pressions, took delight in suggesting and in contemplating the possible disasters which might befal their country. This seditious line of conduct was accompanied also by the most scornful taunts and insulting reproaches, among which, the Paradise of fools and of cowards," was the mildest epithet affixed to the British people and their mg *

*See Cobbett's Political Register, 27th Nov. 1802. In order to shew the soul, perseverance, malignity, and fallacy of this man's assertions, (the tool as well as fool of Mr. Windham) and those of his party, I have here subjoined a few extracts, relative to the affairs of St. Domingo, selected from an immense number, contained in that well-known digest of falsehood.

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* A descent on the island of Jamaica, is so practicable, so easy, that, if it be not accomplished before this day twèloemonths, we shall be disposed to join Mr. Fox, and Lord Castlereagh, in extolling the moderation of Bonaparte." "On this Boot subject, too, we cannot but refer to the arguments of those, who, afraid to rely upon their own exertions, would feigh persuade themselves and their hearers, that France must ultimately fail in the West Indies, or elsewhere, for want of money." We have always that the French would thought finally subdue the Blacks, and make the country at once a productive colony, and a rendezvous for their army, a point d'appui, whence to stretch forth their power, as occasion might offer against our colonies, beginning with Jamaica." Were ແ it not for fear of putting the Richmond Park ministry to the blush, we would ask them, what is now become of all their hopes and predictions about the evacuation of St. Domingo? Mr. Addington will easily comprehend what we mean, when we

It is to be hoped that our countrymen will be henceforth on their guard against insinua. tions, purposely agitated to excite division

say, that this evacuation is not so easily effected as that of Malta." "Because our country cannot now, after the treaty of Amiens, say to France' you shall not ruin my colonies," the New Opposition are to blame for ascribing the approaching ruin of those colonies to the treaty of Amiens: because the evil is now rendered inevitable we are not to complain against those who have brought that evil upon us." Feb. 19, 1803. "From the signature of the preliminaries of peace to the present hour, we had not ceased to represent to our readers the great and imminent danger which must arise to our West India colonies, from the establishment of a considerable French force in the island of St. Domingo. The last intelligence from this grand deposit of troops, pretty fully confirms our opinión, as to the result of the contest between the blacks and the whites."

"Troops had been constantly arriving at St. Domingo for some months before the last intelligence came away; and, from the best means which we have of ascertaining the strength of the French army there, we are persuaded it must consist of about forty thousand Europeans, including the troops who lately sailed from Italy and France. When the blacks are subdued, and ten or fifteen thousand of them added to this European army, we would be glad to learn from Mr. Addington or Lord Hobart, what there is, except the interference of Divine Providence, to prevent our enemy from seizing on Jamaica? The dread of this event has haunted our minds ever since the French expedition first sailed, and it certainly requires a head and a heart like Mr. Addington's to keep a man happy in spite of such danger." March 26, 1803.

"After such tremendous ravings of the factious mind it is but

among them, and to subtract from the merits of their rulers. The total ruin of the expedi tion to St. Domingo will ever form a subject on which the supporters of the present administration may dwell with complacency. The whole conduct of ministers, from the sailing of the Brest fleet to the present hour, is a proof of their firmness, wisdom, and foresight; for they were governed by experience, the best monitor of statesmen. They kept constantly in their view the millions of treasure wasted, and the thousands of lives sacrificed by their predecessors, in

justice to the head and heart of Mr. Addington, and to the heads and hearts of his opponents, to recommend the reader to peruse the entertaining account of the termination of the campaign in St. Domingo, of the official return of the forty thousand European soldiers, who, with general Rochambeau, evacuated that colony, surrendered to the British arms, and are, now in England, or otherwise disposed of, conformably to the will of our commanders, but without having been able to secure a footing in St. Domingo, much less to seize Jamaica. See London Gazette, Feb. 7, 1804, announcing the capitulation of the French force, on the 19th Nov. 1803, in which Messrs. Windham, Cobbett, and Co. will learn what had become "of the effective army of forty thousand French troops, commanded by some of the most skilful and enterprizing officers in the world," Yet did Mr. Cobbett, in a moment of extacy, at the success of the French on the 27th of Nov. 1802, call these men "the conquerors of St. Domingo who sailed out of Brest with 16,000l. in their military chest."

their wild attempt to conquer that revolted colony. They acted, therefore, in conformity to an experience which the French had to prove: they were also not unacquainted with the military topography of the country, (a species of knowledge in which their predecessors were remarkably deficient) and the impenetrable recesses, within which the blacks, defeated in the plains, might withdraw to resume the war at pleasure, under more favourable circumstances. They calculated wisely on the ravages which the tropical diseases would cause among troops habituated to a more genial climate, to decisive pitched battles, and to short campaigns: they recollected also, that the Maroon war in Jamaica had required upwards of forty years before it was brought to a close. In short, every consideration of sound policy, military experience, and local knowledge, forcibly enjoined them to disregard the prejudices raised against the sailing of the Brest fleet, and to persevere in their original determination. Although, as I have before observed, the event has fully established their reputation for political sagacity, it may not be amiss to observe that, with a view to the permanence of peace, the measure was wise and expedient. For, the

employment of so large a force; the investment of large capitals, by the principal commercial houses of France, under the hope that their spe culations would be returned with tenfold interest; the eagerness expressed and displayed by the French government as well as people, to revive their colonial commerce, and recruit their maritime strength; were solid grounds on which every rational statesman might conclude on the nature and object of that expedition. That the first Consul was a villain, every one admitted, but that he was a lunatic none believed. It was obvious, therefore, to infer that he would not rashly stake his fortune by a total disregard of the interests of the French nation. The extent of his armaments, the zeal and activity displayed in forwarding them to the West Indies; the anxiety, frequently and publicly expressed, con cerning their success; were all pledges of his pacific disposition, and unequivocal vouchers of the policy of our government. In either alternative of peace or war, the consequences of that expedition were certain to be productive of benefit to this country. If the peace had continued, the Republic must have been emptied of its warlike population; for the nature of the servile war would have demanded not less than