fome being intelligent and skilful. Secondly, He would have had a conviction approaching to certainty, that the operator was a man. And, thirdly, He would have had a conviction that the man was Inigo Jones; but lefs firm than the former. Let us next suppose another English architect little inferior in reputation to Jones: the stranger would still have pronounced in favour of the latter; but his belief would have been in the lowest degree.

When we investigate the causes of certain effects, the reasoning is often founded upon the known nature of man. In the high country, for example, between Edinburgh and Glasgow, the people lay their coals at the end of their houses, without any fence to secure them from theft: whence it is rationally inferred, that coals are there in plenty. In the weft of Scotland, the cornstacks are covered with great care and nicety: whence it is inferred, that the climate is rainy. Placentia is the capital town of Bifcay; and the only town in Newfoundland bears the fame name; from which circumstance it is conjectured, that the Biscayners were the first Europeans who made a fettlement in that ifland.

Analogical reasoning, founded upon the uniformity of nature, is frequently employ'd in the investigation of facts; and we infer, that facts of which we are uncertain, muft refemble thofe of the fame kind that are known. The bulk of the reafonings in natural philofophy are of that kind. Take the following examples. We learn from experience, that proceeding from the humblest vegetable to man, there are numberlefs claffes of beings rifing one above another, by differences fcarce perceptible, and leaving nowhere a fingle gap or interval: and from conviction of the uniformity of nature, we infer, that the line is not broken off here, but is carried on in other worlds, till it end in the Deity. I proceed to another example. Every man is confcious of a felf-motive power in himself; and from the uniformity of nature, we

infer the fame power in every one of our own fpecies. The argument here from analogy carries great weight, because we entertain no doubt of the uniformity of nature with respect to beings of our ́ own kind. We apply the fame argument to other animals, tho' their resemblance to man appears not fo certain, as that of one man to another. But why not alfo apply the fame argument to infer a felf-motive power in matter? When we fee matter in motion without an external mover, we naturally infer, that, like us, it moves itself. Another example is borrow'd from Maupertuis. As there is no known space of the earth covered with water fo large as the Terra Auftralis incognita, we may reafonably infer, that so great a part of the earth is not altogether "fea, but that there must be fome proportion of land." The uniformity of nature with refpect to the intermixture of fea and dand, is an argument that affords but a very flender degree of conviction. The following argument of the fame kind, tho' it cannot be much rely'd on, feems however better founded. "The

inhabitants of the northern hemisphere, have, in arts and sciences, excelled fuch of the fouthern as we have any knowledge of: "and therefore, if inhabitants be found in the Terra Auftralis incognita, we ought not to expect among them many arts, nor "much cultivation."

After a fatiguing investigation of numberlefs particulars which divide and scatter the thought, it may not be unpleasant to bring all under one view by a fuccinct recapitulation.

We have two means for discovering truth, and acquiring knowledge, viz. intuition and reafoning. By intuition we discover fubjects, and their attributes, paffions, internal action, and in fhort every thing that is matter of fact. By intuition we also discover feveral relations. There are fome facts, and many relations, that cannot be difcovered by a fingle act of intuition,

but

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but require feveral fuch acts linked together in a chain of reafon

ing.

:

Knowledge acquired by intuition, includes for the most part certainty in some instances it includes probability only. Knowledge acquired by reasoning, frequently includes certainty; but. more frequently includes probability only.

Probable knowledge, whether founded on intuition or on reafoning, is termed opinion when it concerns relations; and is termed belief when it concerns facts. When knowledge includes certainty, it retains its proper name.

Reasoning that produces certainty, is termed demonftrative; and is termed probable, when it only produces probability.

Demonstrative reasoning is of two kinds. The first is, where the conclufion is derived from the nature and inherent properties of the fubject: mathematical reafoning is of that kind; and perhaps the only inftance. The fecond is, where the conclufion is derived from some propofition, of which we are certain by in

tuition.

Probable reasoning is endless in its varieties; and affords different degrees of conviction, depending on the nature of the fubject upon which it is employ'd.

SECT.

SECT. II,

PROGRESS OF REASON.

A Progrefs from infancy to maturity in the mind of

man, fimi

lar to that in his body, has been often mentioned. The external fenfes, being early necessary for self-preservation, arrive quickly at maturity. The internal fenfes are of a flower growth, as well as every other mental power: their maturity would be of little or no use while the body is weak, and unfit for action. Reafoning, as obferved in the first fection, requires two mental powers, viz. the power of invention, and that of perceiving relations. By the former power are discovered intermediate propofitions, equally related to the fundamental propofition and to the conclufion; and that relation is verified by the latter power. Both powers are necessary to the person who frames an argument, or a chain of reafoning: the latter only to the perfon who judges of it. Savages are miferably deficient in both. With respect to the former, a fayage may have a pregnant talent for invention; but it will ftand him in little ftead without a stock of ideas enabling him to felect what may answer the purpofe; and what opportunity has a favage to acquire such a stock? With respect to the latter, he knows little of relations: and how fhould he know, when both study and practice are neceffary for diftinguishing between relations, and for preventing the being impofed on by the fhadow of a relation instead of the substance? The understanding, at the fame time, among the illiterate, is obfequious to paffion and prepoffeffion;

poffeffion; and among them the imagination acts without control, forming conclufions often no better than mere dreams. In fhort, confidering the many causes that mislead from just reafoning, in days especially of ignorance, the erroneous and abfurd opinions that have prevailed in the world, and that continue in fome measure to prevail, are far from being furprifing. Were reafon our only guide in the conduct of life, we should have cause to complain; but our Maker has provided us with the moral sense, a guide little fubject to error in matters of importance. In the sciences, reafon is effential; but in the conduct of life, which is our chief concern, reason may be an useful affiftant; but to be our director is not its province.

The national progrefs of reafon has been flower in Europe, than that of any other art. Statuary, painting, architecture, and other fine arts, approach nearer perfection, as well as morality and natural history. Manners, it is true, and every art that appears externally, may in part be acquired by imitation and example: in reafoning there is nothing external to be laid hold of. But there is befide a particular cause that regards Europe, which is the blind deference that for many ages was paid to Ariftotle; who has kept the reafoning faculty in chains more than two thousand years. In his logics, the plain and fimple mode of reasoning is rejected, that which Nature dictates; and in its stead is introduced an artificial mode, fhowy but unsubstantial: it is of no ufe in discovering truth, but nobly contrived for wrangling and difputation. Confidering that reafon for fo many ages has been locked up in the enchanted caftle of fyllogifm, where empty phantoms pafs for realities, the flow progrefs of reafon toward maturity is far from being furprising. The taking of Conftantinople, ann. 1453, opened a new fcene, which in time relieved the world from the ufurpation of Ariftotle, and restored reafon to her privileges. All the knowledge of Europe was centred in ConVOL. II. ftantinople;

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