was handling a subject which it were unbecoming to defile with any ambition or affectation; but yet that he must needs descend to the recollection, (unless indeed he were very inexperienced in affairs and minds, and would begin his journey without any search,) that inveterate errors, like the ravings of the lunatic, must be subdued by art and contrivance, and are aggravated by violence and opposition. We must, therefore, use prudence, and humour them, (as far as we can with simplicity and candour,) that contradictions may be extinguished before they are inflamed. For this object he is preparing a work on nature, which may destroy errors with the least harsh

from the particulars digested into tables, to the inquisition after new particulars, (which is nevertheless itself a useful thing, and like a kind of learned experience,) but that we should first proceed to general and large comprehensions, and so far indulge the natural bent of the understanding. But at the same time he saw that the natural but vous motion and impulse of the mind to jump from particulars to high and general comprehensions, (such as what are called the first principles of arts and things,) and to get at the rest by descending through the middle ones, must be altogether checked; but the nearest comprehensions must be first drawn out and discovered, and then the middle ones, and we must climb the true lad-ness, and enter the senses of mankind without der by repeated steps. For the paths of thought and understanding almost agree with that twofold way in morals, sung by the ancients; for one road, smooth at the entrance, leads to pathless wilds, the other, steep and difficult at first, ends in level road.

violence; which would be easier from his not bearing himself as a leader, but bringing and scattering light from nature herself, so that there may be no future need of a leader. But as time meanwhile glides away, and he has been more engaged in business than he wished; it seems a long work; especially when he considers the uncertainty of life, and pants to lay up something in safety. It therefore seemed to him that something simpler might be proposed which, though not uttered to the many, might perchance at least be sufficient to preserve so salutary a matter from abortion. And after considering the matter, and weighing it long and attentively, it seemed to him the best way that tables of invention, or formulæ of just inquisition, that is, a mass of particulars, arranged for the work of the understanding, should be offered in some subjects, by

He thought that such a form of induction should be introduced as should conclude generally from certain instances, so that it can be proved that there cannot be found a contradictory instance, lest by chance we pronounce from fewer than are adequate, and from those which are at our feet; and (as one of the ancients said) seek knowledge in our private worlds, and not in the public one. He saw that that comprehension only should be approved of and received, which was not made and fitted to the measure of the particulars from which it was derived, but which was rather more ample and lax, and sup-way of an exemplar and almost visible descripported its amplitude and laxity by the designation of new particulars, as a sort of suretiship, lest we should stop at what is already known, or perchance in too wide an embrace catch shadows and abstract forms. He saw that many things besides these should be invented to work notably, not so much to the perfecting of the matter, as to the shortening of the labour, and to the speeding of men's harvest from it. And whether all this be rightly thought or otherwise, we must, if need be, appeal from the opinions, and stand by the effects.

He thought, also, that what he is treating of is rather performance than opinion, and that it lays the foundations, not of any sect or school, but of immense utility and enlargement. Wherefore thought must be taken not only about accomplishing the matter, but about communicating and transmitting it, which is of equal consequence. But he found that men minister to their love of fame and pomp by sometimes publishing, sometimes concealing the knowledge of things which they think they have got; and that they who propose what is least solid are, more than others, used to barter what they offer in an obscure and doubtful light, that they may more easily swell the sails of their vanity. But he thought that he

tion of the work. For nothing can be found to place in a clearer light the right road or the wanderings of error; or show more plainly that what is offered is but words: nor which would be more carefully avoided by the man who either mistrusted his scheme, or desired it to be caught at and celebrated above its deserts. But, if it is not allowed him to complete his designs, as there are nevertheless human minds of a strong and lofty character, it may be that, even without more assistance, taking the hint from what is offered, they may be able to look for and master the rest of themselves. For he is almost of opinion (as some one said) that this will be enough for the wise, though even more would not be for the dull. But he saw that it would be too abrupt to begin his teaching with the tables themselves; and, therefore, that he should say something suitable by way of preface, which he thinks he has now done, and that all which has been hitherto said leads only thither. Lastly, he saw that, if any good be found in what has been or shall be said, it should be dedicated as the fat of the sacrifice to God, and to men in God's similitude, who procure the good of mankind by true affection and benevolence.

