grefs of the allied arms. Not that they were ftopped by any confiderable obftruction from the main body of the French in that quarter, but from fome effects in another quarter of the unfuccessful beginning of the campaign, from which the battle of Minden had not yet perfectly disengaged them. Munfter was ftill behind them, and ftill in the hands of the enemy, who had a powerful garrifon in that city. M. de Contades, who even after his defeat exceeded the allies in numbers, and had now no further view of an offenfive campaign, fent a ftrong body under d'Armentieres, which was reinforced by fome troops from the Lower Rhine, to near fifteen thousand men, to cover that place. Prince Ferdinand had before detached General Imhoff from Caffel in order to reduce it. On the approach of d'Armentieres, Imhoff was obliged to raise the fiege. But being foon after reSept. 6. inforced, the French commander retired in his turn towards, Wefel, the poffeffion of which place has all along proved of infinite importance to the French in all their operations. The fiege of Munfter was again refumed, but the bufinefs threatened to be difficult and tedious. This however was the. only rub which the allies encountered. In all other refpects they were perfectly fortunate. They had driven their enemy two hundred miles before them,, and at the end of the campaign, after all their efforts, and all their fanguine hopes of conqueft, fet them down jut where they had begun it.

The event of the battle of Minden, and the fubfequent misfortunes of the French arms, threw Verfailles into the utmost confufion.

The

news of that defeat arrived just as the King was taking horfe to hunt. He retired filent and dejected into the apartment of Madam de Pompadour, and for fome time faw none of his minifters. The Duke of Broglio and M. de Contades mutually accufed each other, for the ill conduct of the day. The public acquitted Broglio. Belleifle and his general Contades loft all reputation: but the duke ftill preferved his employment and a confiderable part of his influence at court.

As foon as the first confufion and farprize of fo unexpected an event was a little abated; it was refolved to fend reinforcements to their army in Germany, and at the fame time to fend thither fome officer of experience and authority, who might judge, and compofe if poffible, the differences which fubfifted between the commanders; as well as to aflift in the deliberations for retrieving their affairs. Public misfortunes call great men from their obfcurity. M. de Etrees was chofen on this occafion, and invefted with the authority which he unwillingly accepted. When he arrived at the Sept. 25. French camp, he could not avoid a figh on viewing of the ruins of that army, which had tri-` umphed under his command at Haftenbeck. However his behaviour to M. de Cortades was polite and generous. The old Marechal told him that he was not come to take his command, but to ferve upder him; and whilst he affifted him with his advice, he would receive his orders.

Whilft the French endeavoured to piece up.their broken fortune in Germany, they made fome fhew

of pushing the other part of their scheme with vigour. All their ports were full of the preparations for an invafion of the British dominions. Men of war, tranfports and flat bottomed boats, now almoft a word of ridicule, were prepared with great diligence. They talked of a triple embarkation. M. Thurot was to command a fmall fquadron and feveral tranfports from Dunkirk, which it was believed were intended for Scotland. This man from the mafter of a merchant ship, became a captain of a privateer, in which capacity he greatly annoyed the English trade, and acquired a reputation. At a time when France does not abound with great men, his fervices in this way, and his daring fpirit, recommended him to a command in the King's fervice.

"

The defign against England, as the voyage hither is the fhorteft, was to be attempted from Havre, and fome other ports of Normandy, in flat bottomed boats. The third embarkation, which was fuppofed against Ireland, was to be made from Vannes in the Lower Brittany, where a large body of troops was affembled, commanded by the Duke d'Aguillon governor of that province. This embarkation was to be covered by the fleet under M. de Conflans, which was preparing with great diligence in Breft. Had this defign been fuch as it was reprefented, and had it been put into execution, there is no doubt but fuch an attempt upon both kingdoms, at three different places at once, must have thrown the whole into no fmall confufion.

But ex

A fquadron under Commodore Boys was ftationed before Dunkirk. Admiral Rodney was fent to bombard Havre, which fervice he performed with fuccefs. Admiral Hawke blocked up the harbour of Breft with a ftrong fquadron, whilft a leffer kept a watch upon that of Vannes. Thefe precautions were continued the whole fummer, during which time the French proceeded rather flowly, but after the battle of Minden had deftroyed their hopes in Germany, they turned to this object with the greater attention. What iffue it had we fhall relate in its proper place. But their first attempts on the ocean proved as unfuccefsful as their arms on land.

