distinction; infidelity is incapable of affording a man any comfort; when the means are insufficient for obtaining the ends, it is madness to expect success; it is a sad condition of humanity when a man's resources are incompetent to supply him with the first necessaries of life.

Inadequate is relative in its signification, like insufficient and incompetent; but the relation is different. A thing is insufficient which does not suffice either for the wishes, the purposes, or necessities, of any one, in particular or in general cases; thus a quantity of materials may be insufficient for a particular building; The insufficiency of the light of nature is, by the light of Scripture, fully supplied.' HOOKER. Incompetency is an insufficiency for general purposes, in things of the first necessity; thus, an income may be incompetent to support a family, or perform an office; Every speck does not blind a man, nor does every infirmity make one unable to discern, or incompetent to reprove, the grosser faults of others. GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE. Inadequacy is still more particular, for it denotes any deficiency which is measured by comparison with the object to which it refers; thus, the strength of an animal may be inadequate to the labour which is required, or a reward may be inadequate to the service; All the attainments possible in our present state are evidently inadequate to our capacities of enjoyment.' JOHNSON.

WIT, HUMOUR, SATIRE, IRONY,
BURLESQUE.

Wit, like wisdom, according to its original, from weissen to know, signifies knowledge, but it has so extended its meaning as to signify that faculty of the mind by which knowledge or truth is perceived. The first property of wit, as an exertion of the intellectual faculty, is that it be spontaneous, and as it were instinctive laboured or forced wit is no wit. Reflection and experience supply us with wisdom; study and labour supply us with learning; but wit seizes with an eagle eye that which escapes the notice of the deep thinker, and elicits truths which are in vain sought for with any severe effort; 6 Wit lies most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety." ADDISON. Humour is a species of wit which flows out of the humour of a person;

For sure by wit is chiefly meant
Applying well what we invent:
What humour is not, all the tribe
Of logic-mongers can describe:

Here nature only acts her part,

Unhelp'd by practice, books, or art. SWIFT.

an equable and pleasing, flow of wit; There is a kind of nature, a certain regularity of thought, which must discover the writer (of humour) to be a man of sense at the same time that he appears altogether given up to caprice.'. ADDISON. Of this description of wit Mr. Addison has given us the most admirable specimens in his writings, who knew best how to explain what wit and humour was, and to illustrate it by his practice. Humour may likewise display itself in actions as well as words, whereby it is more strikingly distinguished from wit, which displays itself only in the happy expression of happy thoughts; I cannot help remarking that sickness, which often destroys both wit and wisdom, yet seldom has power to remove that talent which we call humour. which we call humour. Mr. Wycherley showed his in his last compliment paid to his young wife (whom he made promise, on his dying bed, that she would not marry an old man again).' POPE.

Satire, from satyr, probably from sat and ira abounding in anger, and irony, from the Greek paviα simulation and dissimulation, are personal and censorious sorts of wit; the first of which openly points at the object, and the second in a covert manner takes its aim; The ordinary subjects of satire are such as excite the greatest indignation in the best tempers.' ADDISON. In writings of humour, figures are sometimes used of so delicate a nature, that it shall often happen that some people will see things in a direct contrary sense to what the author, and the majority of the readers understand them to such the most innocent irony may appear irreligion.' CAMBRIDGE. Burlesque is rather a species of humour than direct wit, which consists in an assemblage of ideas extravagantly discordant; One kind of burlesque represents mean persons in the accoutrements of heroes.' ADDISON. The satire and irony are the most ill-natured kinds of wit; burlesque stands in the lowest rank.

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TASTE, GENIUS.

Taste, in all probability from the Latin tactum and tango to touch, seems to designate the capacity to derive pleasure from an object by simply coming in contact with it; This metaphor would not have been so general had there not been a conformity between the mental taste and that sensitive taste which gives a relish of every flavour.' ADDISON. Genius designates the power we have for accomplishing any object; Taste consists in the power of judging, genius in the power of executing.' BLAIR. He who derives particular pleasure from music may be said to have a taste for music; he who makes very great proficiency in the theory and practice of music may be said to have a genius Taste is in some degree an acquired faculty, or at least is dependant on cultivation, as also on our other faculties, for its perfection; The cause of a wrong taste is a defect of judgement.' BURKE. Genius, from the Latin gigno to generate, is a perfectly

for it.

