1509, and represented Henry as what he really was during all that time, the sole and real minister, conducting in person the affairs of each several depart

ment.

In what spirit he has executed the work, what kind of moral impression the narrative is made to suggest, is a question difficult to answer, because different readers will be differently affected by it. I would only say that those readers who, like Sir James Mackintosh, rise from the perusal of the narrative full of passionate pity for the oppressed, and resentment against the oppressor so vehement that it overflows even upon the innocent historian whose faithful report has excited it, are the last persons who ought to complain of the writer for telling his story in such a way as not to produce such impressions. If strong disapprobation and dislike of Henry be the feeling which his history properly written ought to excite, there is scarcely a writer that has touched the subject since who may not be called as an unconscious witness that Bacon's history has in that respect done its office. We do not blame a painter for flattery because he does not write under his picture "this is the portrait of an ugly man ;" enough if he paints him as he sees him. Why blame a histo rian because, content with describing his hero as he is, he abstains from calling him names?

Passing from the particular to the general question, there is no doubt a real and considerable difference between Bacon's conception of the proper office of history and Mackintosh's. According to Bacon, "it is the true office of history to represent the events themselves, together with the counsels; and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty

and faculty of every man's judgment." According to Mackintosh, history so written "loses the interest which bestows on it the power of being useful:"it must "maintain its sway" by inspiring feelings of pity, anger, &c.

Now that the reader, in order to derive any benefit from history, must feel as he reads, Bacon I suppose would not have denied; but he would have said that the reader should be able to feel without being told when and how; that when an object of emotion is truly represented to a capable mind, the emotion will follow of itself; that a man who is affected by the sight of good and bad in nature, will be affected in the same way when he sees them in a book; that if he be not, it is for want not of epithets and exclamations and notes of admiration in the history, but of moral sensibility in himself, and he should be referred to the preacher or moralist for his cure before he comes to the secular historian. The duty of the historian, being first of all to set forth the truth of the case upon which judgment is to pass, bears a very close analogy to the duty of the judge in summing up. The summing up of the judge is truly the history of the case; it is meant not only to inform the jury as to the facts, but also to guide their judgment. Now we see that in performing this part of his duty the judge is expected carefully to abstain from all expressions which address themselves to the feelings of the jury as distinguished from their judgment; which are calculated "to inspire pity for the sufferer, anger against the oppressor, or earnest desires for the triumph of right over might." The common sense of Englishmen (guided in this case 1 Adv. of Learn. the Second Book, paragraph 7.

more perhaps than in any other by real earnestness and sincerity) has established this as a rule; the clear purposes of justice manifestly requiring that such feelings should not be allowed to mix with the consideration of the case, but be left to follow the judgment; as (if the case be truly judged) they inevitably will. And the historian would do well to remember, whatever his personal feelings may be, that his is the part, not of the counsel on either side, but (as I said) of the judge when he is expounding the case to the jury so that they may be best able to come to a just opinion on it.

Or if this example be objected to as not strictly parallel, (because the purposes of justice are satisfied if the jury come to a correct opinion as to the fact, whereas the purposes of history require that a correct opinion as to the fact should be followed by just feelings as to the right and the wrong,) and if an example be called for of some real history maintaining its proper sway over the reader's feelings without the aid of epithets, exclamations, or comments to direct and stimulate his sensibility; it is enough to say that in that book which all who profess and call themselves Christians are bound to acknowledge as the highest authority, the most odious of all treasons, the most unjust of all judgments, the most pathetic of all tales of martyred innocence, is related four times over without a single indignant comment or a single vituperative expression.

I have dwelt on these points longer perhaps than I need have done in so plain a case. But the error of supposing that Bacon's history was written to flatter Henry has done much mischief. Almost all our mod

ern historians, in trying to correct the supposed flattery, have in fact spoiled the likeness, and so in effect blotted out of that chapter of our history the very thing which was most memorable in it.

In speaking of the character of Henry as described by the writers who preceded Bacon, it will be seen that I have quoted Stowe, and said nothing of Speed, whose history was published in 1609, some years after Stowe's death. But the truth is, that though Bacon's history of Henry's reign was not written till 1621, he had drawn up a slight sketch of Henry's character many years before, of which Speed had a copy, and knew the value and made the right use. He quotes it at the outset of his history of this reign; “being fit," as he says, "to be set in front to his actions, as certain lights of the mind by which to discern the fountain of counsels and causes.' As far therefore as the character of Henry is concerned, and so much of the interpretation of his actions as depends upon a true insight into his character, Speed is not to be reckoned among the historians who preceded Bacon.

The sketch I speak of concludes a short historical fragment, entitled, The History of the reigns of K. Henry the VIII, K. Edward, Q. Mary, and part of Q. Elizabeth, of which there is a fair MS. in the Harleian collection (532. fo. 45.) The name of the writer is not given; but, even without Speed's authority, who quotes it as "fragm. MS. of Sr. Fr. B." there would be no doubt whatever that it is Bacon's. It was afterwards printed, very inaccurately, in the Cabala, Ed. 1663, p. 254., but without any suspicion as to the author; and it is rather singular

that, being extant in so common a book, it has never been claimed or noticed by any of Bacon's numerous editors and commentators. It contains indeed little that may not be found elsewhere in his works, yet like all his other fragments and rudiments it is well worth preserving; and there is no fitter place for it than at the end of this preface. It was written, it will be seen, while Elizabeth was still reigning; and his intention then was to begin with the accession of Henry the Eighth, or rather perhaps with a sketch of the condition in which Henry the Seventh left the kingdom. The idea of beginning with the accession of Henry the Seventh occurred to him afterwards in 1605; as may be seen by comparing his well known. letter to Lord Chancellor Egerton, which was written on the 2nd of April in that year, with the passage on the same subject in the Advancement of Learning.

The History of the reign of K. Henry the Eighth, K. Edward, Q. Mary, and part of the reign of Q. Elizabeth.

THE books which are written do in their kinds represent the faculties of the mind of man; Poesy his imagination; Philosophy his reason; and History his memory. Of which three faculties least exception is commonly taken to memory; because imagination is oftentimes idle, and reason litigious. So likewise History of all writings deserveth least taxation, as that which holdeth least of the author, and most of the things themselves. Again, the use which it holdeth to man's life, if it be not the greatest, yet assuredly is the freest from any ill accident or quality.