But how is it poffible, that a man of his capacity could long remain ignorant, how infufficient a fyllogifin is for discovering any latent truth? He certainly intended his fyftem of logics, chiefly, if not folely, for difputation: and if fuch was his purpose, he has been wonderfully fuccefsful; for nothing can be better contrived than that system, for wrangling and difputing without end. He indeed in a manner profeffes this to be his aim, in his books De Sophifticis elenchis.

Some ages hence, when the goodly fabric of the Romish spiritual power fhall be laid low in the dust, and scarce a veftige remain, it will among antiquaries be a curious enquiry, What was the nature and extent of a tyranny, more oppreffive to the minds of men, than the tyranny of ancient Rome was to their perfons. During every step of the enquiry, pofterity will rejoice over mental liberty, no lefs precious in their eyes than perfonal liberty. The defpotism of Aristotle with respect to the faculty of reason, was no lefs complete, than that of the Bifhop of Rome with refpect to religion; and it has now become a proper fubject of curiofity, to enquire into the nature and extent of that defpotism, from which men are at last set happily free. One cannot peruse the following fheets, without fympathetic pain for the weakness of man with respect to his nobleft faculty; but that pain will redouble his fatisfaction, in now being left free to the dictates of reafon and common fenfe.

In my reveries, I have more than once compared Ariftotle's logics to a bubble made of foap-water for amufing children; a beautiful figure with fplendid colours; fair on the outside, empty within. It has for more than two thoufand years been the hard fate of Ariftotle's followers, Ixion like, to embrace a cloud for a goddefs. -But this is more than fufficient for a preface: and I had almost forgot, that I am detaining my readers from betterentertainment, in listening to Dr Reid.

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168

A Brief Account of ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC.

With REMARKS.

GHA P. I.

Of the First Three Treatifes.

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SECT. 1. Of the Author.

Ristotle had very uncommon advantages: born in an age when the philofophical fpirit in Greece had long flourished, and was in its greatest vigour; brought up in the court of Macedon, where his father was the King's phyfician; twenty years a favourite scholar of Plato, and tutor to Alexander the Great; who both honoured him with his friendship, and fupplied him with every thing necessary for the profecution of his enquiries.

These advantages he improved by indefatigable study, and immenfe reading. He was the first we know, fays Strabo, who compofed a library. And in this the Egyptian and Pergamenian kings, copied his example. As to his genius, it would be disrespectful to mankind, not to allow an uncommon fhare to a man who governed the opinions of the most enlightened part of the species near two thousand years.

If his talents had been laid out folely for the discovery of truth, and the good of mankind, his laurels would have remained for ever fresh: but he feems to have had a greater paffion for fame

than

than for truth, and to have wanted rather to be admired as the prince of philofophers, than to be useful: fo that it is dubious whether there be in his character moft of the philofopher, or of the fophift. The opinion of Lord Bacon is not without probability, That his ambition was as boundless as that of his royal pupil, the one afpiring at univerfal monarchy over the bodies and fortunes of men, the other over their opinions. If this was the cafe, it cannot be said, that the philofopher pursued his aim with lefs industry, lefs ability, or less fuccefs, than the hero.

His writings carry too evident marks of that philofophical pride, vanity, and envy, which have often fullied the character of the learned. He determines boldly things above all human knowledge; and enters upon the most difficult queftions, as his pupil entered on a battle, with full affurance of fuccefs. He delivers his decifions oracularly, and without any fear of mistake. Rather than confefs his ignorance, he hides it under hard words and ambiguous expreffions, of which his interpreters can make what pleases them. There is even reason to suspect, that he wrote often with affected obfcurity, either that the air of mystery might procure greater veneration, or that his books might be understood only by the adepts who had been initiated in his philofophy.

His conduct towards the writers that went before him has been much cenfured. After the manner of the Ottoman princes, fays Lord Verulam, he thought his throne could not be fecure unless he killed all his brethren. Ludovicus Vives charges him with detracting from all philofophers, that he might derive that glory to himself, of which he robbed them. He rarely quotes an author but with a view to cenfure, and is not very fair in reprefenting the opinions which he cenfures.

The faults we have mentioned are fuch as might be expected in a man, who had the daring ambition to be tranfmitted to all future ages, as the prince of philofophers, as one who had carried VOL. II.

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every

every branch of human knowledge to its utmost limit; and who was not very fcrupulous about the means he took to obtain his end.

We ought, however, to do him the juftice to obferve, that although the pride and vanity of the sophist appear too much in his writings in abstract philosophy, yet in natural history the fidelity of his narrations feems to be equal to his induftry; and he always diftinguishes between what he knew and what he had by report. And even in abstract philosophy, it would be unfair to impute to Aristotle all the faults, all the obfcurities, and all the contradictions that are to be found in his writings. The greatest part, and perhaps the best part, of his writings is loft. There is reafon to doubt whether fome of those we ascribe to him be really his; and whether what are his be not much vitiated and interpolated. These fufpicions are justified by the fate of Ariftotle's writings, which is judiciously related, from the best authorities, in Bayle's dictionary, under the article Tyrannion, to which I refer.

His books in logic which remain, are, 1. One book of the Categories. 2. One of Interpretation. 3. First Analytics, two books. 4. Laft Analytics, two books. 5. Topics, eight books. 6. Of Sophifins, one book. Diogenes Laertius mentions many others that are loft. Those I have mentioned have commonly been published together, under the name of Ariftotle's Organon, or his Logic; and for many ages, Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories has been prefixed to them.

SECT. 2. Of Porphyry's Introduction.

In this Introduction, which is addreffed to Chryfoarius, the author obferves, That in order to understand Ariftotle's doctrine concerning the categories, it is neceffary to know what a genus

is,

is, what a fpecies, what a specific difference, what a property, and what an accident; that the knowledge of thefe is also very ufeful in definition, in divifion, and even in demonftration: therefore he proposes, in this little tract, to deliver fhortly and fimply the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning these five predicables; avoiding the more intricate queftions concerning them; fuch as, Whether genera and Species do really exist in nature? or, Whether they are only conceptions of the human mind? If they exift in nature, Whether they are corporeal or incorporeal? and, Whether they are inherent in the objects of fenfe, or disjoined from them? Thefe, he says, are very difficult questions, and require accurate difcuffion; but that he is not to meddle with them.

After this preface, he explains very minutely each of the five words above mentioned, divides and fubdivides each of them, and then pursues all the agreements and differences between one and another through fixteen chapters.

SECT. 3. Of the Categories.

The book begins with an explication of what is meant by univocal words, what by equivocal, and what by denominative. Then it is obferved, that what we fay is either fimple, without compofition or ftructure, as man, horse; or, it has compofition and structure, as, a man fights, the horse runs. Next comes a diftinction between a fubject of predication; that is, a fubject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a fubject of inhefion. These things are faid to be inherent in a fubject, which although they are not a part of the fubject, cannot poffibly exist without it, as figure in the thing figured. Of things that are, fays Ariftotle, some may be predicated of a subject, but are in no subject; as,