G. W.

OF THE

PRINCIPLES AND ORIGINS OF NATURE,

ACCORDING TO THE FABLES OF CUPID AND HEAVEN:

OR, THE

PHILOSOPHY OF PARMENIDES, TELESIUS, AND PARTICULARLY OF DEMOCRITUS, AS EXHIBITED IN THE FABLE CONCERNING CUPID.

THE fables of the ancients repecting Cupid or Love, cannot be made to agree in one and the same person. They indeed profess to speak of two Cupids of two different periods, the one the most ancient of the gods, the other of a much later era. At present we will treat of the ancient Cupid. They relate that this Cupid was the most ancient of the gods, and therefore of all things, excepting chaos, which is said to have been coeval with him. This Cupid had no parent, but being united to heaven, was the father of the gods and of all things. Some indeed would derive him from an egg over which Night brooded. Different atttributes are ascribed to him, so that he is represented as a boy blind, naked, winged, and armed with darts. His chief and especial influence is over the uniting of bodies. To him were given the keys of the earth, the sea, and the sky. Another and younger Cupid is also celebrated in fable, the son of Ve

nus.

certain light of the Divine Word has shone upon men. That chaos therefore which was coeval with Cupid, signified the confused and disordered mass or collection of matter. But matter itself, with its power and nature, in a word, the elements of things were shadowed out in Cupid himself. He is introduced without a parent, that is, without a cause: for cause is, as it were, the parent of effect; and in tropical discourse nothing is therefore more usual than for the parent to stand for cause, and the offspring for effect. But there cannot be in nature (for we always except God) any cause of the first matter, and of its proper influence and action, for there is nothing prior in time to the first matter. Therefore there is no efficient nor any thing more known to nature; there is therefore neither genus nor form. Wherefore whatever primitive matter is, together with its influence and action, it is sui generis, and admits of no definition drawn from perception, and is to be taken just as it is found, and not to be judged of from any preconceived idea. For the mode of it, if it is given to us to know it, cannot be judged of by means of its cause, seeing that it is, next to God, the cause of causes, itself without a cause. For there is a certain real limit of causes in nature, and it would argue levity and inexperience in a philosopher to require or imagine a cause for the last and positive power and law of nature, as much as it would not to demand a cause in those that are subordinate.

To him are ascribed the attributes of the ancient Cupid, besides many peculiar to himself. This fable, with the sequel respecting heaven, seems to embrace in a concise parable the doctrine of the elements of things and of the origin of the world, and to agree with that of Democritus, except that it appears somewhat closer, more reasonable, and clearer. For the observations of that confessedly acute and accurate philosopher nevertheless were of a too diffusive nature, and did not seem to keep their proper limit, and to confine and support themselves sufficiently. And indeed these dogmas, which lie On this account the ancients have fabled Cupid veiled in the parable, although better regulated, to be without a parent, that is, without a cause. are yet of such a nature as to appear to have come And they did so not without design. Nay, perfrom the mind left to itself, and not uniformly haps there is not any thing more important; for and gradually assisted by experience; for this nothing has more corrupted philosophy than the seems to have been the common fault of antiqui- seeking after the parents of Cupid; I mean, that ty. But it must first be remarked, that the opi-philosophers have not received and embraced the nions brought forward in this part of my treatise elements of things as they are found in nature, as were the conclusions and productions of unassistcd reason, and rested on perception alone, the failing and imperfect oracles of which are deservedly rejected, now that the higher and more

a certain fixed and positive doctrine, and as it were by an experimental trust in them; but have rather deduced them from the laws of words, and from dialectics and slight mathematical conclu

sions and common notions, and similar wander- fire, nor any other thing, the body of which is ings of the mind beyond the bounds of nature. perceptible by sense, or open to the touch." And This, therefore, must be constantly in the philosopher's thoughts, that Cupid is without parents, lest perchance his understanding turn aside to empty questions; because in universal perceptions of this kind the human mind becomes diffusive, and departs from the right use of itself and of its objects, and, whilst it tends toward things more distant, falls back upon those that are nearer. For when, through its own limited capacity, it is accustomed to be most affected by those things which occur familiarly to it, and which can enter and strike the mind suddenly; it comes to pass that when it stretches itself toward those things which, according to experience, are for the most part universal, and, nevertheless, is unwilling to rest satisfied, then, as if desirous of something more within the reach of its knowledge, it turns itself to those things which have most effected or allured it, and imagines them to be more causative and palpable than those universals. Therefore, it has been now laid down that the first essence of things, or Cupid, is without a cause.

