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which passed before and during the Peace Conference, the insistent note in Sir Robert Borden's contributions was a stress upon the privileges Canada had won by the share she took in the war. But for the fact that it is a common mistake in democratic politics, it is rather surprising that the onerous obligations which are the obverse of those privileges were not present to Sir. Robert Borden's mind. One recollects that Sir Wilfrid Laurier rather objected to be consulted on questions of Imperial Foreign policy, lest he should be implicated in the consequences of the action taken on his advice. As previously remarked, when the formula was found in Paris and put at the top and bottom of the Peace Treaty, the task of asserting the national individuality of the Dominions was considered accomplished. There was no heart-searching over it, and no attempt to arrive at a common understanding. The implications were left to work themselves out. One gathers that the conception of what was implied varied with the particular Minister and the particular Dominion. It was affected by the theory of Imperial relations dominant in the particular part of the Empire for the time being concerned, and was not unaffected by the political situation there. Australian opinion has displayed a singular lack of interest in the matter, and it has not been possible even to have it discussed in Parliament.

Nobody in Australia and New Zealand believes that anything serious happened. The Hon. W. A. Watt, M.H.R., while in England, and Mr Downie Stewart, M.H.R., of New Zealand, are the only Members of Parliament in either country who have raised a note of warning. Mr Hughes, who distrusts the League of Nations, and is insistent upon the separate status of the Dominions and the other privileges that have been won, has never suggested that any question has been thrown upon the complete integrity of the Empire by what was done at Paris. General Smuts, on the other hand, being one of the protagonists of the League, probably believes that the machinery of the League mitigates the strategic problems of South Africa, and thus renders the protection of the British Empire less essential. General Smuts is a great man, and has articulated more clearly than any other statesman in the Empire what has followed from Vol. 285.-No. 467.

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the separate status of the Dominions. He lays stress on the fact that he is a direct adviser of the King, and does not advise him through the British Government. This is the key-note of his position. The last shred of authority by the British Government has gone. An Act of the British Parliament no longer binds South Africa. The union between South Africa and the United Kingdom is apparently a personal one; South Africa is virtually independent. General Smuts considers it an anomaly that the Dominions still conduct correspondence through the Colonial Office, that the Governor-General is still appointed on the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and that the Dominions have as yet no diplomatic service.

With regard to the desirability of a single voice, he brusquely states that South Africa is not going to be coerced by any majority. The mandate for German South-West Africa is treated as coming direct from the Allied and Associated Powers; and South Africa is fully competent to accept it without any delegation from the Crown. At the same time, according to him, the Empire is one and indissoluble, the person of the King accomplishing a unity which may not exist on any single line of policy. The campaign which General Smuts has fought in South Africa since he returned, to weld together the deeply divided elements, a campaign which the recent elections have crowned with striking success, is no doubt due in some measure to this skilful reading of the Peace Treaty. It is permissible to hope that this reconciliation is not founded on a contradiction. It will be seen, however, that so far General Smuts has been talking rather than acting. He himself confesses that his theory involves a considerable alteration in the machinery of the Imperial system. No steps have yet been taken to bring about such an alteration.

Canada has always led the way towards the advance of Dominion status; and the steps taken at Paris followed not unnaturally from a series of other steps taken by Canada towards diplomatic freedom. Canadian patriotism has always boggled at the theory that Imperial unity resides only in the person of the King, long advocated by Mr J. S. Ewart, K.C. But it would be interesting to hear Sir Robert Borden distinguish the present state

of Imperial relations, as he sees it, from a merely personal union. There is little doubt that Sir Robert Borden had a mandate for a strong assertion of Canadian nationality. It is, however, the vice of democracy that the people, in their demand for privileges, forget the corresponding obligations. This vice it is the paramount duty of the statesman to correct. There is no trace in any of Sir Robert Borden's speeches that are available in Australia that he has attempted to do this. He contents himself with a plain narrative of what he has done for Canada, and never appears to have put to himself the searching questions which should accompany such a big departure as he advocated.

