Qui de Legibus scripserunt, omnes vel tanquam Philosophi vel tanquam Jurisconsulti argumentum illud tractaverunt. Atque Philosophi proponunt multa dictu pulchra, sed ab usu remota. Jurisconsulti autem, suæ quisque patriæ legum, vel etiam Romanarum aut Pontificiarum, placitis obnoxii et addicti, judicio sincero non utuntur; sed tanquam e vinculis sermocinantur. Certe cognitio ista ad viros civiles proprie spectat; qui optime norunt quid ferat societas humana, quid salus populi, quid æquitas naturalis, quid gentium mores, quid rerumpublicarum formæ diversæ ; ideoque possint de Legibus, ex principiis et præceptis tam æquitatis naturalis quam politices, decernere. Quamobrem id nunc agatur, ut Fontes Justitiæ et Utilitatis Publicæ petantur, et in singulis Juris partibus Character quidam et Idea Justi exhibeatur, ad quam particularium regnorum et rerumpublicarum leges probare, atque inde emendationem moliri, quisque cui hoc cordi erit et curæ possit. Hujus igitur rei, more nostro, Exemplum in uno titulo proponemus.

Exemplum Tractatus de Justitia Universali, sive de Fontibus Juris, in uno titulo, per Aphorismos.

PROCEMIUM.

APHORISMUS 1.

IN Societate Civili, aut Lex aut Vis valet. Est autem et vis quædam legem simulans, et lex nonnulla magis vim sapiens quam æquitatem juris. Triplex est igitur Injustitæ Fons; Vis mera; Illaqueatio malitiosa prætextu Legis; et Acerbitas ipsius Legis.

APHORISMUS 2.

Firmamentum Juris Privati tale est. Qui injuriam facit, re utilitatem aut voluptatem capit, exemplo periculum. Cæteri utilitatis aut voluptatis illius participes non sunt, sed exemplum ad se pertinere putant. Itaque facile coëunt in consensum, ut caveatur sibi Fer Leges; ne injuriæ per vices ad singulos redeant. Quod si ex ratione temporum et communione culpæ id eveniat, ut pluribus et potentioribus per legem aliquam periculum creetur quam caveatur, factio solvit legem; quod et sæpe fit.1

1 The doctrine of this aphorism resembles that of Hobbes, inasmuch as there is no recognition of the principle that moral ideas lie at the root of civil rights. All the evidence of which the nature of the subject admits tends to show that society has always been held together, not by fear, but by notions more or less perfectly developed of the distinction between right and wrong; and to assert that in the absence of any such notions selfish fear could serve as the "firmamentum juris privati," is at best to assert that which never has been proved and never can be.

Of course it is not meant to deny that fear is the principle by means of which the moral force of society becomes efficient in the repression of crime.

[That a notion of the distinction between right and wrong in general lies at the bottom of all our notions of individual rights and wrongs; that. when we think of one man as doing an injury to another, we think of him as doing something not only in its effect hurtful, but in its nature unjust; I do not think Bacon would have denied. That in the absence of any such notion the interest which all men have in protection from injury would lead them to concur in the measures necessary to secure protection to each, he would not, I think, have affirmed. But such questions did not enter into the practical problem with which he had to deal; which was this Given our common notions of right and wrong, jus and injuria, with all their constituent elements, what is the principle by which they are made to bear upon the protection of individuals? To this he answers: It is the interest which each individual has in being himself protected. That the personal interest would be insufficient without the sanction of the "moral idea" to stimulate and support it, is probably true; for we see that actions the most dangerous to society, if committed by madmen, and therefore not objects of moral disapprobation, are exempted from punishment; the necessity of self-defence requiring only that measures be taken

APHORISMUS 3.

At Jus Privatum sub tutela Juris Publici latet. Lex enim cavet civibus, magistratus legibus. Magistratuum autem authoritas pendet ex majestate imperii, et fabrica politiæ, et legibus fundamentalibus. Quare, si ex illa parte sanitas fuerit et recta constitutio, leges erunt in bono usu; sin minus, parum in iis præsidii erit.

APHORISMUS 4.

