the very bottom of his heart, where he loves it; and he don't care whether it is for or against him, so that it is real wit and fun. Now Pat would doat upon your father, and kiss the rod with all his soul, he would,—the lash just lifted,-when he'd see the laugh on the face, the kind smile, that would tell him it was all for his good. Your father would lead Pat (for he'd never drive him) to the world's end, and maybe to common sense in the end,―might open his eyes to the true state of things and persons, and cause him to ax himself how it comes that, if he be so distressed by the Sassenach landlords that he can't keep soul and body together, nor one farthing for the wife and children, after paying the rint for the land, still and nevertheless he can pay King Dan's rint aisy,thousands of pounds, not for lands or potatoes, but just for castles in the air. Methinks I hear Pat saying the words, and see him jump to the conclusion, that maybe the gintleman, his reverence, that "has the way with him," might be the man after all to do them all the good in life, and asking nothing at all from them. Better, sure, than Dan after all; and we will follow him through thick and thin-why no? What though he is his reverence, the Church, that is, our cleargy, won't object to him; for he was never an inimy any way, but always for paying them off handsome, and fools if they don't take it now. So down with King Dan, for he's no good! and up with Sydney-he's the man, King of glory!'

But, visions of glory, and of good better than glory, spare my longing sight; else I shall never come to an end of this note. Note indeed! I beg your pardon.

Yours affectionately,

MARIA EDGEWORTH.

CCXXXV.

The saying that the Duke of Wellington's enemies never gave him so much trouble as his friends is verified over and over again in the volumes containing his civil and military correspondence. At the time the following letter was written Viscount Wellington of Talavera was probably the only public man who had complete confidence in his own strength, and in the might of Great Britain to strike the bold stroke for the rescue of the world.' All he required for his campaign in the Peninsula was men, money, and freedom of action. But the Government was half-hearted and economical; the Opposition openly sneered at his 'very rash' conduct; the Spanish General

Cuesta, was old, obstinate, and incapable; the Portuguese
Government was obstructive; and there were 380,000 French-
men, already in possession of the chief strongholds, opposed to
us. No wonder Wellington thought the authorities at home
were all gone mad!'

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington to the Rt. Hon. Sir W. W.

Pole.

Cartaxo: January 11, 1811.

My dear William,—I have received your letters of the 8th and the 25th of December. I have never been able to obtain any specific instructions, or even statement of an object. You have seen the only instructions which I have, which are to save the British army; and that is the only object officially stated to me for keeping an army in the Peninsula.

I agree entirely in opinion with you that it is desirable, nay necessary, to reinforce this army at an early period to a large amount, and of this opinion I have repeatedly apprised Lord Liverpool in some public dispatches, and in many private letters: but after what has been stated to you, you will hardly believe that I have now scarcely the force which was originally promised me, which was to be 35,000 infantry. Then, when the last reinforcements were sent out, not only I was told that I was to expect no more, but I was desired to send home some of the troops in case Massena should retire. I even begged to borrow 10,000 men from England or Ireland for a short period, which was refused; and then they tell you that I don't apply for specific numbers to perform specific operations. What I have already written will show you how the facts stand respecting my applications, and I will now state how they stand respecting objects. Before the siege of Almeida I urged in the strongest terms to be reinforced; I pointed out from whence I could be reinforced; and stated the probability that if I were reinforced, I could save everything. Was this an object or not?

Then I would observe that, adverting to the nature of the war in the Peninsula, to the disparity of means and resources in the possession or in the power of the two parties, to the instructions which government have given to me, and the limitation of my powers of action in every point of view, and to the uncertainty of the operations of the allies, it is not quite fair to call upon me to

state the specific object to be attained by every additional soldier who might be sent to me. Government have embarked in this contest, with all its difficulties and uncertainties; and it is their duty to state their objects in it, and employ the best officer they can find, and the largest army they can collect, to carry it on in the best manner he can, and to reinforce him to the utmost for sure I am that if we cannot persevere in carrying it on in the Peninsula, or elsewhere on the Continent, we must prepare to make one of our own islands the seat of the war; and when one of them will have been so for a week, we shall heartily repent all the little, dirty feelings which have prevented us from continuing the contest elsewhere. If there is confidence in me that I shall use to advantage the reinforcements which can be sent to me, let them be sent without calling upon me for objects; or at all events before I am called upon for objects, let government themselves state theirs, if they have any excepting to keep the war out of the king's dominions.