One of Sir Robert's Ministers, Mr A. L. Sefton, was more critical, and declared that the British Empire is composed of five or six nations with one Sovereign. When that Sovereign is at war, all these nations are at war; but the part that any one nation takes in that war is determined by its own Parliament exercising its own sovereign power.' In this remark he made an attempt to meet one of the deepest problems involved in the position which his chief had taken up. Will it serve? War has consequences undesirable to noncombatants. It can hardly be regarded as a very successful assertion of Canadian individuality to bring about a state of things in which she can be involved in a war, brought about purely by Australian action, in regard to which Canada has never been consulted. The implications from such a position are unthinkable. In the event of the King being at war through Canadian action, the United Kingdom not being consulted, would the British Navy support the King who had been involved by Canada, and would the people of the United Kingdom be willing to suffer the penalties of being at war, even as non-combatants? It is evident that the statesmen who proposed these suggestions do not envisage Canada really in danger. Though they probably do not admit it to themselves, they consider themselves adequately protected by the Monroe Doctrine. It is somewhat significant that Canada's first action in pursuance of her new status is to appoint an ambassador to Washington. Is the common political interest of the two countries under the Monroe Doctrine the

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sub-conscious influence at the back of this? Mr Hughes has also announced that Australia intends to appoint an ambassador in America who will act in conjunction, but not necessarily in agreement, with the British Ambassador. Common interests in the Pacific can hardly be sufficient to justify the appointment. Moreover, the chances of diplomatic incident, needing handling by an ambassador, are very remote. Mr Hughes' action is merely imitative, and it represents a growing momentum in the centrifugal tendency.

The very fact that there can be so many different interpretations of the same act by the participants within a few months is rather a severe criticism upon those statesmen. In fact, save as to the bare words of the formula used in Paris, there was no mutuality. Each statesman used the formula with his own idea of what he meant. What he has been doing since is to give it some relation to a definite theory. This formula represents what is left of Imperial unity. It is not inconsistent with a very effective unity and a common effort to achieve the great purposes for which the British peoples stand. But, while statesmen get up and give varying accounts of what the formula means, while they make up their minds as to how they are going to apply it, the question of Imperial unity must be in a somewhat precarious condition. It may not be possible or desirable to set up a central instrument of government for the Empire. It should at least be possible to draw up a covenant which sets out in intelligible terms what the parties intend to do for one another.

Meanwhile, it is important to point out that, in their anxiety to assert their freedom, their virtual independence without actually parting asunder, the statesmen of Canada and South Africa have placed upon the Sovereign a serious responsibility and strain. It is all too probable that their theory would destroy the very basis upon which they seek to rest it. However far you abstract the Sovereign, he can only act in one way at once. It is contemplated that he will be receiving advice from different sources. Such advice will not always coincide. It may be contradictory, even antagonistic. In such a case, the King will have to choose whose advice he will follow. The rejection of one advice will snap the link

and lead to the dissolution of the one bond. Nor does the responsibility of choosing which advice to follow belong to the Crown. By a series of democratic victories it has been taken away. If we insist on restoring it, we place on the King an obligation which he could never sustain. The King can never become an organ in the Imperial system. He must remain what he is in the British Constitution. The idea of multiple responsibilty is either a reactionary attempt to increase the prerogatives of the Crown or it is a sham. If the advice to the Crown is a mere form-something which is only meant to maintain the show of what has already disappearedthen the Empire is dead already.

Events which have transpired since the Peace was signed render it unnecessary to consider in such detail the third step in Dominion Status taken at Paris-the separate membership of the League of Nations. The refusal of the United States of America to ratify the Covenant radically affects that compact. Without the United States the League cannot function effectively. If the Covenant is finally approved, it will probably differ widely from the existing document. One of the terms at present under discussion is the status of the Dominions. Nevertheless this whole phase illustrates, in the most illuminating way, the statesmanship of the representatives of the various British Delegates. During the Peace Conference-while the Draft Covenant was being prepared-Sir Robert Borden, as he informed his House of Commons, set himself to ensure that the status accorded the Dominions in the Peace Conference and the Peace Treaty should be accorded to them in all international relationships in the future. The first drafts of the Covenant did not altogether satisfy him, and he pressed for a recognition which would be quite unambiguous. It was due to this pressure, which was supported by the other Dominion delegates, that the Dominions were accepted as original signatories of the Covenant and members of the League.

There are still two slight ambiguities in the Covenant which are relevant. The list of British signatories, commencing with the British Empire and the Dominions, are set out with an inner margin. It has been suggested that the words 'British Empire' include the Dominions, which