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digests of its own accord, and with a view or intention to the purposes of circulation or digestion. The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for which it was made-the pointing of the hour: all their various motions conspire, in the nicest manner, to produce this effect. If they were endowed with a desire and intention to produce it, they could not do it better: yet we never ascribe any such desire or intention to them, but to the watchmaker; and we know that they are put into motion by a spring which intends the effect it produces as little as they do. But though, in accounting for the operation of bodies, we never fail to distinguish in this manner the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those of the mind, we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which is in reality the wisdom of God. Upon a superficial view, this cause seems sufficient to produce the effects which are ascribed to it, and the system of human nature seems to be more simple and agreeable when all its different operations are in this manner deduced from a single principle." After distinguishing in this way the efficient from the final cause of our moral impressions, our first perceptions of right and wrong,-after shewing that though it is absolutely necessary for the subsistence of society that the laws of justice should be observed, yet that it is not from a consideration of this necessity that we originally approve of their enforcement (though he admits that our regard for them may often be confirmed, and may sometimes require to be confirmed by such consideration), -he proceeds, "We frequently hear the young and the licentious ridiculing the most sacred rules of morality, and professing, sometimes from the corruption, but more frequently from the vanity of their hearts, the most abominable maxims of conduct. Our indignation rouses, and we are eager to refute and expose such detestable principles. But, though it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness which originally inflame us against them, we are unwilling to assign

this as the sole reason why we condemn them, or to pretend that it is merely because we ourselves hate and detest them. The reason, we think, would not appear to be conclusive. Yet why should it not; if we hate and detest them, because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred and detestation? But when we are asked, why we should not act in such or such a manner, the very question seems to suppose, that to those who ask it this manner of acting does not appear to be for its own sake the natural and proper object of these sentiments. We must shew therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of something else; and the consideration which first occurs to us is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the universal prevalence of such practices. We seldom fail therefore to insist upon this topic. That it is not a regard, however, to the preservation of society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against individuals, may be demonstrated by many obvious considerations. All men, even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor perfidy and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society, however obvious that necessity may appear. The concern which we take in the fortune and happiness of individuals does not, in common cases, arise from that which we take in the fortune and happiness of society. We are no more concerned for the destruction or loss of a single man, because the man is a member or part of society, and because we should be concerned for the destruction of society, than we are concerned for the loss of a single guinea, because this guinea is part of a thousand guineas, and because we should be concerned for the loss of the whole sum. In neither case does our regard for the individuals arise from our regard for the multitude; but in both cases our regard for the multitude is compounded, and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed. As when a small sum is unjustly taken from us, we do not so much prosecute the injury from a regard to the preservation of our whole fortune as from a regard to that particular sum which we have lost; so when a single man is injured or destroyed, we demand the punishment of the wrong that has been done to him, not so much from a

concern for the "general interest of society, as from a concern for that very individual who has been injured."

In a subsequent part of his work, wherein he treats of the " Influence of fortune upon our Moral Sentiments," and shews that, though it is the intention or affection of the heart, the propriety or impropriety, the beneficence or hurtfulness of the design that all praise or blame which can be bestowed upon an action must ultimately belong; yet, nevertheless, the result of those actions, the actual consequences which often proceed from them, do materially affect our sentiments:-He traces, in the same admirable spirit, the final cause of this inconsistency in our judgments; and remarks that "that necessary rule of justice, that men in this life are accountable for their actions only, not for their designs or intentions, is founded upon this salutary and useful irregularity in human sentiments concerning merit and demerit, which appears at first sight so absurd and unaccountable. But," he concludes, " every part of nature, when attentively surveyed, equally demonstrates the providential care of its Author; and we may admire the wisdom and the goodness of God even in the weakness and the folly of men."

We have the greater pleasure in citing these passages, because we think that we may read in them the best refutation of that theory of expediency, which nothing but the reputation of Dr. Paley could ever have recommended to the world*-a theory which Mr. Stewart

has characterised in a strain of indignant eloquence, that well became him on such a topic, as one which, "absolving men from the obligations imposed upon them by the moral constitution of human nature, abandons every individual to the guidance of his own narrow views concerning the complicated interests of society."