I think you are mistaken respecting the facility with which an army could get on without money. Your reasoning is applicable only to the pay of the troops, which is but a small part of the expense which must be defrayed in money, But the necessity of paying in money the officers and soldiers of an army cannot be measured by the necessity of paying in money the officers and seamen of a fleet. First, the rations of the soldier are not sufficient for his subsistence for any great length of time. Secondly, all his necessaries are bought and paid for out of his daily subsistence,

and there is the greatest distress, as well for some descriptions of food not issued by the commissary, as for necessaries when the pay is not issued. In the same manner the officers of the army cannot live upon their rations alone, and they, as well as the soldiers, must be paid, or they must do as the French army do, that is, plunder in order to be able to get on at all.

I think, however, that measures might be adopted to increase our supplies of specie in this country; but since government have taken this subject into their own hands, and have sent here a gentleman to make their own inquiries and arrangements upon the subjects, I have given myself no further trouble about it.

Not only I think that the supply of specie in Portugal might be increased, but that other measures might be adopted to decrease

the demand for specie; and I must observe that if the war in Portugal is to be carried on on the large scale supposed, troops must be brought from other parts; the expenses in those parts, and the demand for specie there, must cease; and the specie which supplied them might be brought here..

I have now, I believe, replied to all the principal points in your letter. I agree with you in thinking that we ought to be largely reinforced. If we are, I am tolerably certain of the result; and I am equally certain that if Buonaparte cannot root us out of his country, he must alter his system in Europe, and must give us such a peace as we ought to accept.

I acknowledge that I doubt whether the government (I mean the existing administration of England) have the power, or the inclination, or the nerves to do all that ought to be done to carry the contest on as it might be. I am the commander of the British army without any of the patronage or power that an officer in that situation has always had. I have remonstrated against this system, but in vain. Then I am the mainspring of all the other operations, but it is because I am Lord Wellington; for I have neither influence nor support, nor means of acquiring influence, given to me by the government. I have not authority to give a shilling, or a stand of arms, or a round of musket ammunition to anybody. I do give all, it is true; but it is contrary to my instructions, and at my peril; and I don't think that government ought in fairness to make a man what they call commander of the forces, and place him in the perilous situation in which they have got me, without giving him in specific terms either power or confidence, or without being certain of having a majority in Parliament to support him in case of accidents.

You can have no idea of the risks I incur every day upon every subject, which not another officer of the army would even look at ; and for this reason I have pressed the strengthening of government much against their inclination: but if I did not incur these risks the service in these times could not go on for a moment. I agree, with you in thinking that the Prince of Wales will make a complete change: indeed I don't think that the restrictions on his power will be carried.

There is nothing new here. If the Spaniards can do anything, they won't allow Mortier to cross the Guadiana unless the siege

of Cadiz should be raised; and then the war will take a new turn.

In the mean time I think Massena must withdraw. He is sadly pressed for provisions, certainly. Indeed it is extraordinary that he has existed at all so long.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.-I wrote this letter last night, and have since received yours describing the mares, which will answer perfectly. Just to show you the uncertainty of all operations in which Spaniards are concerned, I mention that I have this morning received accounts that the enemy have crossed the Guadiana at Merida, the Spaniards having neglected to destroy the bridge, as they were ordered! We shall thus have a large army in the Alentejo immediately.

CCXXXVI.

In the following amusing letter we find the Iron Duke courteously insisting on duty before pleasure!' He had already in a despatch (January 1811), to the Military Secretary expressed his annoyance at the continued absence on leave of general and other officers of the army; and he observed, 'At this moment we have seven general officers gone or going home; and excepting myself there is not one in the country who came out with the army, except General Sir Alexander Campbell, who was all last winter in England.'

There were two good and sufficient reasons for the Duke's complaint that he was actually discharging the duties of 'Generalin-Chief, General of Cavalry, General of Division, and sometimes Colonel of Regiment.' In the first place he was much fatigued; and in the second place the time had arrived for crossing the Portuguese frontier and developing his plan on Spanish ground.

Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington to

Quinta de S. João: June 27, 1811.

I have had the honour of receiving your -'s letter of the 3rd inst., and it is impossible not to feel for the unhappiness of the young lady, which you have so well described; but it is not so easy as you imagine to apply the remedy.

It appears to me that I should be guilty of a breach of discretion if I were to send for the fortunate object of this young lady's