A great fleet was equipped at Toulon, which fome deftined for America, whilft others believed it was defigned to unite itself with that of Breft to favour the invasion. Admiral Bofcawen who commanded in the Mediterranean, blocked up this fquadron, until fome unfavourable weather and the foulness of his fhips obliged him to return to Gibraltar to refit. The French took this opportunity to fail out, and they proAug. 14. ceeded with great diligence to the freights.

They had arrived very near Gibraltar before the admiral had notice of their approach; but notwithstanding that our fhips were not perfectly prepared to fail, the admiral ufed fuch great expedition that in two hours after the account arrived the English fleet was out at fea.

The English fleet was compofed of fourteen fhips of the line befides frigates. The enemy had twelve of the line. They were fuperior in the bulk of their fhips and in the

number

number of men, if they were inferior in the number of veffels; and it is

fhips, the Ocean and the Redoutable, were run on fhore and burn

ment, that if they had formed a line of battle and fought Mr. Bofcawen in order, they might very well have hoped for a better iffue of this matter than they found. But the evil genius of France operating on the cowardice or incapacity of their commander, induced them to feparate their fleet and fly. The English fhips were newly refitted; they proved better failors, and the men animated with the fpirited example of their admiral, engaged the French fhips as they could overtake them; and they overtook fome of them off Cape Lagos in Portugal. A brifk engagement enfaed. Two of the enemies

la Clue the French admiral, who efcaped to land; but being grievously wounded, and as it is faid having loft both his legs, he died. foon after. Two other capital fhips, the Centaure and Modefte, were taken.

The fcattered remains of their fleet with difficulty got into the harbour of Cadiz, where they were foon after blocked up, and where they fill remain. This action happened on the 18th of Auguft; and it gave a great eclat to the British arms, which in the fame month had triumphed fo fignally both by fea and land.

S the King of Pruffia's victory at Rofbach had given the Hanoverians an opportunity to free their country, it might be expected that the affair at Minden would have ferved to free his Pruffian Majefty from fome of the numerous armies that oppreffed him. But as this battle was fought in the middle of the feafon for action, and as Munfter fill continued in the poffeffion of the French, Prince Ferdinand could not venture at that time, to make any detachment from his army in the King's favour, without rifquing all the advantages which he had obtained from his victory. The King of Pruffia was therefore left alone to ftruggle with

Auftrians, Ruffians, Imperialists and Swedes.

The Ruffians, whofe motions governed thofe of all the other armies, left their camp at Pofna in Poland, and quitting the Viftula, drew near to the banks of the Oder. They were under the command of a Ruffian nobleman, Count Soltikoff. Count Dohna who had been ordered to oppofe them, faw that their numbers were too confiderable, and their pofts too ftrong to be attacked with any profpect of advantage, fo that he contented himself with obferving their motions, and harrafling their march. This conduct feemed more dilatory and timid than the circumftances, or the ins C 4 clinations

clinations of the King could bear. He is faid to have, reproached that general in fo fevere a manner, for a conduct in which he was in all probability very justifiable, that he took the firft opportunity to refign his command, and under a pretence of recovering his health, retired to Berlin. The King immediately put General Wedel into his place, with pofitive orders to engage the Ruffian army at all events. To enable him to obey his commands, he reinforced him with feveral detachments from his own army. The pofitiveness of the King's orders on this occafion may perhaps be cenfured, but it must be owned that the time required a courfe next to defperate. His hereditary dominion were in the utmost danger, and nothing but fome great and fortunate ftroke could effectually prevent the junction of the Auftrian and Ruffian armies, an event which of all others he had the greatest reafon to dread.

