man may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any fubject. Some again are in a subject, but can be predicated of no fubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its fubject, but it can be predicated of no fubject; because it is an individual thing. Some are both in a subject, and may be predicated of a subject, as science; which is in the mind as its subject, and may be predicated of geometry. Lastly, Some things can neither be in a fubject, nor be predicated of any fubject. Such are all individual fubftances, which cannot be predicated, because they are individuals; and cannot be in a fubject, because they are substances. After fome other fubtilties about predicates and fubjects, we come to the categories themselves; the things above mentioned being called by the schoolmen the anteprædicamenta. It may be observed, however, that notwithstanding the distinction now explained, the being in a fubject, and the being predicated truly of a fubject, are in the Analytics used as fynonymous phrases; and this variation of style has led fome persons to think that the Categories were not wrote by Aristotle. Things which may be expreffed without compofition or structure, are, fays the author, reducible to the following heads. They are either substance, or quantity, or quality, or relatives, or place, or time, or having, or doing, or fuffering. These are the predicaments or categories. The first four are largely treated of in four chapters; the others are flightly paffed over, as fufficiently clear of themselves. As a fpecimen, I fhall give a fummary of what he fays on the category of substance. Substances are either primary, to wit, individual fubftances, or fecondary, to wit, the genera and species of substances. Primary fubftances neither are in a fubject, nor can be predicated of a fubject; but all other things that exift, either are in primary fubstances, or may be predicated of them. For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a fubject, may alfo be predicated of the fubject fubject itself. Primary substances are more fubftances than the fecondary; and of the fecondary, the fpecies is more a substance than the genus. If there were no primary, there could be no fecondary substances. 1. No fubftance is ca The properties of fubftance are these : pable of intenfion or remiffion. 2. No fubftance can be in any other thing as its subject of inhesion. 3. No fubstance has a contrary; for one substance cannot be contrary to another; nor can there be contrariety between a fubftance and that which is no fubftance. 4. The most remarkable property of substance, is, that one and the fame fubftance may, by fome change in itself, become the fubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the fame body may be at one time hot, at another cold. Let this ferve as a specimen of Aristotle's manner of treating the categories. After them, we have fome chapters, which the schoolmen call poftprædicamenta; wherein, first, the four kinds of oppofition of terms are explained; to wit, relative, privative, of contrariety, and of contradiction. This is repeated in all fyftems of logic. Laft of all we have diftinctions of the four Greek words which answer to the Latin ones, prius, fimul, motus, and habere. SECT. 4. Of the book concerning Interpretation. We are to confider, fays Ariftotle, what a noun is, what a verb, what affirmation, what negation, what speech. Words are the figns of what paffeth in the mind; writing is the fign of words. The figns both of writing and of words are different in different nations, but the operations of mind fignified by them are the fame. There are fome operations of thought which are neither true nor false. These are expreffed by nouns or verbs fingly, and without compofition. A A noun is a found which by compact fignifies fomething without respect to time, and of which no part has fignification by itfelf. The cries of beasts may have a natural fignification, but they are not nouns. We give that name only to founds which have their fignification by compact. The cafes of a noun, as the genitive, dative, are not nouns. Non homo is not a noun, but, for distinction's fake, may be called a nomen infinitum. A verb fignifies fomething by compact with relation to time. Thus, valet is a verb; but valetudo is a noun, because its fignification has no relation to time. It is only the present tense of the indicative that is properly called a verb; the other tenses and moods are variations of the verb. Non valet may be called a verbum infinitum. Speech is found fignificant by compact, of which fome part is alfo fignificant. And it is either enunciative, or not enunciative. Enunciative fpeech is that which affirms or denies. As to fpeech which is not enunciative, fuch as a prayer or wifh, the confideration of it belongs to oratory, or poetry. Every enunciative speech must have a verb, or fome variation of a verb. Affirmation is the enunciation of one thing concerning another. Negation is the enunciation of one thing from another. Contradiction is an affirmation and negation that are oppofite. This is a fummary of the first fix chapters. The seventh and eighth treat of the various kinds of enunciations or propofitions, univerfal, particular, indefinite, and fingular; and of the various kinds of oppofition in propofitions, and the axioms concerning them. These things are repeated in every fyftem of logic. In the ninth chapter he endeavours to prove, by a long metaphyfical reasoning, that propofitions refpecting future contingencies are not, determinately, either true or false; and that if they were, it would follow, that all things happen necef farily, The farily, and could not have been otherwise than as they are. remaining chapters contain many minute observations concerning the equipollency of propofitions both pure and modal. CHA P. II. Remarks. SECT. I. On the Five Predicables. THE HE writers on logic have borrowed their materials almost entirely from Aristotle's Organon, and Porphyry's Introduction. The Organon however was not wrote by Aristotle as one work. It comprehends various tracts, wrote without the view of making them parts of one whole, and afterwards thrown together by his editors under one name on account of their affinity. Many of his books that are loft would have made a part of the Organon, if they had been saved. The three treatifes of which we have given a brief account, are unconnected with each other, and with thofe that follow. And although the first was undoubtedly compiled by Porphyry, and the two laft probably by Ariftotle, yet I confider them as the venerable remains of a philofophy more ancient than Ariftotle. Archytas of Tarentum, an eminent mathematician and philofopher of the Pythagorean school, is faid to have wrote upon the ten categories. And the five predicables probably had their origin in the same school. Ariftotle, tho' abundantly careful to do justice to himself, does not claim the invention of either. And Porphyry, without without afcribing the latter to Ariftotle, profeffes only to deliver the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning them. The writers on logic having divided that science into three parts; the first treating of fimple apprehenfion, and of terms; the fecond, of judgement, and of propositions; and the third, of reafoning, and of fyllogifms. The materials of the first part are taken from Porphyry's Introduction, and the Categories; and those of the second from the book of Interpretation. A predicable, according to the grammatical form of the word, might feem to fignify, whatever may be predicated, that is, affirmed or denied, of fome fubject. And in this fenfe every predicate would be a predicable. But the logicians give a different meaning to the word. They divide propofitions into certain claffes, according to the relation which the predicate of the propofition bears to the fubject. The firft class is that wherein the predicate is the genus of the fubject; as when we fay, This is a triangle, Jupiter is a planet. In the fecond clafs, the predicate is a species of the fubject; as when we fay, This triangle is right-angled. A third clafs is when the predicate is the specific difference of the fubject; as when we fay, Every triangle has three fides and three angles. A fourth when the predicate is a property of the fubject; as when we fay, The angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles. And a fifth clafs is when the predicate is fomething accidental to the fubject; as when we fay, This triangle is neatly drawn. Each of thefe claffes comprehends a great variety of propofitions, having different fubjects, and different predicates; but in each clafs the relation between the predicate and the subject is the fame. Now it is to this relation that logicians have given the name of a predicable. Hence it is, that altho' the number of predicates be infinite, yet the number of predicables can be no greater than that |