than reflection.

It is on few, only, and great occasions that men deliberate at all; on fewer still, that they institute any thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of what they are about to do; or wait for the result of it. We are for the most part determined at once; and by an impulse, which is the effect and energy of pre-established habits. And this constitution seems well adapted to the exigences of human life, and to the imbecility of our moral principle. In the current occasions and rapid opportunities of life, there is ofttimes little leisure for reflection; and were there more, a man, who has to reason about his duty, when the temptation to transgress is upon him, is almost sure to reason himself into an

error.

If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits, where, it is asked, is the exercise of virtue, the guilt of vice, or any use of moral and religious knowledge? I answer, in the farming and contracting of these habits.

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And from hence results a rule of life of considerable importance, viz. that many things are to be done, and abstained from, solely for the sake of habit. We will explain ourselves by an example or two. A beggar, with the appearance of extreme distress, asks our charity. If we come to argue the matter, whether the distress be real, whether it be not brought upon himself, whether it be of public advantage to admit such applications, whether it be not to encourage idleness and vagrancy, whether it may not invite impostors to our doors, whether the money can be well spared, or might not be better applied; when these considerations are put together, it may appear very doubtful, whether we ought or ought not, to give any thing. But when we reflect, that the misery before our eyes excites our pity, whether we will or not; that it is of the utmost consequence to us to cultivate this tenderness of mind; that it is a quality, cherished by indulgence, and soon stifled by opposition: when this, I say, is considered, a wise man will do that for his own sake, which he would have hesitated to do for the petitioner's; he will give way to his compassion, rather than offer violence to a habit of so much general use.

A man of confirmed good habits will act in the same manner, without any consideration at all.

This may serve for one instance: another is the following. A man has been brought up from his infancy with a dread of lying. An occasion presents itself, where, at the expense of a little veracity, he may divert his company, set off his own wit with advantage, attract the notice and engage the partiality of all about him. This is not a small temptation. And when he looks at the other side of the question, he sees no mischief that can ensue from this liberty, no slander of any man's reputation, no prejudice likely to arise to any man's interest. Were there nothing further to be considered, it would be difficult to show why a man under such circumstances

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