sued to proceed against him upon this charge whenever he could be taken. But, in the present case, the Americans, sensible that they had a stronger ground of complaint, conducted themselves more temperately, and the President published a* proclamation, commanding all British ships of war to depart from the harbours of the United States, and interdicting the entrance of their ports to the British navy. A fit proviso was added, excepting from the decree, all packet-ships with dispatches, and vessels forced in by distress, or weather, or pursued by an enemy. But the edict, in other respects sufficiently moderate for the occasion, falsely asserted, that the seamen in question had been ascertained

to be citizens of the United States. The congress, in a subsequent + report, prudently waived this point, saying, that whether the men so taken were or were not American subjects, the character of the act of taking them remained the same.

The British government disclaim ed the act of its admiral, and explicitly disavowed the right of searching ships of war. But it was the practice of searching merchant ships which galled the Americans; accustomed, during the last war, to enjoy the whole carrying trade of Europe, and being now deprived of it, they forgot, in their vexation, that France had begun this system of restrictions, and their whole resentment was directed against England. Under this feeling, they co-operated with Buonaparte in his plan of commer

cial warfare: a Non-importation Act, prohibiting many articles of English manufacture, was past in 1806, to see if it would have the effect of intimidating us. It was at various times suspended; but when Buonaparte, and his besotted ally, the Emperor of Russia, had, as far as edicts could do it, closed the ports of Europe against us, then this act was brought forward to be enforced. The tyrannous conduct of France at length extended to America itself; and finding themselves, by the edicts of Milan, and the orders in council, reduced to a choice of difficulties, they adopted the strange expedient of suspending their own commerce entirely, by laying an embargo upon fall exports. In these measures of the American government, there was a semblance of neutrality towards the two contending powers; but, virtually, it was co-operating with France, in the plan of destroying the commerce of Great Britain. Buonaparte was now enabled to give this political experiment a full trial; he had sent an army into Portugal, who drove out the reigning family to their possessions in America, and shut the ports of that kingdom against us. The king of Prussia,|| in a melancholy declaration, prohibited all intercourse between us and his states; and the king of Spain, ¶ so long the tool, and soon to be the victim of the Corsican villain, added one more proof of blind obsequiousness to this treacherous ally, by adopting, in all his dominions, the measures which had been enacted

by France. Thus then, with the single exception of Sweden, was the whole continent of Europe closed against British goods, and our whole import trade from America suddenly suspended.

A circular letter, addressed by the minister of the interior to the chamber of commerce, was annexed in the Moniteur, (the official journal of the French government) to the last Milan decree; and there, amidst much angry declamation against England, the effect which our orders in council must produce in France was confessed. One might have imagined, said M. Cretet, that every obstruction and restraint which clogged the course of commerce, on the continent, had been exhausted; but this new mode of oppression-these last acts of the British government, are the last stage of the oppression of the commerce of the world. We must not shut our eyes to the consequences: importation and exportation, already so much restricted, will soon be much more so: every thing connected with maritime commerce, every thing that depends upon it, will now be liable to more difficulties, and more uncertainty. The consolations which were held out, were a hope that many neutrals would elude the English cruisers; and the plunder which their privateers would obtain, by attacking every ship that, in French language, renounced the independence of its national flag, by navigating under a British licence. French commerce, it was said, will not devote itself uselessly to that sort of warfare which never lets courage, dexterity, and decision go unrewarded. Substitutes also were to be sought for those articles of which France would now, in a great measure, be deprived. Cotton, it was said, would come from the Levant;

and, at a more distant period, that what they produced themselves (for it had been, not unsuccessfully, attempted to cultivate it,) would assist in supporting their manufactures; but, mean time, it would be necessa❤ ry to have recourse, as far as possible, to hemp and flax; and it was desirable that the French people should circumscribe their consumption within the products of homegrown materials, and restrain the unhappy effects of habits and taste contracted for manufactures, that would render them dependent upon foreign commerce. Materials for dying would become scarce; colours, therefore, which had no other advantage, than their apparent greater beauty, would be dispensed with. Sugar and cof fee could not be procured in quantities adequate to the demand for them; but these were objects of secondary utility, the great mass of the people would not suffer by the privation; and habits of indulgence, too widely extended, would be counteracted and restrained by the rise in the price.--M. Cretet concluded, by saying, that "the commerce of Europe would soon, beyond a doubt, be rescued from oppression. The interest of nations, the honour of sovereigns, the magnanimous resolutions of the most powerful of the allies of France; the power and the will of the hero who rules over us; the justice of a cause to which heaven will grant its protection; every motive concurs to decide the contest, nor can its issue remain uncertain."