again he says of their nature, "but it is requisite the elements in the work of creation, should put forth a secret and dark nature, lest any contrarious and opposing principle arise." Therefore atoms are neither like sparks of fire, nor drops of water, nor bubbles of air, nor grains of sand, nor the minute particles of spirit or ether. Nor, is the power and form of them a something heavy or light, or hot or cold, or dense or rare, or hard or soft, as are found in larger bodies, since those powers, and the rest of that order, are compounded and wrought together. And, in like manner, the natural motion of an atom is neither that motion of descent which is called natural, nor a motion opposed to that force, nor a motion of expansion and contraction, nor of impulsion and connexion, nor the rotatory motion of the heavenly bodies, nor any other of the greater motions simply. But, notwithstanding this, in the body of an atom are the elements of all bodies, and in the nature of an atom the beginning of all motions and natural properties. But, yet, in this very point, namely, We have now to inquire into the mode of this the motion of an atom as compared with the thing which is uncaused; and the mode of it is motion of greater substances, the philosophy of likewise very obscure, which indeed the fable | the parable appears to differ from that of Demoelegantly hints in Cupid being hatched beneath the brooding wing of night. So at least the inspired philosopher saith, "God hath made all things beautiful in their seasons: He hath also set the world in their heart, yet so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning unto the end." For the great law of essence and nature which cuts and runs through the vicissitudes of things, (which law seems to be described in the compass of the words, "the work which God wrought from the beginning even to the end,") the power lodged by God in the primitive particles, from the multiplication of which, the whole variety of things might spring forth and be composed, may indeed just strike, but cannot enter deeply the mind of man. But, that saying concerning the egg of night, is very aptly referred to those proofs by means of which our Cupid is brought to light. For those proofs which are concluded by means of affirmatives, seem to be the offspring of light; those which are concluded by means of negatives and exclusions, may be called the offspring of darkness and night: and Cupid is in truth the egg sprung from night; for all the knowledge we can gather respecting him comes by the way of negatives and exclusions. But a proof gathered by exclusions has still some degree of ignorance in it, and is a kind of night as to that which is included in it: whence Democritus admirably remarked, that the atoms or seeds and their properties were like nothing that falls under the observation of sense, and held them to be of a dark and secret nature. He therefore pronounced of them, "They are neither like

critus.. For he is not only opposed to the parable, but inconsistent, if not contradictory in his more copious assertions on this head. For he should have ascribed a heterogeneous motion to an atom not less than a heterogeneous body and power. But, he out of the motions of greater substances, has chosen two, to ascribe them as primitive motions to atoms, namely, the descent of heavy and the ascent of light bodies, (which he explained by the striking or the percussion of the more heavy, in forcing upwards the less heavy bodies.) But the parable all along preserves the heterogeneous and exclusive nature it ascribes to atoms, as well in speaking of its motion as of its substance. But the parable further intimates, that this exclusion has its limit, for night does not brood over the egg forever: and it is certainly proper to the Deity, that in our inquiry into his nature by means of the senses, exclusions should not terminate in affirmatives. And there is another reason for this, namely, that after the due exclusions and negations, something should be affirmed and settled, and that the egg should be produced as it were by a seasonable and mature incubation; not only that the egg should be brought forth by night, but also that the person of Cupid should be delivered of the egg: that is, that not only should an obscure notion upon this subject be originated, but one that is distinct. Thus much upon demonstrations, as far as they can be given, upon the first matter, and I think in accordance with the parable.