It may not perhaps be unworthy of observation, before we close these few remarks upon the "Theory of Moral Sen

Hume

It may be allowed us to state in a few words what we have always considered to be the wide difference upon this great point, betwixt the doctrine of Mr. Hume and that of Dr. Paley, which it is surprising to see so often confounded." proved from the phenomena of human nature as a fact, that whatever in moral conduct was intrinsi cally right, was useful. Paley laid it down as a rule, that whatever was expedient, was right; and thus converted a position of undeniable truth and beauty into an hypothesis full of fallacy, as the solution of a problem pregnant with evil in its consequences, when considered as a precept.

Philos. Hum. Mind, vol. ii. Ch. 4, Sect. 6.

timents," that the same principle of sympathy as a source of morals, from which Smith has deduced his system, appears to have been referred to by Polybius, in a remarkable passage of his history, for the same purpose. It is rather long for a quotation; but as it is curious in itself, and as Polybius is not a writer in every one's hands, we shall transcribe part of it in a note below; when possibly it may appear, after all, that the coincidence is rather in expression than in substance, and that it applies rather more strikingly to the doctrine of sympathy with utility, (the theory of Hume) than to that of sympathy as unfolded by Smith*.

SECTION 4.-From the publication of the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" to that of the "Wealth of Nations." We have seen, from the letter which Mr. Hume addressed to our author, something of the impression which was produced by the publication of his first great work. We shall shortly perceive that the hope therein expressed, that it with the Duke of Buccleugh was not might lead to an interesting connexion idly formed. In the meantime, however, it made no change in the life and habits of Dr. Smith. He continued his professorship in the University of Glasgow for a period of four years after this, directing his attention, and that of his ment of ethics, of which he had prestudents, somewhat less to that departsented to the world his views, and jects which come within the range of treating more particularly of the subOf the long and profound attention he jurisprudence, and political philosophy. had devoted to this latter branch of moral science, he has bequeathed an imperishable monument to the world in

"For man, who among all the various kinds of animals is alone endowed with the faculty of reason, titude and injustice) with indifference; but reflectcannot, like the rest, pass over such actions (ingraing on what he sees, and comparing the future with the present, will not fail to express his indignation at this injurious treatment, to which, as he foresees, he may at some time be exposed. Thus it is certain that all men must be shocked by such ingratitude through sympathy with the resentment of their neighbour, and from an apprehension also that the case may be their own. And from hence arises in the mind of man, a certain sense of the nature, and force of duty, in which consists both the beginning and the end of justice; and thus it is that the people begin to discern the nature of things, honourable or base, and in what consists the difference between them; and to perceive that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are fit to be admired and imitated, and the latter to be detested and avoided."-Polybius, Hist., Book vi. Ex. 1, Ch. i. Hampton's Translation.

his "Wealth of Nations." His views upon the theory of jurisprudence, except inasmuch as he has embodied some of its important principles in that work, were confined to his lectures; though it is clear from an intimation conveyed in the closing paragraph of the "Moral Sentiments," and still more so from the advertisement he prefixed to the last edition of that work, written only a few months before his death, that it was a subject which, during the whole of his life, he had deeply meditated, and upon which he had always designed to communicate his labours to the public, if the engagements with which he was occupied during the latter period of it had not interfered to prevent him.

For himself, Dr. Smith has undoubtedly done enough, and so far as regards his own interest and his fame, it would be idle to indulge in regrets. For the world however, and for the interests of science, perhaps a greater loss has been rarely sustained than in the unfortunate circumstances, whatever they were, which concurred to deprive it of this most valuable portion of his labours. The enlarged views he had evidently formed of the objects and principles of legislation; the glimpses which we occasionally catch in his other writings of the spirit in which he was accustomed to contemplate such subjects; the pure and lofty sources to which he was accustomed to refer for those principles; all assure us of the invaluable addition which would have been made to this department of philosophy, had it been illustrated by his pen.

From this, however, and from his academical labours generally, he was withdrawn in the year 1763, by an invitation to accompany the Duke of Buccleugh on his travels; an appointment which was principally recommended to him at the time, by the desire which he had conceived of visiting the continent. The proposal, which was made to him through Mr. Charles Townsend, was liberal in the extreme; as might be expected to be made to such a man, to induce him to quit the scene of his honourable and useful labours, the society of his friends, and those studious delights, known only to the pure and devoted lovers of truth, which constitute the highest charm of human existence.

It is well known that, whatever pleasure Smith might derive from his tour, or whatever advantage from his connexion with the noble family of Buc

cleugh, the separation from the university of Glasgow was a source to him of very heartfelt regret. An interesting and characteristic anecdote has been recorded of him, relative to his resignation of his duty as professor there, which is well worth preserving.