The power and the will of Buonaparte had, indeed, occasioned this state of things; his will might have terminated it, but his power could not; and whether the people of France, and of the conquered and allied countries, believed in M. Cretet's predictions of a speedy termination or not,

they had no alternative, being compelled to suffer and be silent. In England, the immediate inconvenience which was felt occasioned a partial cry for peace, begun by some of those manufacturers whose trade was at a stand, and supported by others, whose views were less selfish, though not more enlightened. Among these were a considerable part of those persons, who term themselves the religious public; pious and conscientious men, but inconsistent; for, while they admit that the principle of war must be allowed in just cases, they, at all times, and in all cases, cry out against the practice, setting their compassionate feelings in array against the manlier virtues. A superstition* concerning Buonaparte mingled itself with this womanish sensibility; they who had not lost sight of his enormities, doubted whether he were the Beast + or Antichrist; others, whom he had in some degree conciliated, by his various aggressions upon the papal power, forgave him all his crimes, because the whore of Babylon happened to be among those whom he had plundered; they rather imagined him to be the man upon the white horse; in this, however, they were all agreed, that Providence had appointed him for some great purpose, and it was an easy conclusion for those whose weak heads and warm imaginations looked no farther, that it must be unavailing, if not impious, to oppose him. This was a pitiable delusion; but more extraordinary was the weakness of those who, having originally been the friends of France, when they

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imagined that the cause of liberty was implicated in her success, looked with complacency now upon the progress which oppression was making in the world, because France was the oppressor! They had turned their faces toward the east in the morning to worship the rising sun, and now that it was evening, they were look. ing eastward still, obstinately affirming, that still the sun "was there. Meetings were convoked by the manufacturers to petition for peace, cause their trade was injured by the war; and this selfish purpose was disinterestedly assisted by the admirers of Buonaparte, and the apocalypsepoliticians. The good sense of the people frustrated these attempts; few petitions could be carried, and those only in places where a number of workmen had been thrown out of employ. The members of opposition themselves, though ready to concede more than was consistent with the honour or safety of the country, discouraged this mode of proceeding, which so obviously seconded the views of the enemy.

The most conspicuous advocate for peace at this inauspicious season was Mr Roscoe, a man not to be mentioned without respect, even when his errors are noticed. He endeavoured to shew, that we had no reasonable grounds for being at war, and that ministers were insincere in professing themselves ready to make peace upon fair terms, because fair terms were always to be had. But as forthe ground of the war, it was plainly stated by Mr Addington, when he said, "we are at war because we

cannot be at peace." This was the general feeling of the people of England, and it was this deep and wellfounded conviction which occasioned that acclamation of joy at Lloyd's, when the commencement of hostilities was made known. That peace was desirable no man doubted, if any thing more than the name of peace could be obtained; but the experiment was tried for eighteen months, and, during the whole of that armed truce, the enemy was steadily pursuing his plans of usurpation upon the continent; collecting, by means of his commercial commissioners, information how best to attempt the invasion of these islands, and preparing a navy which would enable him to effect it. Unquestionably it was his sincere desire to make just such a peace with us again; and we might well believe him when he said so."We want to be at peace," is the language of his officers, who have been taken prisoners: "we want peace for six years; that will be time enough for us to build a navy which shall outnumber yours, and to train up sailors for it, and then we will come over and conquer you." This language has been held, and it is too sensible to leave any doubt of its sin

cerity upon a mind not closed against all argument. With all the coast of Europe at his command, it is in Buonaparte's power to build ships, outnumbering ours, in the proportion of ten to one, or twenty to one, if they were thought needful. He may build them at any time, but it is only in peace that he can man them; and it is for this object, and this only, that he is desirous of peace.* Peace would give him the power of invading us; and is there any man foolish enough, or hardy enough, to affirm, that he wants the will to do it?

It was thus that those persons argued who differed in opinion from Mr Roscoe, and they were the great majority of the people of England. In fact, his whole reasonings resolved themselves into this proposition, that the personal character of Buonaparte had nothing to do with the propriety of making peace with him, for that the government of France, like other governments, would observe treaties just so long as they were convenient to its interests, and no longer. But France had no other rule of government than the will and pleasure of its lord and master; every thing, therefore, depends upon his personal character; and that character, even

though its last and consummating act of villainy, the usurpation of Spain, had not then been perpetrated, was already more atrocious than that of any chieftain who had ever before ruled over a civilized people. On this ground we should take our stand, and openly proclaim to France, and to all Europe, that England never will, on any terms, make peace with Napoleon Buonaparte. It cannot be done with honour, it cannot be done with safety. What would be said of the merchant who should hazard his whole property in engagements with a man notoriously dishonest, but that he deserved the ruin that would befal him? Switzerland, Prussia, and Tuscany, have shown what are the consequences of French friendship. Looking at the question, with reference to our national honour, (and in this point we ought always to behold it,) the argument against treating with Napoleon Buonaparte becomes yet more forcible. The private, personal murders which he has committed, stamp him with a peculiar and individual guilt, which distinguishes him from the other scour ges of mankind, whose pleasure, like his, has been in conquest. That of the Duc d'Enghein, it belonged to the Bourbons, to Germany, and Rus

sia, to avenge. For Pichegru and Villeneuve, it was the business of France to take vengeance. But the murder of Palm was an offence committed against all states and people, against all principles of law and justice and social order; it was an act by which he outlawed himself in human society, and, from the hour in which it was committed, he was under the ban of human nature. There is also one crime committed peculiarly against England, which should for ever preclude the possibility of treating with its perpetrator; the murder of captain Wright, an Eng-lish officer, put to death in prison. That captain Wright was murdered, no inquest or jury of Englishmen would hesitate to pronounce, from the evidence before them, furnished, as it is, wholly by his murderers. For the sake of the living, as well as the dead, it behoved us to take cognizance of this foul deed; and any minister who should have advised his majesty never to enter into any treaty with the tyrant who committed it, would have received the support of the whole British people. Well had it been for us, if, from the beginning of this war, we had at all times studiously distinguished between the French nation and its ru

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