(From JANUARY to JUNE, 1807.)

BY adverting to our laft Hiftorical Sketch, prefixed to the Twenty-fifth Volume of our Review, our readers will find that we formed a just eftimate of the Ruffian character, and that we knew how to appreciate the fituation to which Buonaparte, by his natural temerity, and by an implicit reliance on his favourite deity, Chance, which had too long fmiled upon him, had reduced himself. Subfequent events have fully juftified all the conclufions which we then drew from an attentive confideration of the relative state of the belligerent powers, and of the actual fituation of the different states of Europe. It has been our invariable opinion, from the very commencement of the French revolution, that there always exifted, and that there ftill exifts, fufficient ability to crush the revolutionary hydra which has long threatened the civilized world with ruin, and that nothing but the will has been wanted to give action and effect to that ability. Did a doubt remain on the subject, we would refer for its folution to the noble ftand which Ruffia, aided only by the fcanty remnant of the broken forces of Pruffia, has made against the favage hordes of France. All that we predicted, refpecting the vigour and efficacy of their exertions, has been completely fulfilled. They have already "exacted fevere vengeance, in the moraffes of Poland, for the defeat which they fuftained in the plains of Moravia." Thefe foldiers, whom the Corfican tyrant ftigmatized as a barbarous and undifciplined rabble, have taught him to feel their fuperiority in difcipline as well as in courage. In every action which has yet been fought, they have beat him by a difplay of fkill and a knowledge of tactics as much as by their cool, fteady, and determined bravery, and by their unfhaken fortitude. Prudence and vigour combined to mark all the operations of the Ruffian army, from the opening of the campaign to the battle of Eylau. In that action the Ruffians manifefted an union of all the talents and endowments which are requifite to form great generals and good foldiers. The Corfican was out-generalled, (to ule a vulgar expreffion) as well as exceeded in every other point that was neceffary to ensure fuccefs. The fickle Goddefs, Fortune, forfook him; victory fled from his ftandard, and, fuperior only in numbers, in all other refpects inferior, he had the mortification to find his plan difconcerted, his efforts fruitless, his hopes blafted, and bis force diminished by more than forty thousand men, though reduced, by the magic power of his revolutionary pen, to five thoufand! The pofition of the Ruffians at Eylau was the bett that could be taken for the protection of Koningberg, on the one hand, and of Dantzie on the other; and had Buonaparte fucceeded in his attempt to get in their rear, and then to drive them from the field, thofe towns would have been left, in a great measure, at his mercy. The fubfequent conduct of the Ruffians has been eminently prudent. They have fo ftationed themfelves as to give effectual protection to the Pruffian pofts, and to receive the immenfe reinforcements which cenftantly join them. It is true, indeed, that the French alfo receive acceffions of ftrength; but, when the Ruffians are once strong enough to move forwards, in conjunction with the Pruflians, whofe numbers too are confiderably increafed, the confequence of a victory will

APP. VOL. XXVI.

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be decifive. Leaving their wounded behind them, they will then rush forward, with the fame impetuofty which Suwarrow difplayed in Italy; drive enemy before them from place to place, and give him no reft, till expelled from Germany. Nor will the effect of a defeat, on the other hand, be equally decifive in favour of France. The Ruffians are not lefs refolute in retreat, than impetuous in purfuit; they will defend every inch of ground; and thould Buonaparte prove fuccefsful in every attack, and drive them back to their own frontier, his own numbers. will, to a certainty, be fo thinned, as to reduce him to the neceffity of retracing his fteps; while the approach of a fresh army from Ruffia will enable his enemy again to advance. This conclufion will appear obvious to every one who has attended to the memorable campaign of Suwarrow in Italy, and to the recent operations of the Ruffians in Poland. The Coffacks, too, which attend their army, are most formidable to the French, whom they inceffantly harass, by night and by day, flaughtering great numbers by a mode of warfare to which they are little accustomed, and which, naturally enough, they very much dread.