It was at the latter end of his course of lectures, that it became necessary for him to take his departure, and it was well ascertained that he had been at exceeding pains to provide, in a friend, a very competent successor for that part of the course which yet remained unfinished. He had suffered the greatest possible anxiety upon this point, and had done everything that might satisfy the most scrupulous of his friends and his pupils. This, however, did not satisfy the conscientious delicacy of Dr. Smith. He was of course aware of the high estimation in which he was held in the university, and the just value which was put upon his lectures. The day at length arrived when he was to address the students of his class for the last time, and it was a moment deeply affecting to both parties. He took leave of them in a tone of affection and regret, which enlivened their mutual sorrow; and when they were about to depart, he called them severally to his chair, and tendered to each of them, carefully folded in paper, the amount of the fee which he had received for the whole course of his lectures, notwithstanding so small a portion of it only remained unfinished. This was of course refused resolutely, as by acclamation; the professor, however, persisted in his endeavour, assuring them that he should not be satisfied otherwise, and that he should quit them under the impression of having failed in his duty, and of having wronged them, if they did not take back the fee for the entire course of lectures, which circumstances prevented him from completing. It was in vain that they assured him how far they were overpaid by the smallest portion of his labour bestowed upon them for the trifling emolument he derived; how real a wrong they should be committing to consent to such a proposal, and, in short, their firm determination by no means to listen to it. The professor was sensibly touched by their generous avowal, but he was not to be moved from his purpose. When they were at last on the point of quitting the lecture room, he seized hold of the foremost of the students, and

absolutely forced the money into his hands, exclaiming, with his accustomed ardour," Nay, gentlemen, I will not suffer this; it is a matter of conscience with me, and I must have my way;" and in this manner seeing him so deeply concerned in his object, they were obliged to submit; and thus to terminate a struggle of very unusual occurrence, equally honourable to the delicacy and generosity of the professor, and the attachment of his pupils.

It may safely be said, without disparagement to the many eminent successors of Dr. Smith, that his removal from the chair of moral philosophy was perhaps the greatest loss which the University of Glasgow has sustained. Of his merits and his method as a lecturer, we have presented our readers with an interesting memorial in the last section; but there is a circumstance related of him which may still better serve to evince the pains and sagacity which he exerted in the performance of his duty, and may suggest a standing and instructive lesson to both public and private teachers in all times and places. It is said that in the delivery of his daily lectures, his observation had been drawn, in an especial manner, to a certain student of his class, whose general habit of close and riveted attention to what was going on, became a mark or indication to the professor of the degree in which he succeeded in the developement and expression of his subject that he was accustomed to fix his eye upon the student in question, and as long as he found that he retained his hold of his attention, he felt satisfied; but whenever he remarked any relaxation in his manner, whether in the wandering expression of his countenance, or the position of his body, which seemed to indicate a diminishing interest in the lecture" I took this as a valuable admonition," he used to say; "I was sure that there was something wanting either of connection in my reasoning or of sufficient fulness and perspicuity in my exposition, and I immediately paused. I recapitulated what I had been saying-I explained-I re-argued -I endeavoured further to illustrate my propositions, and I never felt quite satisfied that I was going on right, until I had regained complete hold of my monitor, till I saw by the resumption of his usual manner and gaze that I possessed the whole of his attention."

Having disengaged himself as well as

he could from the ties that bound him to Glasgow, Smith quitted that city in January, 1764, and joined the Duke of Buccleugh in London, where they remained together a couple of months. In March they set out on their route to Paris, and had the fortune to be joined at Dover by Sir James Macdonald, who accompanied them as far as the French capital, where they parted ;-Sir James on his way to Italy, where he died within two years after, in the twenty-fifth year of his age. Were there no other testimony to the merit of this accomplished person, it would be sufficient to shew that he enjoyed in so high a degree the esteem and admiration of two such men as Dr. Smith and Mr. Hume; and a letter which the latter addressed to Smith, on the occasion of his death, contains strong evidence of this-" Were you and I together," says he, "we should shed tears at present for the death of poor Sir James Macdonald: we could not possibly have suffered a greater loss than in that valuable young man."

It was about the same time when Smith set out for the continent with the Duke of Buccleugh, that his friend Hume had been invited to join the embassy of the Earl of Hertford at Paris. Smith remained in that city only a few days; but before he left it we should mention that he addressed the rector of the University of Glasgow in form, tendering his resignation of the chair he had filled, and expressing himself as might be expected on such an occasion.

