which you are said to have uttered in your speech

-on the Preliminaries.

"What the condition and feelings of the country would be in this latter case. (a renewal of the war,) I need hardly point out. The dread, in fact, of what they would be, will operate so strongly, that the case will never happen. The country will never bear to put itself in a situation, in which the sense of its own folly will press upon it in a way, so im 'possible to be endured. At all events, with its present feelings and opinions, the country never can go to war again, let France do what she will: for, if we are of opinion, that war, continued at present, must be ruin, in the course of a few years; what do we suppose it must be, when, to replace cus, where we now are, we must begin by the reIcovery of that list of places, which the present treaty has given up? France, therefore, will be under no necessity of going to war with us: and, nothing but her own intemperance and insolence, and an opinion of our endurance and weakness, beyond even what they may be found to deserve, can force upon us that extremity. She has much safer and surer means of going to work; means, at the same time, sufficiently quick, to satisfy any ordinary ambition: she has nothing to do but to trust to the progress of her own power in peace, quickened,

95441

as often as she shall see occasion, by a smart threat of war. I cannot conceive the object, which a judicious application of these two means is not calculated to obtain. A peace, such as France has now made, mixed with proper proportions of a seasonable menace of war, is a specific, for undoing a rival country, which seems to me impossible to fail."*

Such were your sentiments in 1801, what ought they to be now, when you find the nation "can go to war, without letting France do what she will;" that in a few months it has "recovered that list of places, which the treaty had given up," that it has added Malta to the list, and that the "seasonable menace of war," instead of proving " a specific for undoing a rival' country," has actually proved its antidote t. But I leave you for the present to enjoy the inconsistency of your opinions, and proceed to more important facts.

In a former part of this letter, I stated the effec tive force of the country at the close of the war

et Commenting on the above speech, Cobbet has this apostrophe "This is now fulfilled to the very letter" See Pol. Reg. Jans 8. 1803. Really one could find great source of entertainment in this man's habitual imitation of Munchausen, if it were displayed on less serious subjects.

The slightest survey will shew its augmentation; for, in February 1808, that is, one month before the King's Message, the regulars alone amounted to 15,257 cavalry, and 97,882 infantry. The militia was embodied in April of the same year, and encreased the force to 156,782, which, any man conversant with the means of France, must know, was more than sufficient to avert any sudden blow, that, at the time under discussion, it was in the power of her ruler to inflict upon this country. Immediately on the rupture, the offers of the Volunteers were so numerous, that it might have been supposed, the whole British population designed to have precipitated itself in a mass on the rash invader. :ita ti RGV DA

4

But, let us contemplate the first effects of previous preparation. On the 16th of May, the war broke out. On the 22nd of the following month, St. Lucia was taken by storm. On the 26th of the same month, the blockade of the Weser was announced. On the 1st of July, the valuable island of Tobago capitulated. Sep. 7th, Havre de Grace, and the ports of the Seine were blockaded. Demarara, and Essequibo surrrendered on the 20th

The shipping employed in the Dutch colonies alone, while they were in our possession last war, amounted to fifty thou sand tons per annum.

ཎྜ་ *

On the 30th of Nov. in consequence of our vigilant blockade, the valuable colony of St. Domingo was lost by France, and the remnant of the French force surrendered to the British arms. To these prosperous events may be added, the immense quantity of shipping captured by our cruizers in the West Indies. Martinique indeed has not yet falleh, but its fate may be considered as certain; and I will venture to predict, when that desirable event shall have taken place, eleven thousand of the finest troops in the British service will not have fallen a sacrifice in accomplishing its reduction. Such, in the short space of four months, have been the consequences of the arrangements that were made previous to the war. If, after this accurate statement of facts, any one dare impute to administration a want of vigour, let him explain to the world in what vigour consists; and, if he think proper to select his examples from the conduct of the late ministers, I challenge him to produce in thrice the space of time mentioned above, a solitary fact in support of their claims. otel spa omad to

During the recess of Parliament, every effort was employed to give effect to the measures which it had adopted; in consequence of which, we now find that the total regular force amounts to 133,260 infantry of the line, 20,324 cavalry, 99,257 militia,

and 14,204 artillery men, making altogether, *267,043 men; so that in the short space of a few months only, we have obtained an accession of 60,000 men beyond: what had been embodied at the commencement of the war. In addition to this formidable force, we must add the volunteers, amounting to 390,386 men, making a grand total of SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND, FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY NINE men in arms for the defence of our country.

The progressive augmentation and actual state of the navy, is not less creditable to the ministers; At the time of his Majesty's Message, on the sth of March 1805, there were 244 ships in commission, with 46,820 seamen and marines. On the 31st of December of the same year, there were 411 ships in commission, and 86,863 seamen, besides 25,000 sea fencibles, making in the short space of nine months an increase of 167 ships, and 40,043 seamen and marines, besides the sea fencibles*. The augmentation since the last period has been very great, but as my object is solely

* That this progressive increase may be more apparent, I. have subjoined a comparative statement of the naval force on the 8th of March, and the 31st of December, 1803, with the rates of the ships.