Neque tamen Jus Publicum ad hoc tantum spectat, 'ut addatur tanquam custos Juri Privato, ne illud violetur, atque ut cessent injuriæ; sed extenditur etiam ad religionem et arma et disciplinam et ornamenta et opes, denique ad omnia circa Bene Esse civitatis.

APHORISMUS 5.

Finis enim et scopus quem leges intueri, atque ad quem jussiones et sanctiones suas dirigere debent, non alius est quam ut cives fœliciter degant. Id fiet, si

to prevent the recurrence of them, and the sense of justice refusing to sanction any further severity. But that the "moral idea," unassisted by the sense of personal interest, could be still less relied upon as a "firmamentum privati juris," seems to me still more certain; for we see that the penalties exacted or denounced by the laws, though proportioned with tolerable accuracy to the danger of the offence, bear no proportion at all to the moral disapprobation of which it is the object. Actions which are morally wrong in the highest degree, if they be such as every man may protect himself against, are not punished at all. Actions which the moral sense scarcely condemns, if such that the general permission of them would entail a general insecurity of property, are punished with great severity. And the truth seems to be, that to make an action seem a fit object of punishment, there must be something morally offensive in it, but that the nature and amount of punishment varies according to the interest of society in preventing it, and the difficulty of effecting that end. Men are not content with less severity than they think necessary for their protection, nor do they feel justified in using more. -- J. S.]

pietate et religione recte instituti; moribus honesti; armis adversus hostes externos tuti; legum auxilio adversus seditiones et privatas injurias muniti; imperio et magistratibus obsequentes; copiis et opibus locupletes et florentes fuerint. Harum autem rerum instrumenta et nervi sunt leges.

APHORISMUS 6.

Atque hunc finem optimæ leges assequuntur, plurimæ vero ipsarum aberrant. Leges enim mirum in modum, et maximo intervallo, inter se differunt; ut aliæ excellant; aliæ mediocriter se habeant; aliæ prorsus vitiosæ sint. Dictabimus igitur, pro judicii nostri modulo, quasdam tanquam Legum Leges, ex quibus informatio peti possit, quid in singulis legibus bene aut perperam positum aut constitutum sit.

APHORISMUS 7.

Antequam vero ad corpus ipsum legum particularium deveniamus, perstringemus paucis virtutes et dignitates legum in genere. Lex bona censeri possit, quæ sit intimatione certa; præcepto justa; executione commoda; cum forma politice congrua; et generans virtutem in subditis.

TITULUS I.

De Prima Dignitate Legum, ut sint Certœ.

justa esse possit.

APHORISMUS 8.

Legis tantum interest ut certa sit, ut absque hoc nec Si enim incertam vocem det tuba, bellum ?1 Similiter, si incertam

quis se parabit ad

11 Corinth. xiv. 8.

Ut

vocem det lex, quis se parabit ad parendum? moneat igitur oportet, priusquam feriat. Etiam illud recte positum est; optimam esse legem, quæ minimum relinquit arbitrio judicis: id quod certitudo ejus præs

tat.

APHORISMUS 9.

Duplex legum Incertitudo: altera, ubi lex nulla præscribitur; altera, ubi ambigua et obscura. Itaque de Casibus Omissis a lege primo dicendum est; ut in his etiam inveniatur aliqua norma Certitudinis.

De Casibus Omissis a Lege.

APHORISMUS 10.

Angustia prudentiæ humanæ casus omnes quos tempus reperit non potest capere. Non raro itaque se ostendunt casus omissi et novi. In hujusmodi casibus triplex adhibetur remedium, sive supplementum; vel per processum ad similia; vel per usum exemplorum, licet in legem non coäluerint; vel per jurisdictiones quæ statuunt ex arbitrio boni viri et secundum discretionem sanam; sive illæ Curiæ fuerint Prætoriæ sive Censoriæ.

De Processu ad Similia, et Extensionibus Legum.

APHORISMUS 11.

In Casibus Omissis deducenda est norma legis a similibus; sed caute, et cum judicio. Circa quod servandæ sunt regulæ sequentes. Ratio prolifica, Consuetudo sterilis esto, nec generet casus. Itaque quod contra rationem juris receptum est, vel etiam ubi ratio

1 Arist. Rhet. i. 1.