"Tis with our judgements as our watches, none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own;
In poets as true genius is rare,

True taste as seldom is the critic's share. POPE.

It is obvious, therefore, that we may have a taste without having genius; but it would not be possible to have genius for a thing without having a taste for it: for nothing can so effectually give a taste for any accomplishment, as the capacity to learn it, and the susceptibility of all its beauties, which circumstances are inseparable from genius.

INGENUITY, WIT.

Both these terms imply acuteness of understanding, and differ mostly in the mode of displaying themselves. Ingenuity, in Latin ingenuitas, signifies literally freedom of birth, in distinction from slavery, with which condition have been naturally associated

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nobleness of character and richness in mental endowments, in which latter sense it is allied to wit. Ingenuity comprehends invention; wit comprehends knowledge. Ingenuity displays itself in the mode of conducting an argument; Men were formerly won over to opinions by the candour, sense, and ingenuity of those who had the right on their side.' ADDISON. Wit is mostly displayed in aptness of expression and illustration; When I broke loose from that great body of writers, who have employed their wit and parts in propagating vice and irreligion, I did not question but I should be treated as an odd kind of fellow.' ADDISON. One is ingenious in matters either of art or science; one is witty only in matters of sentiment: things may, therefore, be ingenious, but not witty; witty, but not ingenious, or both witty and ingenious. A mechanical invention, or any ordinary contrivance, is ingenious, but not witty; an ingenious, not a witty solution of a difficulty; a flash of wit, not a flash of ingenuity; a witty humour, a witty conversation; not an ingenious humour or conversation: on the other hand, a conceit is ingenious, as it is the fruit of one's own mind; it is witty, as it contains point, and strikes on the understanding of others.

SENSE, JUDGEMENT.

Sense, from the Latin sensus and sentio to feel or perceive, signifies in general the faculty of feeling corporeally or perceiving mentally; in the first case it is allied to feeling (v. Feeling), in the second it is synonymous with judgement, which is a special operation of the mind. *The sense is that primitive portion of the understanding which renders an account of things through the medium of the senses;

Then is the soul a nature, which contains

The power of sense within a greater power. DAVIES.

selects or rejects from this account. The sense is, so to speak, the reporter which collects the details, and exposes the facts; the judgement is the judge that passes sentence upon them. According to the strict import of the terms, the judgement depends upon the sense, and varies with it in degree. He who has no sense has no judgement; and he who loses sense loses judgement: since sense supplies the knowledge of things, and judgement pronounces upon them, it is evident that there must be sense before there can be judgement.

On the other hand, sense, when taken to denote the mental faculty of perceiving, may be so distinguished from judgement, that there may be sense without judgement, and judgement without sense: sense is the faculty of perceiving in general; it is applied to abstract science as well as general knowledge: judgement is the faculty of determining either in matters of practice or theory. It is the lot of many, therefore, to have sense in matters of theory, who have no judgement in matters of practice; whilst others, on the contrary, who have nothing above that is not to be surpassed. common sense, will have a soundness of judgement that is not to be surpassed.

Nay farther, it is possible for a man to have good both natural faculties, men are gifted with them as sense, and yet not a solid judgement: as they are variously as with every other faculty. By good sense a man is enabled to discern, as it were intuitively, that which requires another of less sense to ponder over and study;

There's something previous ev'n to taste: 'tis sense,
Good sense; which only is the gift of heav'n,
And, though no science, fairly worth the seven;
A light within yourself you must perceive,
Jones and Le Notre have it not to give.

POPE.

By a solid judgement a man is enabled to avoid those always falling into; In all instances where our expeerrors in conduct which one of a weak judgement is rience of the past has been extensive and uniform, our judgement concerning the future amounts to moral certainty.' BEATTIE. There is, however, this distinction between sense and judgement, that the deficiencies of the former may be supplied by diligence and attention; but a defect in the latter is to be supplied by no efforts of one's own. A man may improve his sense in proportion as he has the means of information; but a weakness of judgement is an irremediable evil.

