they could transgress; and therefore they could not be sinners, the apostle himself being judge, who declares, that "where there is no law, there is no transgression," Rom. 4: 15. This again could not be said without contradicting Paul, who has laboured through the latter part of the 1st chapter of this epistle, and occasionally in the 2d and 3d chapters, to prove that all the heathen are sinners, and has expressly asserted (Rom. 2: 14), that "the heathen who have no law, are a law unto themselves." Thirdly an objector might say, in the way of parrying or abating the force of the apostle's declaration viz. "until the law sin was in the world," that 'men without a revelation put no right estimate on the nature or conse-, quences of sin, and therefore could not fairly stand chargeable with it.' But what says the apostle to this? His answer is, that supposing this to be true, or conceding it to be so, still it does by no means follow that sin was not in the world; for death reigned from the time of Adam down to that of Moses, even over those who did not, like Adam, sin against an expressly revealed law, but only against the law that was in themselves.'

It is plain that the first of these objections is so palpably grounded as to need no contradiction. The second had alreaby been more than once directly contradicted by what the apostle had already said. The third, which was specious only because it seemed to contain matter of fact that could not be denied, the apostle contradicts so far as it applied to the case in hand, by averring that death, the consequence of sin, had exercised its dominion over all men during the period spoken of. The inevitable deduction from this is, that the men of that period were considered as sinners on the part of the divine Being, because they were treated as such; and his decisions and dealings must unquestionably be right and proper.

Thus we can perceive some good reason why the apostle has brought forward the allegation, that sin is not made account of where there is no law. One cannot parry or evade the force of his preceding declaration, that "before the law sin was in the world," even if he allege that the men of that period did not put any right estimate upon its odious nature. In technical language we might say: The apostle demurs to this plea, and shows its inappositeness and insufficiency.

One thing more might be said, with some show of reason, against the exegesis which I am defending. This is, that did

would have more force and real propriety of meaning, if we should construe the whole thus: Sin is not imputed where there is no law; but still (alla) death did actually reign from Adam to Moses; therefore the sin of Adam was put to the account of men, and by reason of this death reigned.' Should this be alleged, the answer is obvious. First the imputation denied (o vz ¿lloyɛita) cannot, in such a case, respect Adam's sin, but men's own sins; and therefore it makes nothing for the cause of supposititious imputation. Secondly, this mode of interpretation makes out a direct contradiction, as has already been remarked, not only to what the apostle has said in the preceding part of this epistle, which declares the heathen to be sinners, but also to the historical facts and declarations contained in the book of Genesis.

There seems therefore, to be no way of escape left for those who advocate the translation of loyɛiraι by imputed here, but to aver, as Tholuck and others have done, that the phrase is to be understood only in a comparative sense, i. e. the apostle means to say, that the guilt of men destitute of a revelation is comparatively small. But conceding this fact, (which no doubt is true), still it does not meet the difficulty before us. The apostle has it in his purpose to show, that all men were sinners before the law of Moses was given. The question, how great their sins were, or how much their offences were aggravated, is not at all to his purpose. "The soul that sinneth shall die," and "whosoever keepeth the whole law and yet offendeth in one point is guilty of all," are eternal principles of divine legislation and justice. Be it that the heathen were not sinners in such a high sense as the Jews were, yet they sinned enough to deserve and receive condemnation; otherwise the first part of the writer's epistle is not true. We must therefore reject this accommodation of the difficulty, which is proposed by Tholuck and adopted by some others, because it makes the apostle reason irrelatively, and therefore inconclusively.

From considerations such as these, I am induced to abide by the rendering of 5: 13 as proposed above in the second place, viz., Sin is NOT MADE ACCOUNT OF where there is no law. I cannot find another sense here for loyɛitai, which seems to me consistent with the sentiments of Paul, or congruous with the text. At all events, if ¿loyɛitae must here be rendered imputed, it can mean nothing but the imputation of men's own sins to themselves. On any other ground it expressly denies

the imputation of Adam's sin to men, before the law of Moses was given. This is the last meaning, therefore, for which the advocates of supposititious imputation could well contend.

One other example occurs in the New Testament of the use of hoy. It is in Philemon v. 18: "If he [Onesimus] hath done thee wrong (ndixnoe oe), or is in debt to thee ( ogie), put this to my account, or reckon this to me, (TOUTO ¿μoi 2Aoye"). Paul means to say, as it seems to me, that from his affectionate regard to Onesimus, he would willingly take on himself the reparation of any wrong or injury which he may have done his master by abstracting his services from him, or by flying from the payment of some debt that was due. He agrees to become accountable for any and every thing of this nature, in case Philemon will forgive and kindly receive his fugitive servant. But the whole matter here taken into consideration is a civil wrong, viz., the withholding of service or of money due; and as such, there was a kind of responsibility which another could take, or there was a debt which another could pay. The moral wrong or the sin, in this case, does not appear at all to be here in the view of the apostle. That was a thing which Philemon could not adjust; it was a matter between Onesimus and his omniscient Judge.