The KING OF PRUSSIA muft now, from neceffity not less than from intereft, remain firm to his engagements.to conclude no treaty with the Corfican, without the concurrence of his Ruffian protector, and his British ally; and means will now be fupplied to enable him to arm any number of his well-difpofed fubjects, to augment the general force. Had he yielded to the propofals of Buonaparte, Frederick William had, ere this, ceafed to be a monarch, and had funk into a degraded vaffal of the most inexorable, the moft merciless, the moft fanguinary, of tyrants. As it is, though difpoffeffed of the greater part of his dominions, he is ftill a King, and will be restored to the poffeffion not merely of his territory, but of his independence and his power alfo. Even fhould the Ruffians, contrary to all hope and expectation, sustain a defeat, and be driven back beyond their own frontier, he may not only retreat with them, and find a fure and honourable afylum in the dominions of Alexander, but be certain, at no diftant period, to recover his own.

The KING OF SWEDEN, with a heroifm almoft peculiar to himself, and which perpetually makes us regret that his means are not equal to his fpirit, fets all the power of France at defiance, and contributes more than his portion towards the emancipation of Europe. The check which his troops recently received, from a mifcalculation of the enemy's force, was not fuf-. ficient to induce this gallant Prince to fan&tion the difgraceful armistice concluded by his General, Von Effen. He has, on the contrary, reinforced his army, and again prepared to take the field; and whatever skill and courage can achieve, we may confidently predict, will be accomplished by the Swedes, under the guidance of fuch a Sovereign. They will ferve materially to keep a part of the French force employed, and fo to prevent it from joining the main army; and, in the event of a victory gained by the Ruffians, he will effectually harass the French in their retreat.

Auftria, meanwhile, who holds, as it were, the balance of Europe in her hands, remains a mere fpectator of the furrounding fcene. Whether this paffiveness be the refult of any fecret understanding with Ruffia, or whether it be the confequence of a fettled system of inaction, a fhort time will fuffice to demonftrate. If the former, fhe is waiting till Ruffia fhall be able to push forward with her whole force, when the Außrian army may ad

vance in the rear of the French from Bohemia, and cut off their retreat. Such a step would, at once, crush the tyrant, and rescue fubjugated Europe from his iron yoke. If the latter be the cafe, if by a perfeverance in the fame timid and mistaken policy which has lately marked his conduct, the Emperor Francis, deaf alike to the fuggeftions of wifdom, the voice of experience, and the dictates of felf-preservation, should refolve to remain neuter, and to limit his impotent efforts to the preservation of his neutrality, his fituation will be perilous. Should France prove ultimately victorious, his ruin will be certain, and in the fate of Sardinia, Naples, and Prussia, he may read his own. And should Ruffia prevail in the contest, the Imperial Alexander will not look with an eye of fatisfaction on a line of conduct which, he will know, could only be dictated by fear or by treachery. And what refiftance Auftria could make to the conqueror of France it would be difficult to conjecture. At all events, fhe will have made a formidable enemy, where the might have fecured a moft powerful friend; and, if no immediate lofs of territory or of power should enfue, she will, at least, be placed in a flate of conftant uneafinefs and alarm, between Ruffia on the one fide, and France on the other; while the will have forfeited all pretenfions to character and all claim to refpect-a confideration of primary importance to a great nation.

We have no fufficient data on which to form any thing like a rational opinion as to the conduct which Austria, thus situated, will purfue. It has been generally fuppofed that Francis himself is of a pacific difpofition; that the Archduke Charles, who has conceived fome difguft at the English (whether fince Mr. Adair has refided at Vienna, or before, we know not), has confirmed him in his fentiments; and that the Queen (whom he has lately loft) exerted her influence over him for the purpose of perfuading him to adopt a fyftem of policy more confonant with his dignity, and more conducive to his fecurity. If this fuppofition be correct, and if no change of circumstances has occurred to produce a correfponding change of difpofition, there is little to hope from the exertions of Auftria. But we have fome reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement; and are more inclined to believe, that the influence and firmnefs of the Ruffian Emperor will ultimately fubdue all other influence in the mind of Francis; an effe& which the departure of Mr. Adair from Vienna, and the circumstances which gave rise to it, will contribute, not a little, to produce.