When employed as epithets, the terms sensible and judicious serve still more clearly to distinguish the two primitives. A writer or a speaker are said to be sensible; I have been tired with accounts from sensible men, furnished with matters of fact, which have happened within their own knowledge.' ADDISON. A friend, or an adviser, to be judicious; Your observations are so judicious, I wish you had not been so sparing of them.' SIR W. JONES. The sense dis

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plays itself in the conversation or the communication of one's ideas; the judgement in the propriety of one's actions. A sensible man may be an entertaining companion, but a judicious man in any post of command is an inestimable treasure. Sensible remarks are always calculated to please and interest sensible people; judicious measures have a sterling value in themselves, that is appreciated according to the importance of the object. Hence, it is obvious that to be sensible is a desirable thing, but to be judicious is an indispensable requisite.

DISCERNMENT, PENETRATION, DISCRIMINATION, JUDGEMENT. Discernment expresses the judgement or power of discerning, which, from the Latin discerno, or dis, and cerno, signifies to look at apart, so as to form a true estimate of things; penetration denotes the act or power of penetrating, from penetrate, in Latin penetratus participle of penetro and penitus within, signifying to see into the interior; discrimination denotes the act or power of discriminating, from discriminate, in Latin discriminatus participle of discrimino to make a difference; judgement denotes the power of judging, from judge, in Latin judico, compounded of jus and dico, signifying to pronounce right. The first three of these terms do not express different powers, but different modes of the same power; namely, the power of seeing intellectually, or exerting the intellectual sight.

Discernment is not so powerful a mode of intellectual vision as penetration; the former is a common faculty, the latter is a higher degree of the same faculty; it is the power of seeing quickly, and seeing in spite of all that intercepts the sight, and keeps the object out of view: a man of common discernment discerns characters which are not concealed by any particular disguise; Great part of the country was abandoned to the spoils of the soldiers, who, not troubling themselves to discern between a subject and a rebel, whilst their liberty lasted, made indifferently profit of both.' HAYWARD. A man of penetration is not to be deceived by any artifice, however thoroughly cloaked or secured, even from suspicion; He is as slow to decide, as he is quick to apprehend, calmly and deliberately weighing every opposite reason that is offered, and tracing it with a most judicious penetration.' MELMOTH (Letters of Pliny).

Discernment and penetration serve for the discovery of individual things by their outward marks; discrimination is employed in the discovery of differences between two or more objects; the former consists of simple observation, the latter combines also comparison discernment and penetration are great aids towards discrimination; he who can discern the springs of human action, or penetrate the views of men, will be most fitted for discriminating between

the characters of different men; Perhaps there is no character through all Shakspeare drawn with more spirit and just discrimination than Shylock's.' HEN

LEY.

Although judgement derives much assistance from the three former operations, it is a totally distinct power: the former only discover the things that are; it acts on external objects by seeing them: the latter is creative; it produces by deduction from that which passes inwardly. The former are speculative; they are directed to that which is to be known, and are confined to present objects; they serve to discover truth or falsehood, perfections and defects, motives and pretexts: the latter is practical; it is directed to that which is to be done, and extends its views to the future; it marks the relations and connections of

things; it foresees their consequences and effects; I love him, I confess, extremely; but my affection does by no means prejudice my judgement.' MELMOTH (Letters of Pliny).

Of discernment, we say that it is clear; it serves to removes all obscurity and confusion: of penetration, we say that it is acute; it pierces every veil which falsehood draws before truth, and prevents us from being deceived: of discrimination, we say that it is nice; it renders our ideas accurate, and serves to prevent us from confounding objects: of judgement, we say that it is solid or sound; it renders the conduct prudent, and prevents us from committing mistakes or involving one's self in embarrassments.

When the question is to estimate the real qualities of either persons or things, we exercise discernment; Cool age advances venerably wise,

Turns on all hands its deep discerning eyes. PoPE.

When it is required to lay open that which art or cunning has concealed, we must exercise penetration; A penetration into the abstruse difficulties and depths of modern algebra and fluxions is not worth the labour of those who design either of the three learned professions.' WATTS. learned professions.' WATTS. When the question is to determine the proportions and degrees of qualities in persons or things, we must use discrimination; A satire should expose nothing but what is corrigible, and make a due discrimination between those that are and those who are not proper objects of it.' ADDISON. When called upon to take any step, or act any part, we must employ the judgement; Judgement, a cool and slow faculty, attends not a man in the rapture of poetical composition.' DENNIS. Discernment is more or less indispensable for every man in private or public station; he who has the most promiscuous dealings with men, has the greatest need of it penetration is of peculiar importance for princes and statesmen: discrimination is of great utility for commanders, and all who have the power of distributing rewards and punishments: judgement is an absolute requisite for all to whom the execution or management of concerns is entrusted.