That the word loyé means, or may mean, to reckon to, to put to the account of, there can be no just ground of doubt. The etymology of the word (ev and loyos) would plead loudly for this. This is the natural and proper meaning of the word in Philem. v. 18. But here it is to be remembered, that Paul himself makes the proposal to have the malfeasance of Onesimus put to his account, i. e. Paul proposes to be responsible for a reparation of the civil wrongs which Onesimus has committed; not to be punished in his room, or to take upon himself the moral guilt of the offending party. But that loyé, like λoyiἐλλογέω, Souai, may also mean simply to count, reckon, estimate as, etc., seems to be plain from the nature of the word itself, and from the example in Psalt. Salom. 16: 5, οὐκ ἐλλογίσω με μετὰ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν εἰς ἀπόλειαν, thou hast not reckoned me with sinners [doomed] to destruction,' or with those who sin to perdition.' The passive sense which corresponds to this class of meanings, seems to be the appropriate sense of ¿¿λoyeτaι in Rom. 5: 13, viz., is reckoned or made account of. It is needless, indeed, to urge any proof that the word λoyɛîzat is susceptible of such a sense, after all that has been said in the way

of illustrating, and loyišoua (a kindred word), and when one takes into view the obvious etymology of this compound verb.

It is proper to remark, moreover, that loy is stated by Bretschneider and others, not to be a classical word. It is not employed by the Seventy. Passow puts it down in his large lexicon, without any mark of reference to its usus loquendi; from which it would seem, that he deemed it to be classical. At any rate, we are confined, as yet, to its etymology, to the nature of the case where it is employed, and to the three instances above produced, as the data from which our conclusions are to be drawn as to its meaning.

No case then, it appears, exists in all the Bible, in which the word, or loyi5oua (to impute), ever means to impute the sin or righteousness of one to another. The only example in the case of Moyo which can be construed as giving any countenance to such a sense, is that in Philem. v. 18. But how very different this case of a voluntary offer on the part of Paul to become responsible for a civil injury, is from one in which sin is supposed to be imputed to men without any voluntary concurrence on their part, and they to become guilty in consequence of such imputation, yea deserving of everlasting death -how very different these two cases are, no effort of mine is needed to show.

§ 4. Is the doctrine of imputation IMPLIED by the declarations of the Scriptures.

If the Scriptures teach the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin or of Christ's righteousness, it is taught independently of the words, doyišoμai, or lloyέw. That this is possible, surely no sober critic or theologian will deny. It depends not merely on the form of a word, or the employment of some particular word, whether this or that doctrine is taught in the Scriptures. It does not depend, for example, on the use of the word Trinity by the sacred writers, whether the so-called doctrine of the Trinity is taught in the Scriptures; nor on their employing the word person in reference to the Godhead, whether they have taught that there is a three-fold distinction in the divine nature. Both of these doctrines may be taught in other ways than by the use of these technical terms, which are the invention of ages later than the apostolic, and are theo

logical merely in a scientific sense. And analogically with these two classes, the advocates for supposititious imputation might say: Conceding all that has been said in reference to the words ΣΕπ, λογίζομαι, and ἐλλογέω, still the doctrine of imputation may be scriptural; for it may be found, at least it is implied, in other formulas of expression; and implied in such a way as to make it as palpable as if one or all of the verbs in question had been employed in asserting that the sin or righteousness of one is counted or imputed to another.'

To examine the correctness of this assertion at length, would lead me of course into a protracted theological discussion, which would render necessary a treatise on the doctrine of imputation. The limits of this periodical, and the immediate object which the editor of it has in view, do not seem to warrant such a liberty on my part. Besides; my present object is philological rather than theological. The philology of the present piece has indeed a reference to a topic which is theological; for what important discussion of a philological nature that respects the Scriptures, must not necessarily have some such reference? Still it is remote from my design, as I have already said, minutely to examine and weigh here the arguments of a merely theological nature, on one side or the other, in respect to the subject of imputation. All I can be permitted to do in this place and consistently with my present design, will be simply to hint, in passing, at a few considerations of a theological nature, which seem to force themselves upon me in order to render what I say explicit, and which therefore the reader will perhaps not be displeased to see.

Do the Scriptures, then, impose on us the obligation to receive the doctrine that either the sin or the righteousness of one person is imputed as demerit or merit to another? My meaning in this question, (which at first view appears to be so general as almost necessarily to involve the whole topic before us), is nothing more at present than this, viz., whether the usual declarations of the Scriptures appealed to for the purpose of establishing the doctrine of imputation, and most depended on by those who argue in its favour, do necessarily imply what they endeavour to educe from them, or (in other words) do necessarily or properly lead us to regard this doctrine as really taught by the sacred writers?

Here, as in most other cases that come to be considered or examined by intelligent and honest minds, which cherish a sin