to right and wrong. Whatever minute differences there may be to distinguish one perfon from another, yet in the general principles that conftitute our nature, internal and external, there is wonderful uniformity.

This uniformity of fentiment, which may be termed the common fenfe of mankind with respect to right and wrong, is effential to focial beings. Did the moral fentiments of men differ as much as their faces, they would be altogether unqualified for fociety: difcord and controverfy would be endless, and major vis would be the only rule of meum et tuum.

But fuch uniformity of fentiment, tho' general, is not altogether univerfal: men there are, as above mentioned, who differ from the common fenfe of mankind with respect to various points of morality. What ought to be the conduct of such men? ought they to regulate their conduct by that standard, or by their private conviction? There will be occafion afterward to obferve, that we judge of others as we believe they judge of themfelves; and that private conviction is the standard for rewards and punishments (a). But with refpect to every controversy about property and pecuniary intereft, and, in general, about every civil right and obligation, the common fenfe of mankind is the ftandard, and not private conviction or confcience; which I fhall endeavour to make out as follows.

We have an innate fenfe of a common nature, not only in our own fpecies, but in every fpecies of animals. And that the fact corresponds to our sense of it, is verified by experience; for there appears a remarkable uniformity in creatures of the fame kind, and a difformity, no lefs remarkable, in creatures of a different kind. As that common nature is perceived to be a model or standard for each individual of the kind, it raises wonder to find

(a) Se&. 5.

an

an individual deviating from the common nature of the species, whether in its internal or external structure: a child born with averfion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, no lefs than if born without a mouth, or with more than one.

Secondly, The innate fenfe mentioned dictates, that the common nature of man in particular, is invariable as well as univerfal; that it will be the fame hereafter as it is at present, and as it was in time past, the fame among all nations, and in all corners of the earth nor are we deceived; becaufe, allowing for flight differences occafioned by culture and other accidental circumstances, the fact correfponds to our perception.

Thirdly, We perceive that this common nature is right and perfect, and that it ought to be a model or standard for every human being. Any remarkable deviation from it in the ftructure of an individual, appears imperfect or irregular; and raises a painful emotion: a monstrous birth, exciting curiosity in philofophers, fails not at the fame time to excite averfion in every fpectator.

This fenfe of perfection in the common nature of man, comprehends every branch of his nature, and particularly the common sense of mankind with refpect to right and wrong; which accordingly is perceived by all to be perfect, having authority over all men as the ultimate and unerring ftandard of morals, even in contradiction to private conviction. Thus, a law in our nature binds us to regulate our conduct by that fstandard: its authority is univerfally acknowledged, as nothing is more common in every dispute about meum et tuum, than an appeal to it as the ultimate and unerring standard.

At the fame time, as that ftandard, through infirmity or prejudice, is not confpicuous to every individual, many are misled into erroneous opinions, by mistaking a false standard for that of And hence a distinction between a right and a wrong fense in morals; a diftinction which every one understands, but

nature.

which, unless for the conviction of a moral standard, would be altogether unintelligible.

The final cause of this branch of our nature is confpicuous. Were there no standard of right and wrong for determining endlefs controverfies about matters of intereft, the strong would have recourse to force, the weak to cunning, and fociety would be intolerable. Courts of law could afford no remedy; for without a standard of morals, their decifions would be arbitrary, and of no authority. Happy it is for men to be provided with such a standard: it is necessary in society that our actions be uniform with respect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is neceffary that our perceptions of right and wrong be alfo uniform to produce fuch uniformity, a standard of morals is indifpenfable. Nature has provided us with that standard, which is daily apply'd by courts of law with success.

In reviewing what is faid, it must afford great fatisfaction, to find morality established upon the most folid of all foundations, viz. intuitive perception, which is not only a fingle mental act, but is complete in itself, having no dependence on any antecedent propofition. The most accurate reafoning affords not equal conviction; for every fort of reasoning, as explained in the sketch immediately foregoing, requires not only felf-evident truths or axioms to found upon, but employs over and above various propofitions to bring out its conclufions. By intuitive perception folely, without reafoning, we acquire knowledge of right and wrong; of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of what we ought to abstain from: and confidering that we have thus greater certainty of moral laws, than of any proposition discoverable by reasoning, man may well be deemed a favourite of heaven, when he is fo admirably qualified for acting the part that is agreeable to his Maker. The moral fenfe or confcience is the voice of God within us; conftantly admonishing us of our duty, and re

quiring

quiring from us no exercise of our faculties but attention merely. The celebrated Locke ventured what he thought a bold conjecture, That moral duties might be susceptible of demonstration: how agreeable would the difcovery have been to him, that they are founded upon intuitive perception, ftill more convincing and authoritative!

By one branch of the moral sense, we are taught what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do; and by another branch, what we may do, or leave undone. But fociety would be imperfect, if the moral fenfe stopped here. There is no particular that tends more to complete fociety, than what is mentioned in the first section, viz. That every man is accountable for his conduct to his fellow-creatures; and he is rendered accountable by a third branch of the moral fenfe, which teaches him, that this is his duty. And it will be made evident afterward, in the 3d sketch, that we are accountable to our Maker, as well as to our fellow

creatures.

To complete this theory, I add, that an action is right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion. Thus, when a man, excited by friendship or pity, rescues a heretic from the flames, the action is right, even tho' he think it wrong, from a conviction that heretics ought to be burnt. But we apply a different rule to those who act: a man is approved, and held to be innocent, when he does what he himself thinks right; he is disapproved, and held to be guilty, when he does what he himself thinks wrong. Thus, to assassinate an atheist for the fake of religion, is a wrong action; and yet the enthusiast who commits that wrong, may be innocent and one is guilty who, against conscience, eats meat in lent, tho' the action is not wrong. In fhort, an action is perceived to be right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion: but he is approved or difapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.

SECT.

SE C T. III.

Laws of Nature refpecting our MORAL CONDUCT IN SOCIETY.

A Standard being thus established for regulating our moral conduct in fociety, we proceed to investigate the laws that refult from it. But firft we take under confideration, what other principles concur with the moral sense to qualify men for fociety.

When we reflect on the different branches of human knowledge, it might feem, that of all subjects human nature should be the best understood; because every man has daily opportunities to study it, in his own paffions and in his own actions. But human nature, an interesting fubject, is feldom left to the investigation of philofophy. Writers of a sweet difpofition and warm imagination hold, that man is a benevolent being, and that every man ought to direct his conduct for the good of all, without regarding himself but as one of the number (a). Thofe of a cold temperament, and contracted mind, hold him to be an animal entirely selfish; to evince which, examples are accumulated without end (b). Neither of these fystems is that of nature. The felfifh fyflem is contradicted by the experience of all ages, affording the clearest evidence, that men frequently act for the fake of others, without regarding themfelves, and fometimes in direct opposition to their own intereft. And however much felfishness may prevail

(a) Lord Shaftesbury.

(b) Helvetius.