We come now to Cupid himself, the primitive matter and its properties, involved in so great

darkness; and let us see what light the parable mostly present to the human understanding which can throw upon it. And here I am aware that it most imbibes, and with which itself is most opinions of this sort the most incredible have moved. Hence it is that forms, as they are called, entered men's mind. Certainly was this danger seem to exist more than either matter or action, incurred here by the philosophy of Democritus because the one is hid, the other glides before us; itself upon atoms, which, from its seeming acute- the one is not so strongly impressed, the other ness and profundity, and for its remoteness from constantly inheres. But forms, on the other hand, common notions, was childishly entertained by are deemed evident and lasting, so that the primithe vulgar, but unsettled, and nearly overthrown tive and common matter seems as it were an by the arguments of other philosophies which accessory, and to be in the place of a support to came nearer to the vulgar comprehension: and yet them; but every sort of action only an emanation he was the admiration of his age, and was styled from the form, and forms, therefore, to be in every Pentathlus for his multifarious erudition, and was respect worthy of the higher rank. And hence, deemed by universal consent the greatest of also, seems to be derived the kingdom of forms natural philosophers, and obtained the name of a and ideas in essences, by the addition of a kind wise man. Nor could even the opposition of of fantastic matter. Some things moreover have Aristotle (who, like the Ottomans, could not feel grown out of this superstition; (from want of firm upon his throne until he had murdered his judgment having, as might have been expected, brother philosophers; and who was solicitous, as followed this error;) abstract ideas and their powers appears from his own words, that posterity should have been introduced with such confidence and not doubt his dogmas) effect by his violence, nor authority, that this troop of dreamers had nearly the majesty of Plato effect by reverence the demo- overpowered the more sober class of thinkers. lition of this philosophy of Democritus. But But these follies have for the most part disapwhilst the dicta of Aristotle and Plato were cele-peared, although one person in our age, with more brated with applause and professorial ostentation in the schools, the philosophy of Democritus was in great repute amongst the wiser sort, and those who more closely gave themselves to the depths and silence of contemplation. It kept its ground and was approved in the era of Roman letters; for Cicero every where makes mention of him with perfect approbation; and soon after we read the panegyric of the poet, who appears to echo after the manner of the poets the sentiment of his times, whose wisdom shows that in a land of dulness and beneath a Boeotian sky, the greatest and the most illustrious men can spring up. (Juv. Sat. 10, v. 48.)

Neither Aristotle, therefore, nor Plato, but Genseric, Attila, and the barbarians were the ruin of this philosophy. For, then, after that human learning had suffered shipwreck, those records of the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy, as being lighter and more inflated matter, were preserved and came down to our times, whilst the more solid sank and went into oblivion. I cannot but consider, on the other hand, the philosophy of Democritus worthy of being rescued from neglect, especially since it agrees in most things with the authority of antiquity. In the first place, then, Cupid is described as a certain person, and to him are attributed infancy, wings, arrows, and other attributes, concerning which we will afterward speak separately. But this we assume in the mean while, that the ancients laid down the primitive matter (such as can be the origin of things) with a form and properties, not abstract, potential, and informal. And certainly that matter which is stripped and passive seems altogether an invention of the human mind, and to have sprung thence, for those things are

daring than advantage, made it his endeavour to raise and prop them up when they were of themselves on the decline. I think, however, that it can to an unprejudiced person be easily shown how, contrary to reason, abstract matter was made into an element. It arose thus; men supposed that forms endued with action subsisted by themselves, but none thought that matter thus subsisted by itself; not even those who considered it an element; and it seemed unreasonable and contrary to the nature of an inquiry upon the elements of things to make entities out of mere imaginations And it is not our object to search how we can most conveniently conceive of the nature of entities or distinguish them, but what are in truth the first and simplest possible of all entities, from which all others are derived. But the first ones ought no less to possess a real existence than those which flow from it; rather more. For it has its own peculiar essence, and from it come all the rest. But the assertions that have been made respecting abstract matter are as absurd as it would be to say that the universe and nature were made out of categories and such dialectic notions, as out of elements. For the difference is by no means important between asserting that the world sprang from matter and form and privation, and asserting that it arose out of substance and the contrary qualities. But almost all the ancients, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, though disagreeing in other respects upon the prime matter, joined in this, that they held an active matter with a form, both arranging its own form and having within itself the principle of motion. Nor can any one think otherwise without leaving experience altogether. All these, then, submitted their mind to nature.

