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jos take up a good line to cover the retreat of the IInd Corps towards Bavai, which was to commence at daybreak. Apparently no written order for this retreat was issued, and, as we have seen, the verbal order to retire did not reach the IInd Corps from H.Q. at Le Cateau until too late for the retreat to begin at daybreak, when the Ist Corps had already started. The Official History states that the instructions were given at Le Cateau by the Chief of the General Staff (Sir Archibald Murray) at 'about 1 a.m.,' and that the staff officer of the IInd Corps had to cover 35 miles by motor-car to the H.Q. of his corps. The fact that instructions were issued verbally, as far to the rear as Le Cateau, undoubtedly increased the fog of war and the difficulties of the IInd Corps throughout the whole retreat. This is a matter of staff work. We read in the Official History: 'Before the IInd Corps could retreat, it was imperative that the roads should be cleared of all transport and impedimenta, and the orders to that effect did not filter down to the brigades of the 3rd Division till 4.45 a.m.' The result was that the 5th Division, heavily engaged with the enemy, could not break away and commence its retreat until 11 a.m., and its difficulties were increased by the withdrawal, at 9 a.m., of the brigade borrowed from the Ist Corps.

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8

At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th General French moved up from Le Cateau to his advanced H.Q. at Bavai. Shortly before 1 p.m. a message reached him from Joffre giving Cambrai as the general direction of retirement for the British if the enemy should appear in superior force, with the British eastern flank on Le Cateau (Official History, p. 84). A welcome reinforcement, the 4th Division from England, was arriving by train at Le Cateau and neighbouring stations, and this division (incomplete) was ordered forward to occupy an important position at Solesmes to aid in the retirement. At 6 p.m. Smith-Dorrien saw General French at Bavai, and asked for instructions about further retreat. He was given a free hand to do as he liked, on the understanding that the Ist Corps, on his right, was retiring at 5 a.m. He impressed upon the Chief of Staff the advisability of issuing regular orders. So far, as we have seen, there had been no written orders for the

retreat, and no co-ordination of the retirement of the Ist and IInd Corps, from G.H.Q. At 8.25 p.m. on the 24th the first operation order (No. 7) since the 21st was issued. It contained no information about the enemy, or about the position of the left of the French Army to the eastward. The general plan was thus notified: 'The Army will leave to-morrow, 25th instant, to a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, exact positions will be pointed out on the ground to-morrow.' The allotment of roads showed that during the retreat the Cavalry Division, with the 19th Infantry Brigade attached, would be on the left (westerly) flank, the IInd Corps in the centre, the Ist Corps, with the 5th Cavalry Brigade attached, on the right (easterly) flank; and that from about Bavai onwards the Mormal Forest would divide the two corps, which would regain touch on the Le Cateau position. The 4th Division was not mentioned. (Smith-Dorrien heard of its arrival during the course of the next morning.) G.H.Q. would move from Bavai to Le Cateau at 5 a.m.

At 3.45 p.m. on the 25th the Sub-Chief of the General Staff (Henry Wilson) wrote in a private letter to SmithDorrien: The C.-in-C. has decided to continue the retirement to-morrow, the left, (probably the 4th Division) being directed towards Péronne' (Official History). This letter reached its destination at about 6 p.m. (SmithDorrien). At 9 p.m. operation order No. 8 reached H.Q. of the IInd Corps from G.H.Q., and at 10.15 p.m. SmithDorrien ordered the IInd Corps to continue its retreat the next day (26th). Operation order No. 8 was of great importance. Original copies kept at G.H.Q. and sent to Ist and IInd Corps are marked Issued at 1 p.m.,' with the '1' erased. One copy, preserved by IInd Corps, shows no time of issue. The copy sent to the 4th Division is marked 'Issued at 7.30 p.m.' From the point of view of the IInd Corps the time of receipt (9 p.m.) is the important hour. The order states: 1. The enemy followed our movement this morning, and is also passing troops of all arms to the West and South. 2. It is the

* General French in '1914' gives about 3 p.m.' as the time when he gave the order. If not an error, the 5 hours' delay must have been occupied by the staff in compiling their written order.

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nt dintention of the C.-in-C. to continue the retirement topn'morrow with a view to covering his advanced base and the protect his L. of C.'