REASONABLE, RATIONAL,

Are both derived from the same Latin word ratio reason, which, from ratus and reor to think, signifies the thinking faculty.

Reasonable signifies accordant with reason; rational signifies having reason in it: the former is more commonly applied in the sense of right reason, propriety, or fairness; the latter is employed in the original sense of the word reason: hence we term a man reasonable who acts according to the principles of right reason; and a being rational, who is possessed of the rational or reasoning faculty, in distinction from the brutes. It is to be lamented that there are much fewer reasonable than there are rational creatures. The same distinction exists between them when applied to things; A law may be reasonable in itself, although a man does not allow it, or does not know the reason of the lawgivers.' SWIFT. The evidence which is afforded for a future state is sufficient for a rational ground of conduct.' BLAIR.

Objects, pleasures, pains, operations, gifts, &c. are denominated mental; To collect and reposit the various forms of things is far the most pleasing part of mental occupation.' JOHNSON. Subjects, conversation, pursuits, and the like, are entitled intellectual;

Man's more divine, the master of all these,
Lord of the wide world, and wide wat'ry seas,
Endued with intellectual sense and soul. SHAKSPEARE.

It is not always easy to distinguish our mental pleasures from those corporeal pleasures which we enjoy in common with the brutes; the latter are however greatly heightened by the former in whatever degree they are blended: in a society of well-informed persons the conversation will turn principally on intellectual subjects.

MEMORY, REMEMBRANCE, RECOL

LECTION, REMINISCENCE. Memory, in Latin memoria or memor, Greek μνήμων and μνάομαι, comes in all probability from μένος the mind, because memory is the principal faculty of the mind; remembrance, from the verb remember, contracted from re and memoro to bring back to the mind, is a verbal substantive, denoting the exercise

of that faculty; recollection, from recollect, compounded of re and collect, signifies collecting again, i. e. carefully, and from different quarters by an effort of the memory; reminiscence, in Latin reminiscentia, from reminiscor and memor, is the bringing back to the mind what was there before.

Memory is the power of recalling images once made on the mind; remembrance, recollection, and reminiscence, are operations or exertions of this power, which vary in their mode.

The memory is a power which exerts itself either independently of the will, or in conformity with the will; but all the other terms express the acts of conscious agents, and consequently are more or less connected with the will. In dreams the memory exerts itself, but we should not say that we have then any remembrance or recollection of objects.

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Remembrance is the exercise of memory in a conscious agent; it is the calling a thing back to the mind which has been there before, but has passed away; Forgetfulness is necessary to remembrance." JOHNSON. This may be the effect of repetition or habit, as in the case of a child who remembers his lesson after having learnt it several times; or of a horse who remembers the road which he has been continually passing; or it may be the effect of association and circumstances, by which images are casually brought back to the mind, as happens to intelligent beings continually as they exercise their thinking faculties;

Remember thee!

Ah, thou poor ghost, while memory holds a seat In this distracted globe. SHAKSPEARE.

In these cases remembrance is an involuntary act; for things return to the mind before one is aware of it, as in the case of one who hears a particular name, and remembers that he has to call on a person of the same name; or of one who, on seeing a particular tree, remembers all the circumstances of his youth which were connected with a similar tree.

Remembrance is however likewise a voluntary act, and the consequence of a direct determination, as in the case of a child who strives to remember what it has been told by its parent; or of a friend who remembers the hour of meeting another friend in consequence of the interest which it has excited in his mind : nay indeed experience teaches us that scarcely any thing in ordinary cases is more under the subservience of the will than the memory; for it is now become almost a maxim to say, that one may remember whatever one wishes.

The power of memory, and the simple exercise of that power in the act of remembering, are possessed in common, though in different degrees, by man and brute; but recollection and reminiscence are exercises of the memory that are connected with the higher faculties of man, his judgement and understanding. To remember is to call to mind that which has once been presented to the mind; but to recollect is to remember afresh, to remember what has been re