In Sicily, the laft refuge of the exiled King of Naples, where, it might naturally be expected, all would unite in one common effort for felfdefence, and in one common fentiment of indignation against the Tyrant of Europe, and of gratitude to those who enable them to refift his final exertions for their utter deftruction, strange to fay! the fame fpirit of party prevails, which, at the beginning of the French revolution, obtained among the emigrants from that devoted country. There fubfifts in that inland three different parties;-the King's party, the Queen's party, and the party of the Nobles; the last of which is infected with revolutionary ideas, and, as far as they are capable of attachment, are attached to the destroyers of their country. Such reptiles ought to be crushed; and the fooner they are configned to the gallows, the better. While the English troops remain there, however, no bad confequences can enfue from this difcord.

If we call our eyes upon the Turkish Empire, we fhall there behold the

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fad fruits of British imbecility;-a government and a people overawed by foreirn influence, and depending for their prefervation, not on their own ftrength, not on their own exertions, not on their own resources, but on the oppofite interefts of the neighbouring ftates;-under more obligations to Britain than to any other power, and having ftronger temptations to court her alliance, he has of late yielded to French intrigue, the effects of which have been confirmed by our late moft injudicious and most impolitic conduct.

In this state of Europe, what remains to be done? what line of policy to be purfued? It is in vain, we fear, to think of restoring the old eftablishments of Europe, or the ancient balance of power. New establish

ments must be formed, in the prefent situation of affairs; a new balance fettled, a new fyftem of policy adopted. It is too much to expect, that France, if checked in her career of conqueft, and compelled to retire within her ancient frontier, will tamely fubmit to have a bridle imposed on her ambition, or fuffer treaties, however folemn, to reftrain her from attempts to recover her loft fuperiority. The nations immediately adjacent, if divided, as they are at prefent, by various caufes, local, natural, and artificial, will oppofe but a feeble and impotent barrier to the arms of France. It becomes, then, a matter of neceffity, that the other great powers of Europe fhould receive a confiderable acceffion of ftrength, and fhould bind themselves by a folemn league vigorously to refift the smallest effort of the common enemy to interfere in the concerns of other states, or to extend his own territory. For this, and for other reafons, Europe fhould be moulded anew; the Turks fhould be driven into their native Afia, and left at once to occupy and to amufe themfelves-the only occupation for which they are fit, and the only amufement which they are worthy to enjoy-with the performance of pilgrimages to the fhrine of their Prophet. In a temporal point of view, they will find it much better to be the dupes of their own impoftor than of a foreign ufurper; of Mahomet than of Buonaparte. This done, Dalmatia, Bofnia, Servia, and a part of Wallachia, fhould be affigned to Auftria; Moldavia, and the remaining part or European Turkey, including the Capital, and the total command of the Dardanelles, thould be given to Ruffia; to Pruffia, Hanover and Holland fhould be allotted; Saxony might retain her fituation; Bavaria hould be transferred to the King of Naples; and all the other petty States of Germany fhould be confolidated into one kingdom, and the Prince of Orange placed at its head. Great Britain thould have Sicily, and all the iflands of the Archipelago now belonging to the Turks, with Alexandria, Damietta, and Suez, for her portion. It would be foreign from our purpofe, and would likewife greatly exceed our allotted bounds, to affign all the reafons which may be urged in favour of fuch an arrangement, and in anfwer to the objections which may rationally be preffed against it. But we live at an epoch when every thing prefents a new afpect; when all the ancient bulwarks which formerly fecured the independence of individual ftates have been overthrown; and when one gigantic power has arifen, threatening to overwhelm all others in one vaft gulph of deftruction. The paft fuccefs of that power has fucceeded, in the first place, from the adoption of new means, from the purfuit of new plans, and from a total difregard of all thofe forms, rules, and modes of proceeding, which had, for centuries, regulated the conduct of civilized ftates; and, in the fecond

place,