had been fighting their way back for three days, and " the 4th Division for one day, against Kluck's vastly superior army.

On the day of Mons (Aug. 23) the Cavalry Division and the 19th Brigade had been on the left, the IInd Corps on the right of them, with its 5th Division on its left and 3rd Division on its right. The Ist Corps was

NOTE.-The diagram accompanying this article is based on Sketch 3 B in the "official" history, omitting the cavalry with the 4th Division and with the Ist Corps on account of the doubt at the time regarding their whereabouts.-G. G. A.

drawn back in echelon on the right. At midnight on Aug, 25-26 the relative positions had changed. The 3rd Division was on the left, the 5th Division on the right. This change had been skilfully effected to meet the tactical conditions when the 5th Division was hard pressed during the morning of Aug. 24. The position of the 19th Brigade and of the cavalry (both under the

orders of G.H.Q.) was not known by Smith-Dorrien, who was also ignorant of the position of Haig's Corps on the right. The Mormal Forest, which was between the two corps during the retreat on the 25th, had proved an 'impenetrable wall.' Haig's corps was expected to re-establish touch at Le Cateau. The 4th Division (also operating under orders from G.H.Q. at St Quentin, 26 miles away) was far to the front, near Solesmes, covering the retreat. The order to continue the retreat had, as we have seen, been issued by SmithDorrien at 10.15 p.m. That was the position at midnight.

'It would be difficult,' writes Smith-Dorrien, for
any reader to realise the fog of war which surrounded
us that night. Communication was most difficult ...
it was impossible to find out the position of units until
hours after they had reached them.' The 19th Brigade,
instead of being on the left flank, turned up at Le
Cateau at 10 p.m., and it was not discovered till 6 a.m.
on the 26th, resuming its retirement.
There were

' rumours' that Haig's Corps was heavily engaged, and
reports that heavy firing was heard in the direction of
Landrecies. 'This was serious as, if they were not
nearer than that, it meant a gap of eight miles between
the right of my Corps and the left of the Ist Corps.'
Smith-Dorrien must have known that Sordet's French
Cavalry Corps was somewhere to the westward.
had crossed the line of march, and delayed one of his
retreating divisions.

It

Such was the situation, as it appeared to SmithDorrien, who had arrived at Le Cateau at 3.30 p.m., seen the Chief of Staff, who shortly afterwards followed G.H.Q. to St Quentin (26 miles), decided upon the distribution of his troops on the Le Cateau position, selected by G.H.Q. in accordance with operation order No. 8 then still in force (see above), cancelled his orders, and ordered a retirement in accordance with the new order received from G.H.Q. at 9 p.m. Then, we can

imagine, he snatched a short rest. Soon came the crisis, thus described :

'However, some of the fog was cleared away by the arrival of General Allenby (commanding the Cavalry Division). . . .

Allenby told me his troops were much scattered, 2 brigades being about Catillon, 5 miles east, and the other one and a half brigades at Viesly, 8 miles north-west of Le Cateau' (the official account makes them more scattered), 'that his men and horses were pretty well played out, and that he could not get into touch with General Headquarters. He wanted to know what I was going to do, saying that unless I could move at once, and get away in the dark, the enemy were so close that I should be forced to fight at daybreak. I then sent for Major-General Hubert Hamilton, the commander of the 3rd Division, whose headquarters were close by, and asked him whether his troops could move off at once, or at any rate before daylight, and his reply was very definite that the 3rd Division could not move before 9 a.m. The 5th Division were, if possible, in a worse plight, being more scattered, whilst of the 4th Division, which, though not under me, I could not leave in the lurch, there was no news, except that they had last been seen after dark still in their positions south of Solesmes, covering the retirement of masses of transport and fugitives jammed up in the roads.'

General Smith-Dorrien mentions the arguments that passed through his mind on receipt of Allenby's news, and then:

'Well do I remember the dead silence in the little room at Bertry when I was rapidly considering these points, and the sigh of relief when, on my asking Allenby if he would accept orders from me, and he replied in the affirmative, I remarked: "Very well, gentlemen, we will fight, and I will ask General Snow to act under me as well." The die was cast. . . .

Such were the conditions under which Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien came to the momentous decision to stand at bay before retreating. The Army commander, upon whom under normal conditions the responsibility should have fallen, was far away, at St Quentin, summoned there to a conference by Joffre, with whose army it was all-important to co-operate. 'If' (as we read in the British Field Service Regulations then in force) 'a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his order, when such a departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues,

* Commanding 4th Division.

he will be held responsible for such failure.' The fog of war was dense around Smith-Dorrien. It was still more dense round Kluck, his opponent, as we know from his own reminiscences. Such conditions are not unusual in land warfare, in which action has frequently to be based upon intuition rather than upon definite information. Smith-Dorrien writes:

'It is undoubtedly a fact that after Le Cateau we were no more seriously troubled during the ten days' retreat, except by mounted troops and mobile detachments who kept at a respectful distance. That the enemy received a very serious blow, and losses far heavier than ours, and gained a wholesome respect for the efficiency of British troops, are facts beyond dispute. . . . One has only to study von Kluck's orders and subsequent movements to appreciate that his army was delayed and misled for a sufficient period to gain valuable time. . .

That view will be the verdict of history, supported as it is by Kluck's account and by Brigadier-General Edmonds's narrative, which is based upon the abundant evidence of official and other documents. A glance at the above diagram of the situation on the eve of Le Cateau, shows that, if Smith-Dorrien had continued his retreat with tired-out troops, the 4th Division would have been left to its fate and probably surrounded. The Ist Corps (Haig) would have been sorely harassed owing to its exposed position. Its situation was eased by the change of direction (towards Le Cateau) of Kluck's IVth and IIIrd Army Corps. Allenby would have experienced almost insurmountable difficulty in regaining touch with and controlling the units of his Cavalry Division.

The historical sources mentioned at the head of this article enable students of history of land warfare to grasp the strategic significance of the resistance offered by the left wing of the British Army to the advance, between Aug. 23 and 26, 1914, of the forces executing the most vital movement in the German plan of campaign. The divisional and regimental histories afford evidence of the value of the dogged fighting, in desperate situations, by units and individuals, some of whom were destined to eat their hearts out for years in German prisons.

Taking these sources in detail, Hamley shows the importance to armies of their lines of communication, and the value of sea-power which enabled the British base to be changed, and the British Army to retreat south-west (after Mons) and south (after Le Cateau), and so to deceive their opponents. Hamley also helps us to follow into the field of strategy the precedent of Waterloo, which is quoted both by Edmonds and by Smith-Dorrien. After Napoleon had compelled Blücher to retreat from Ligny, he expected him to retreat eastward, towards his base in his own country. By retreating northward, towards Wavre, Blücher deceived Napoleon and appeared on his flank at Waterloo. The precedent is very similar.

'1914' discloses many points of value about the personality of an Army Commander, the harassments to which he is likely to be subjected if acting in co-operation with Allies, the fog of war which surrounds him and its persistence long after the event, and the importance of rapid staff work when plans are changed during a retreat in close contact with the enemy. Kluck's reminiscences teach similar lessons. Smith-Dorrien's confirm them. His book is a valuable human document disclosing his motives and the exact information upon which he arrived at his decisions. Matters of fact have been verified from official documents before being recorded. Edmonds's 'official' history is an example of what such works should be, true history without national bias, based upon conscientious research through all the original sources that are accessible.

GEORGE ASTON.