bout The advanced base was then at Amiens, and at this Festage we will cross over to Kluck, bearing in mind the quotation from Hamley, with which this article begins, about the situation of an army with its communications cut. General French, in 1914,' refers to this subject, and mom to the 'terrible temptation' to seek shelter in the fortress of Maubeuge on Aug. 24. He adds that he had an instinctive feeling that this was exactly what the enemy was he trying to make him do,* and that having in his mind Sir Edward Hamley's comments on Bazaine's retreat into Metz in 1870, he abandoned all such ideas.' Abundant proof that he was right in this conception can be found in Kluck's account of his intentions. Kluck was, as we have seen, obsessed with the idea that the British lines of communication ran to some point far north of Amiens. His ultimate failure to cut them was due to the fine work done in the rear of the British Army in changing the base from Havre (with advanced base at Amiens) to the mouth of the Loire (with advanced base at Le Mans). This point is emphasised in the new edition of Hamley, and is only mentioned here to show, from operation order No. 8, the influence of exposed communications upon General French's decision to retreat instead of standing on the Le Cateau position, as he originally intended. Before returning to SmithDorrien, and investigating the motives for his momentous decision to stand at bay and to fight the battle of Le Cateau, it will be as well to add a brief note of the moves on the German side, from Aug. 23 to 25. Throughout this period the fog of war was still dense around them. We left Kluck on the night of the 23rd with 3 Army Corps (IV, III, and IX, from west to east) in the front line, their advance delayed for a whole day by the stand of the British IInd Corps, 19th Brigade, and Cavalry Division on the Mons canal. His IInd Corps was in echelon behind his right (westerly) flank, and his IVth Reserve Corps behind. The Cavalry Corps of Marwitz was away to the north towards Courtrai, fortunately for the British Army.

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* A good appreciation. Vide infra.

Kluck tells us (p. 49) that the 'main object' of his operations on Aug. 24 and following days was to force the enemy into Maubeuge,' so French's intuition was not at fault. Kluck also aimed at cutting and obstruct-e a ing the communications of the British Army leading tob the coast.' So French was again right, the difference th being that Kluck did not know to what part of the coast op the British communications led. He hoped to sever d them on the 24th. French, knowing their direction (tom Havre) was not nervous about them until the evening of the 25th, and he then abandoned his plan to stand on the Le Cateau position. By the evening of Aug. 24 Kluck had 2 extra Army Corps (the IInd and IVth Reserve) in readiness for use on the 25th, making 5 Army e Corps in all, and the Cavalry Corps of Marwitz, recalled from its fruitless mission to the north, was now under his orders. He had formed a mistaken impression of the true direction of the British retreat, and his plan for the 25th was to swing his army round like a door, with the hinge a few miles north-east of Bavai, the Cavalry Corps of Marwitz to sweep round the outer flank h to the rear of the British Army and cut off its retreat 'westwards.' His mistaken view of the situation may e be gathered from the fact that he proposed to establish his H.Q. on the 25th at Solesmes, which was still in the hands of the British up to midnight. He slept two miles short of Solesmes, in the only comfortable bed to be found, with his staff sleeping on straw.

We can now return to the British Army, and ascertain the circumstances which led Smith-Dorrien to cancel his order to the IInd Corps to retreat from the Le Cateau position. In 1914' (1st Edition, pp. 78-80), we read that the effect of Smith-Dorrien's stand at Le Cateau was · total loss of at least 40,000 officers and men, about 80 guns,' etc., that 'the effect upon the British Army was to render subsequent conduct of the retreat more difficult and arduous,' and that there is no semblance of truth in the statement' that 'some tacit consent at least was given at Headquarters at St Quentin to the decision arrived at by the commander of the IInd Corps.' The Army Commander was misinformed on these points at some period after the date of his despatch of Sept. 7, 1914, in which he referred to the saving of his

6

left wing on the morning of Aug. 26,' which could never have been accomplished unless a commander of -rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.' In the Official History we read that Smith-Dorrien's troops completely foiled the plan of the German commander (Kluck), who has added his personal testimony i in support of this statement. Joffre expressed similar views in a grateful telegram to French on Aug. 27; the importance to historians of the personal evidence of General Smith-Dorrien on this point needs no further emphasis. The casualties during the battle of Le Cateau were not 40,000 and 80 guns. They were less than 8000 and 38 guns. The extent to which tacit consent was given to Smith-Dorrien from G.H.Q. can be judged by the actual wording of the message of 5 a.m., in reply to Smith-Dorrien's report of his decision: 'If you can hold your ground the situation appears likely to improve. i Fourth Division must co-operate. French troops are taking the offensive on right of Ist Corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not as anxious as you to carry out the retirement, and you must make every endeavour to do so.' This reply, Smith-Dorrien adds, 'cheered me up, for it showed that the chief did not altogether disapprove of the decision I had taken, but on the contrary considered it might improve the situation.' Replying on the telephone to a similar message sent through Sir Henry Wilson, soon after 6.45 a.m., Smith-Dorrien said that he' was feeling confident and hopeful of giving the enemy a smashing blow and slipping away before he could recover,' to which Wilson's reply was, 'Good luck to you. Yours is the first cheerful voice I have heard for three days.' Having cleared up these points, we come back to the stand at Le Cateau and the reasons which made that stand inevitable. On that point SmithDorrien writes: I think I have shown that without risking a debâcle and jeopardising the safety of the 4th Division and the Ist Corps, I had no alternative but to stand and fight.'

Let us examine the position at midnight on Aug. 25-26, when the IInd Corps, 19th Brigade, and Cavalry Division