Fortified in fome measure by the reinforcements he had received, and in confequence of his orders, General Wedel refolved to attack the Ruffians on their march. They had

got to Zulichau, and diuly 23. rected their courfe to Croffen in Silefia, to get before the Pruffian army and to make good the paffage of the Oder. The fituation of the Ruffians was very advantageous; pofled upon eminences, defended by a powerful artillery, and near feventy thousand ftrong. The Pruffian army fell fhort of thirty thoufand; and they had greater difadvantages than their inferiority of number to get over. They had a bridge to pafs, and fuch a narrow defile to ftruggle through, that fcarce a third of a

battalion could march in front. The ground was fuch that the cavalry could not fupport their infantry. Yet with all thefe difficulties the attack was long and resolute. But this refolution made their repulfe, which all these difadvantages had rendered inevitable, far more bloody and diftrefsful. Four thoufand feven hundred were killed or prifoners; the wounded came to three thousand. General Woberfnow, an officer of great ability, was killed, and General Manteuffel was wounded.

The Pruffians were obliged to retire, but they were not purfued, and they paffed the Oder without moleftation. The Ruffians feized upon the towns of Croffen and Frankfort on the Oder.

The King of Pruffia fince the beginning of the war, had never hitherto obtained an advantage where he was not perfonally prefent. His prefence now became more neceffary than ever. Since the action at Žulichau the Ruffians had pene, trated a confiderable way into his territories, and had taken poffeffion of the important city of Frankfort upon the Oder. He therefore marched with ten thousand of his beft troops, to join the broken army of Wedel, in order to drive this formidable and determined enemy from his country. Prince Henry commanded the remainder of his army, which was too well pofted to fear any infult during his abfence. The eyes of all were fixed upon his march, and his foldiers who remembered Zorndorf eagerly longed to try their ftrength once more with the fame antagonists.

M. Daun was not unapprifed of the motions of the Ruffians, or the defigns of the King of Pruffia. He knew that the great fault of the

Ruffian

Ruffian troops, was the want of a regular and firm cavalry, which might be depended upon in a day of action. This defect was a principal caufe of their misfortune at Zorndorf in the last year; a miffortune which difconcerted all the operations of that campaign. As this was the only want which the Ruffians were under, fo it was that which Daun was beft able to fupply at a fhort warning. With this view he felected about twelve thousand of his horfe, and there is no better horfe than that of the Auftrians, which, with about eight thousand foot, he placed under the command of General Laudohn, one of the ableft officers in that fervice. This body was divided into two columns, one of which marched through Silefia, and the other through Lufatia. By extreme good fortune and conduct, with little lofs or oppofition, they both joined the Ruffian army, and were received with tranfports of joy.

In the mean time, the King of Pruffia, who was unable to prevent this ftroke, joined General Aug. 4. Wedel at Muhlrofe, and took upon him the command of the united armies. But ftill finding himfelf too weak for the decifive action he was preparing to attempt, he recalled Gen. Finck, whom he had fent fome time before into Saxony with nine thousand men, in order to oppofe the Imperalifts in that country. With thefe reinforcements he was not able to raife his army to fifty thoufand compleat. That of the Ruffians, fince the junction of Laudohn, was upwards of ninety thoufand. They had befides taken a poft, which they had fo ftrongly entrenched, and defended with fuch a prodigious number of cannon, that it was extremely difficult and

hazardous to attempt them, yet under thefe accumulated difadvantages, it was abfolutely neceflary that he should fight. The detachments from Count Daun's army already menaced Berlin; Saxony, which he was obliged to leave expofed, had become a prey to the Imperialists; and the Ruffians, united with the Auftrians, encamped before his eyes in Silefia, the beft and richest part of his dominions. In fhort, his former reputation, his prefent difficulties, his future hopes, every motive of honour and of fafety demanded an engagement; the campaign hafted to a decifion, and it was evident that nothing farther could be done by marches and choice of pofts. The fanguine temper of other generals has often obliged them to fight under disadvantages; but the King of Pruffia's circumftances were fuch, that, from the multitude of his enemies, he was neither able to confult times nor fituations. Rafhnefs could hardly dictate any thing, which, in his condition, would not have been recommended by prudence.

Aug. 12.

When the attack was refolved, the King's troops put themselves in motion at two in the morning, and having formed themfelves in a wood, advanced towards the enemy. It was near eleven before the action began. The principal effort of the King of Pruffia was against the left wing of the Ruffian army. He began, according to their ufual method, with a fierce cannonade, which having had the effect he defired from it, he attacked that wing with feveral battalions difpofed in columns.

The Ruffian entrenchments were forced with great flaughter. Seventy-two pieces of cannon were

taken.