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ley differs from Aristotle ; then, to exhibit the grounds of my conviction, that he differed only to err; and next as the result, to show, by what influences of the choice and judgment the associative power becomes either memory or fancy; and, in conclusion, to appropriate the remaining offices of the mind to the reason, and the imagination. With my best efforts to be as
may have suggested his thoughts on these points, though it cannot have exactly formed them.
It is rather remarkable, if Hume had indeed read this commentary before composing his own work, that he should have expressed himself thus at p. 22.—"Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together, I do not find that any philosopher hus attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of Association, a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity." Aquinas, in the commentary, does certainly attempt to enumerate them, though he does not classify them exactly as Hume and other modern philosophers have done. He does not make Cause and Effect a principle of Association over and above Contiguity in Time and Place; and he mentions, as a separate influence, direct Dissimilarity or Contrast, which Hume refers to Causation and Resemblance, as a mixture of the two: in both which particulars he does but follow the leading of his text.
I will just add that, in commenting on two sentences of Aristotle, quoted in a former note,-explaining why some men remember, and some things are remembered, better than others under similar circumstances of association, Aquinas observes, that this may happen through closer attention and profounder . knowledge, because whatever we most earnestly attend to remains most firmly impressed on the memory; and again, in accounting for false and imperfect remembrance, he states the converse fact, that by distraction of the imagination the mental impression is weakened. Lects. v. a. and vi. h. These remarks tend the same way with those in the Biographia, toward the end of chap. vii. concerning the superiour vividness of certain parts of a total impression, and the power of the will to give vividness to any object whatsoever by intensifying the attention. Mr. Coleridge's aim was to show that these agents or occasion
perspicuous as the nature of language will permit on such a subject, I earnestly solicit the good wishes and
ing causes of particular thoughts which have been specified, are themselves subject to a deeper law,-to the determination of the will, reason, judgment, understanding. S. C.]
[It was not till the new edition of this work was in the press that I became aware of a note, relating to chapter v. of the B. L. at the end the Dissertation on the progress of Ethical” Philosophy, by Sir J. Mackintosh, in which the author speaks as follows: I have already acknowledged the striking resemblance of Mr. Hume's principles of association to those of Aristotle.” After showing that the story of Mr. Hume was a mistake, and how the mistake arose, he proceeds to say—" It is certain that * * * * Aristotle explains recollection as de pending on a general law,- that the idea of an object will remind us of the objects which immediately preceded or followed when originally perceived. But what Mr. Coleridge has not told us is, that the Stagyrite confines the application of this law exclusively to the phenomena of recollection alone, without any glimpse of a more general operation extending to all connections of thought and feeling,-a wonderful proof indeed, even so limited, of the sagacity of the great philosopher, but which for many ages continued barren of further consequences.” Perhaps Mr. C. thought, as Maasz appears to have done, that to discover the associative principle in respect of memory was obviously to discover the general law of mental association, since all connections of thought and feeling are dependent on memory. It is difficult to conceive a man writing a treatise on Memory and Recollection without hitting on this law of association, by observing the manner in which he hunts in his mind for any thing forgotten: but perhaps this remark savours of simplicity, for sinipte folks, when a truth is once clearly presented to them, can never again so abstract their minds from it as to conceive the possibility of its being unrecognized. “The illustrations of Aquinas,” Sir James adds,“throw light on the original doctrine, and show that it was unenlarged in his time, &c.” (Yet Aquinas almost touches the doctrine of Hobbes when he says reminiscentiu habet similitudinem cujusdam syllogismi, quare sicut in syllogismo pervenitur ad conclusionem ex aliquibus principiis, ita etiam in reminiscendo aliquis quodammodo
friendly patience of my readers, while I thus go “sounding on my dim and perilous way."
syllogizat, &c.)“ Those of L. Vives, as quoted by Mr. C. extend no farther.”
“ But if Mr. Coleridge will compare the parts of Hobbes on Human Nature, which relate to this subject, with those which explain general terms, he will perceive that the philosopher of Malmesbury builds on these two foundations a general theory of the human understanding, of which reasoning is only a particular case.” This has been already admitted in note 2. Sir James seems to refer to the whole of chap. v. which begins thus : “ Seeing the succession of conceptions in the mind are caused *** by the succession they had one to another when they were produced by the senses,” &c. He points out the forgetful statements of Mr. C. respecting the De Methodo, and expresses an opinion that Hobbes* and Hume might each have been unconscious that the doctrine of association was not originally bis
Either I should think had quite sagacity enough to discover it for himself; but the question is whether Hobbes was more sagacious on this part of the subject than any preceding philosopher.
Sir James makes an interesting reply to Mr. C.'s remark that he was unable to bridge over the chasm between their philosophical creeds, which I do not quote only from want of space. That Sir James was one of Mr. C.'s most intelligent readers is undeniable; yet I think it is not quite conclusive against the German doctrines,-either as to their internal character or the mode in which they have been enunciated—that they found no
The language of Hobbes has somewhat of a Peripatetical sound, and when he discourses of the motions of the mind, reminds one of the Aristotelian commentator-Causu autem reminiscendi est ordo motuum, qui relinquuntur in anima ex prima impressione ejus, quod primo apprehendimus. Sir James says “the term Onpeúw is as significant as if it had been chosen by Hobbes." This term may bave led Hobbes to talk about “ hunting,” “ tracing,” and “ranging,” in the Human Nature,
entrance into his mind; or at least no welcome there, or enti approval; for are not all new doctrines, even such as are ul mately established, opposed, on their first promulgation, some of the strongest-headed persons of the age ? S. C.]
THE END OF THE FIRST PART OF THE
C. Whittingham, Chiswick.