THE DUTY OF OBEDIENCE TO THE

CIVIL MAGISTRATE.

PART II.

"RENDER THEREFORE UNTO CESAR THE THINGS THAT ARE CESAR'S, AND UNTO GOD THE THINGS THAT ARE GOD's."

Matthew xxii. 21.

In the preceding discourse, I have endeavored to show that every disciple of Christ is under imperative obligations to obey the civil magistrate, so long as the civil magistrate obeys the social and moral laws by virtue of which his office has been created. While the magistracy employs itself in the administration of justice, in the protection of innocence, and the punishment of crime, and in the discharge of those duties, which, for the sake of convenience, the public has voluntarily confided to it, Christ commands us not merely to yield it our obedience, but to proffer to it our cheerful and disinterested support. We may not too closely scrutinize the extent of our obligation for the selfish purpose of ascertaining how little we may do and yet escape censure. We are to look upon civil society as one of our greatest sublunary blessings, and we must cherish, and succor, and sustain it, not from wrath, (the fear of wrath,) but for conscience' sake; not because physical force would, if necessary, compel us, but because we thus most effectually subserve the interests of good order and happiness, of virtue and religion.

So much as this, then, the gospel commands, in respect to

our obedience to civil government. Beyond this I know not that it utters any command whatever. The acts, therefore, the laws, the requirements of civil society, like the acts, the laws, the requirements of the church, or of any other society, are amenable to the tribunal of reason, and conscience, and the word of God. The Christian is at liberty to inquire whether any act of the government transgresses the limit within which its action is, by reason and revelation, restricted; and yet more, to determine, concerning every one of its actions, whether it be right or wrong. At liberty, did I say? He is more than at liberty, he is obliged thus to inquire and to determine. He is a party to every act of the society of which he is a member. He is an intelligent moral agent, responsible to God for his actions, whether they be personal or associated, and therefore he must think about civil government, and act about it, according to the light which God has given him, all things else to the contrary notwithstanding.

I therefore, as a Christian citizen, look upon the civil government and the civil magistracy with as unblenching an eye as I look upon any thing else. In simplicity and godly sincerity, not in the spirit of strife or partisanship, I may pronounce my opinion upon its enactments and measures, just as I would express my opinions in any other case. I see in presidents, cabinets, senators, representatives, and all the array of the civil magistracy, nothing but men, fallible men, of like passions with myself. Every page of the history of the past has shown that men placed in such situations have been exceedingly prone to err and to do wickedly. I cannot, therefore, worship men in power. In so far as they are virtuous men, I love them. In so far as they are able men, I respect them. In so far as, with an honest and true heart, they labor to discharge the solemn duties to which they have been appointed, I honor and I venerate them. I will pay all due deference to the offices which they hold, and will bow with seemly respect to the men who hold them. These men are to me the representatives on earth of eternal justice and unsullied truth; and may my arm fall

palsied from my shoulder-blade when I refuse to raise it in token of respect to him who is called of God to minister under so solemn a responsibility.

But all this veneration is due, not to the man, but to the magistrate; and it is due to him, therefore, only so long as he confines himself to the duties of his office, and discharges them with pure and patriotic intentions. I have a right to inquire whether his actions in his office conform to the principles of justice. He must claim for himself no immunity from scrutiny on account of the dignity of his station. If he use the power committed to him for any other purpose than that for which it was committed; if he prostitute his official influence to pander to the wishes of a political party; if he sacrifice the gravest interests of his country for the sake of securing to himself the emoluments of office; if he trample the national honor in the dust in order to minister to the grasping selfishness of a contemptible clique,— that moment every vestige of his sacredness is gone forever. He stands before me like Samson from the lap of Delilah. Shake himself as he may, it matters not to me, his strength is departed from him. But this is not all: not only is his official sacredness departed, has become to me the most odious of despicable men. He has sacrificed his country to his lusts. He has bartered away the well-being of millions for food to nourish his vices. Whether in office or out of it, whether powerful or powerless, I can look upon him henceforth with no other feelings than those of pity and disgust.

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But this may become a yet more practical matter. The magistrate may not only do wrong himself, but he may command me to do wrong. How shall I regard this command? I will regard it as I do any other command to do wrong, I will not obey it. I will look the magistracy calmly and respectfully in the face, and declare to it that in this matter I owe it no allegiance. I will have nothing to do with its wrong-doing. I will separate myself, as far as possible, from the act and its consequences, whether they be prosperous or adverse.

It is

wickedness; it has the curse of God inwrought into it, and I will have nothing to do with it. From the beginning to the end, I will eschew it, and the rewards that it offers. The magistracy may punish me; I cannot help that. I will not resist, but I will not do wrong, nor will I be a party to wrong, let the magistracy or aught else command me.

In saying this, I hope that I arrogate to myself nothing in the least peculiar. I am only in the plainest and simplest manner stating the rights and obligations of an intelligent moral being, accountable to God for his actions, and bound to reverence his Creator above all else in the universe. Created under such a responsibility, can I transfer the allegiance which I owe to God, to legislative assemblies, to political caucuses, to mass meetings, to packed or unpacked conventions representing or pretending to represent the assumed omnipotence of public opinion? My whole moral nature with loathing forbids it. I could not do it without feeling that I had become a despicable slave. I could not do it without knowing that I had exchanged the glorious and incorruptible God for an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things, and worshipped the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forever. My fellow-citizens must not ask this of me; I will surrender, for my country, my possessions, my labor, my life, but I will not sacrifice my integrity; and that is unworthy of being the country of a good man which shall ask it.

But here it seems proper that I illustrate more clearly the nature of that limit, beyond which the Christian obligation of obedience to the magistrate ceases. I proceed to offer a few suggestions on this part of our subject.

I have said that the great end for which civil society is established, and the magistracy appointed, is, to secure to man the enjoyment of those rights with which he was endowed by his Creator. If society or the magistracy interfere with those rights, it is tyranny. If its acts transcend the limits of the authority committed to it, it is guilty of usurpation. In

neither of these cases does the gospel of Jesus Christ command us to render to it obedience.

The civil magistrate has frequently persecuted men even unto death for believing the gospel of Jesus Christ. Here he not only does not secure the enjoyment of an inalienable right, -he goes farther and actually prohibits it. He demands of the conscience that it bow down to him rather than to its Maker. I need not repeat here the precepts of Christ which I have already quoted in reference to this subject. You all know that we are commanded under such circumstances, on the peril of our souls, to pay no respect to the precepts of the magistracy. "Fear not," saith our Lord, "those that kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him that is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Here, then, is a plain case, in which the magistrate, by inhibiting instead of securing the rights conferred on man by his Creator, has forfeited his claim to obedience; I do not say to all obedience, but to obedience in just so far as his commands interfere with the rights of man or the commandments of God.

The magistrate may also forfeit his claim to obedience by usurpation, that is, by employing his official power for other purposes than those for which it was committed to him. One of the most common instances of this form of wrong is found in the case of war. To this case let us direct our attention.

I have already remarked that the supreme power is conferred on the magistracy for the purpose of securing to every individual the rights conferred on him by the Creator. I have also said that in the exercise of this power the magistracy may defend the individual against wrong, whether it be offered by its own citizens or by strangers. It may, consistently with this principle, use force in order to extend its protection to innocence, if it can accomplish this purpose by no other means. But, while all this is admitted, we are carefully to observe the limitations with which this admission is guarded. The object for which this power is conferred is, to secure to the citizen the enjoyment of his rights. Hence, for no other