if France was bent upon their destruction, they were and must be, in an eternal war, unless either France should change her purpose, or they would submit to be destroyed. With all their fears and complainings, they have never been sensible to above half their danger. They seem always to have supposed, that like the contests in use among our common people, (till the wisdom of magistrates extinguished those remains of rustick chivalry,) they could terminate this war at any time, by only declaring, that they had had enough.

N. - Page 47.

SEE on this subject the important facts and excellent reflexions contained in chap. 2. towards the end, and in other parts of Professor Robison's valuable work, published in 1797, and entitled "Proofs of a Conspiracy," &c.

O.- Page 52.

THOUGH it was Francis I. who, after the battle of Pavia, originally expressed himself in this dignified manner, the King of Prussia adopted and repeated the sentiment, upon occasion of his memorable defeat at Schweidnitz.

Reg. for the year 1761.

See Ann.

P. - Page 55.

THE population of these provinces is by no means stated with exaggeration, when it is said far to exceed the popu lation of the kingdom of Ireland.' It might be described with truth, as nearly, if not altogether, equal to the population of Great Britain.' From Caen to Bourdeaux, without comprising more in breadth than belongs properly to the

royalist country, there is a population, according to the statement of Mr. Necker, of little less than 9,000,000. In ascertaining the proportions of this population which may be considered as royalist, we must distinguish between those who were only royalists in their affections; those who actively, though secretly, favoured the cause; and those who, at different times, openly appeared in arms. By the numbers of the last of these classes, by the manner in which they maintain themselves, and by the effects which they produced, we may form, perhaps, the surest judgment, though possibly a very inadequate one, of the general sentiments and dispositions of the country. If those, who have been most engaged in these scenes, and have at least the best means of knowing, may be relied on, it was a small portion of the inhabitants indeed, and those confined almost exclusively to the towns, who were not royalists in their hearts. But facts, and the inferences resulting from them, may after all be considered as the best criterion, especially to those who may not have the means of resorting to the testimonies which we have alluded to, or of appreciating the degree of credit, that may be due to them. Of these facts the principal lie open to the observation of every body, and are of a nature little liable to be mistaken or misrepresented. They are the length of time during which the royalist war subsisted; the armies which it obliged the Republick to employ; the nature of the pacifications which took place in different parts of it; the anxiety which it evidently excited in the government, during the whole of its continuance; the interruption which it gave to the communication between the metropolis and the principal sea-ports - the transport of goods and passengers, and letters between Paris and Brest being sometimes stopt for a fortnight, requiring at times an immense escort, and being at all times attended with considerable danger, insomuch that officers going to

join their ships often preferred a passage by sea, even at the risk of being taken by our cruizers; - these are facts, which rest on no authority of individuals, and may afford some measure for judging of the degree and extent, to which the sentiment of royalism prevailed in this part of France. For facts of a description somewhat different, though of a character and magnitude not to be much concealed or disguised, such as the nature and progress of the war; the armies, which the royalists were able to bring into the field; the manner in which they employed them; the resources which they possessed; the energy which they displayed; for these, or other similar ones, the reader would do well to have recourse to an Account (published here in 1796 and since translated) of Campaigns in the Vendée, by the republican General Turreau, the same, probably, who is now employed in something of a similar service in Switzerland, and who, though interested in some degree in magnifying the force of an enemy, whom he was employed to combat, and requiring in that respect, as well as in several others, to be read with some reserve and caution, may yet be relied on for the general substance of his narrative, and the principal representations which accompany it : and will afford to those, who may be new to the subject, much valuable information on the history and circumstances of this most extraordinary and affecting war.

Q- Page 56,

In the early stages of the war of La Vendée, before the republicans had had recourse to the system of laying waste and burning the country, and had brought the war to a footing, in which no quarter was given on either side, whatever prisoners were taken by the royalists, were released upon the condition of not serving again, either against them, or

against the allied powers; the royalists having imagined, for some reason or another, that the allies and they were engaged in a common cause, and that the neglect which they might seem till then to have experienced, was owing wholly to the precautions taken by the enemy for preventing any communication with them. When, therefore, they heard, in the year 1793, that the garrisons of Mentz and Valenciennes were marching against them, knowing that these garrisons had surrendered upon terms, and that one of the terms was, that they should not serve again till exchanged, they concluded that this was a new instance of republican treachery, and that these troops, a numerous and most formidable body, the garrison of Mentz alone being reckoned at twelve thousand, could not be employed in this service, without some scandalous breach of engagement, such as would excite in the breasts of the allies no less resentment, and indignation, than it did in those of the royalists. What then were their sensations, when they found, that this was no treachery on the part of the republicans, but that the allies themselves in framing their capitulations, and providing that these garrisons should not serve against the other parties in the war, had wholly neglected or forgotten, to extend this provision to the case of the royalists; who with an army of immense force in point of numbers, perfect in the mode of its composition, animated by the most heroick courage, headed by officers of great ability and experience, but still weak to a great degree by the extreme deficiency, and often total want of all the ordinary means of war; were left to prosecute as well as they could, the desperate and unequal contest in which they were engaged, disowned and abandoned by all the world. When they found this, their feelings were indeed acute, and their constancy almost shaken. They did not despair; it was not their nature to do so: but left thus to themselves, abandoned

to their own resources, without aid, without co-operation, proclaimed, as it were, to all Europe, as not even belonging to that confederacy, of which they might, without presumption, have hoped, that they should have been placed at the head; they felt that their prospects were truly gloomy, and such as might well have excused them for relinquishing from that instant every thought of further resistance. That they did not so relinquish their hopes; that they long maintained the contest with unabated vigour; that the war broke out afterwards with fresh violence; that it never ceased to be renewed at every favourable \ opportunity, till the last of the continental powers had submitted and made its peace; that the elements of it remain entire to this day; these are truths, which ought to be known and remembered for the credit of those concerned, though they yield but little consolation in the retrospect, and can now unhappily afford no ground of hope for the future.

R. - Page 60.

THOSE who may before have thought, that such a vindication was necessary, will not be less of that opinion, when they shall be told, that within the last twelve months, more than three hundred royalist officers have been taken and put to death, in the western provinces, and that of these all but forty or fifty have suffered since the date of the preliminary treaty. In the name of all that is sacred, what justification can a government or a country offer for such conduct? Three hundred men, or at least a great proportion of them, sacrificed to the vengeance of their enemies, simply because we neglected, or refused to listen to their solicitations to be allowed an asylum in this country, when in consequence of the peace which we were making,