:

But Plato subjected the world to his contempla- ties in the unfixed and distributable nature of the tions, and Aristotle his contemplations to terms: same element. The second is of those who for the studies of men were at that time verging maintain an element one in substance, and fixed toward logomachies and disputations, and leaving and invariable, but derive a diversity of entities the severer investigation of truth. Wherefore through the various magnitudes, figures, and podogmas of this nature are rather to be condemned sitions of this kind of element. The third is of in the mass than refuted in detail. For they those who maintain more elements, and a divercome not from a desire of knowledge, but of much sity of entities, on the ground of their temperaspeaking and that abstract matter is not the ment and commixture. The fourth, of those who matter of the universe, but matter for disputation. lay down an infinite, or, at least, very numerous For a true philosopher will dissect, not sever body of elements of things, but with their species nature, (for they who will not dissect, must pull and forms; and these have no need of inventing her asunder,) and the prime matter is to be laid something to lead things to a various principle, down joined with the primitive form, as also with seeing they already separate nature from a primithe first principle of motion, as it is found. For tive element. Among these, only the second sect the abstraction of motion has also given rise to seems to me to set forth Cupid as he is, native innumerable devices concerning spirits, life, and and unclothed. The first introduces him as veiled, the like, as if there were not laid a sufficient the third with a coat, the fourth with a cloak and ground for them through matter and form, but mask. they depended on their own peculiar elements. But these three are not to be separated, but only distinguished, and matter is to be so treated (whatever it be) in regard of its adornment, appendages, and form, as that all kind of influence, essence, action, and natural motion may appear to be its emanation and consequence. Nor need we fear that from this that inquiry should stagnate, or that variety which we perceive should become incapable of explanation, as will be shown hereafter. And that the first matter is possessed of form, the parable teaches in making Cupid a definite person. Yet so that matter in the mass was at first without form: for chaos is without form, Cupid is a person. And this perfectly agrees with Holy Scripture. For it is not written that God created in the beginning the matter of chaos, but the heavens and the earth.

There is also subjoined a description of the state of things as it was before the work of the days, in which distinct mention is made of the heaven and earth, which are the names of forms, but yet, that the mass according to the whole was without form. But Cupid is introduced into the parable personified, yet so as that he is naked. Therefore, after those who speak of matter as abstract, they err next (though in a contrary way) who speak of matter as not unclothed. And, on this topic I have inserted some remarks, in treating upon what kind of proofs are suited to the subject of the first matter, and upon the heterogeneous nature of the first matter. But the proper place for this subject, upon which we shall now

enter.

We will examine, therefore, who of those who attributed the origin of things to matter endowed with form, held a native and bare form of matter, and who, on the other hand, a form spread over it and shapen. There are, in all, four sects of those who have hazarded opinions on this subject. The first is of those who maintain one element of things, but set up a diversity of enti

For the better explication of the parable, I will make a few remarks on each. In the first place, then, of those who have laid down but one first element, I find none who affirm that of the earth. The nature of the earth, indeed, was against it; quiet, and senseless, and inactive, but yielding to the influence of the heavens, of fire, and other things; so that none thought of asserting this of the earth. Yet, the wisdom of the ancients assigned to the earth the next place after chaos, making it first the parent, then the bride of the heaven, from which union proceed all things. But we are not to suppose from this, that the ancients ever thought of the earth as the principle of essence, but as the element, or rather origin of the system. We, therefore, leave this subject to the parable on heaven that follows; where we will inquire into the origin of things, which inquiry comes after that of their elements.

Thales made water the prime element. For, he saw that matter was mostly disposed in moisture, and that in water. But he deemed that it was right to make that the element of things in which the virtues and powers of entities, especially the elements of generations and renovations, were mostly found. He remarked that the generating of animals was by moisture, and that the seeds and kernels of plants, as long as they vegetated and were not dried up, were moist and tender. He remarked that metals melted and flowed, and were, as it were, the thickened juices of the earth, or rather a kind of mineral waters. He remarked that the earth itself was enriched and renewed by showers or the irrigation of rivers; and that the earth and loam seemed nothing but the dregs and sediments of water; but that the air was very evidently the expiration and expansion of water, and that fire was not conceived of itself, nor altogether continued, or was kept alive of itself, but from and through moisture; and, moreover, that that fat of moisture, in which the fire and flame are supported and live,