I was never more anxious" (he says, in the conclusion of his letter) " for the good of the college than at this moment; and I sincerely wish that, whoever is my successor, he may not only do credit to the office by his abilities, but be a comfort to the very excellent men with whom he is likely to spend his life, by the probity of his heart and the goodness of his temper." On the receipt of this letter, the chair was declared to be vacant; and at a meeting of the heads of the university the sense of the value of their late professor, and the loss sustained by his removal was recorded in the following terms:

"The University cannot help expressing their sincere regret at the removal of Dr. Smith, whose distinguished probity and amiable qualities procured him the esteem and affection of his colleagues, and whose uncommon genius, great abilities, and extensive learning, did so much honour to this society: his

elegant and ingenious Theory of Moral Sentiments having recommended him to the esteem of men of taste and literature throughout Europe. His happy talent of illustrating abstracted subjects, and faithful assiduity in communicating useful knowledge, distinguished him as a professor, and at once afforded the greatest pleasure and the most important instruction to the youth under his care." On quitting Paris, Dr. Smith and the Duke of Buccleugh proceeded to Toulouse, where they fixed their abode for a year and a half; enjoying the best society of the place, and finding in new manners and new modes of existence fresh sources of interest and information equally advantageous to both partiesto Dr. Smith affording opportunities of extending and confirming his previous acquaintance with men and books; and perhaps having the effect of biassing his judgment in some matters of taste and literature, rather erroneously, in favour of French criticism and genius, and of certain pre-conceived theories to which he was naturally inclined.

On quitting Toulouse, they spent the autumn of that year in a tour through the southern provinces of France and to Switzerland. At Geneva they remained a couple of months; and returned to Paris about Christmas 1765, where they continued till the month of October following. It was at Paris, as we may well suppose, that Smith, after all, enjoyed by far the highest gratification which his journey afforded him. The capital, as Mr. Hume used to say, is the true scene for a man of letters; and if any, surely it was the capital of France at this period. Mr. Hume himself was there only for a short time after the arrival of his friend; but he was there long enough to introduce him to the most distinguished philosophers and men of learning then living in Paris:-D'Alembert, Helvetius, Marmontel, Turgot, Quesnai, and many others. The society of the two latter in particular we may be assured, from the congeniality of their sentiments upon subjects which Smith was at that time deeply meditating, must have been gratifying to him in a degree not very easy to conceive. It was that private and unreserved interchange of opinion in matters of moral and political science, with men like these, equally enlightened with himself, and animated by the same zeal for the happiness of mankind, that constituted his felicity; for, in other respects, the mere gaiety and brilliancy of Pari

sian society were not adapted to his taste and manners; nor were his powers in conversation such as fitted him to shine amid its glare.

With Turgot and Quesnai he contracted a very close intimacy. With the former it was long supposed that he maintained an epistolary correspondence for a long period after his return to Scotland, a circumstance which excited naturally considerable interest, but of which Mr. Stewart, who took some pains to inquire into it, found reason to doubt the truth. It is certain that no memorial of such correspondence existed amongst Smith's papers, nor has any been made public from those of Turgot. It is well known, indeed, that Smith had no fondness for letter-writing, nor are we aware of three letters of his which have ever appeared in print. As he wrote few letters, it is equally to be regretted that he kept no journal during his travels, or if he did, that it was amongst the other papers which he took such anxious pains to secure the destruction of previous to his death.

Amongst the other eminent persons with whom Smith became acquainted whilst in Paris, and from whom he received distinguished marks of respect, was the family of the Duke de la Rochefoucauld; a circumstance not unworthy of being recorded, inasmuch as his introduction to that accomplished and amiable man led to the suppression in the latter edition of his "Theory of Moral Sentiments" of a rather severe animadversion upon the author of the celebrated " Maxims," which had been expressed in the first, where Smith had associated the name of Rochefoucauld with that of Mandeville. There is a letter extant from the Duke de la Rochefoucauld dated in 1778, addressed to Smith, transmitting to him a new edition of the " Maxims," in which he adverts with some pain to Dr. Smith's censure, and offers a poor apology, though the best that can be made, for a very shallow and pernicious performance, which persons equally shallow have taken for philosophy, but which nobody would have thought it worth while to remember or refute, if it had not been written in epigrams. In France he studied the principles of the economists in their writings as well as in their conversations; and was perhaps first led by the errors of that ingenious and amiable sect, to the contemplation of the more wide and just views to which

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