had shown himself disposed to treat all those who were privy to marriages performed in an irregular manner, this had been solemnized in a private house, without a licence being previously obtained for the purpose; and notwithstanding the footing cf acquaintance, if not of intimacy, on which that prelate stood with regard to the attorney-general, the act of contumacy was not passed over. A prosecution was instituted in the ecclesiastical court against all the parties concerned, among whom was Lord Burleigh himself. The consequences might have been serious, had the authority of the church been exerted to the utmost on the occasion; but it is probable that the suit was commenced merely for the sake of public example, and the penalties incurred were eventually remitted. It is curious to remark that the cause assigned for this lenity was, that the offence had been committed through ignorance of the law. Meantime the professional duties of the attorney-general were prosecuted with unremitted attention; and it is supposed, that in addition to the functions which belonged to his office, he had other occupations to employ his attention in private, being frequently consulted by the queen's council in matters only indirectly connected with his public duties. But, notwithstanding the multiplicity of his avocations, he found time in 1600 to publish the first of the eleven parts of his Reports, the remainder of which were completed during the subsequent reign.

In the same year occurred the memorable trial of the Earls of Essex and Southampton, for high-treason. They had been guilty not only of conspiring against the government, but of actually exciting the citizens to revolt and insurrection, with the intent (as the indictment set forth) of compassing the queen's death. The case for the prosecution was, of course, conducted on the part of the crown by the attorneygeneral; but he acquired little credit by his conduct on the occasion. It is true that, according to the general practice of that time, state prisoners were commonly treated with a degree of harshness and severity quite incompatible with the just and benevolent axiom of the English law, which supposes every accused party innocent until the charges brought against him have been confirmed by a verdict. The person to be put on his trial was thrown into prison

without the formality of an indictment. When confined, he was allowed neither pen, ink, nor paper; his friends and relations were denied access to him; and till the time of his appearing in court he remained in utter ignorance of every charge that was to be brought forward against him. He was not allowed to have any previous knowledge of the persons who were to compose the jury, though his right of challenging was almost the only privilege he was permitted to exercise; and whatever number of witnesses the crown might think proper to produce against him, he was not suffered to question them, or reply to their statements, until the whole case for the prosecution was closed. In short, the law treated the accused in every respect as though his conviction had already taken place, and he was unworthy to be considered other than a culprit. The formal proceedings in court were carried on in the same spirit. State trials were habitually conducted with a want of liberality, and even of decorum, towards those who were arraigned, which would be quite intolerable to the spirit and good taste of the present age. The counsel appointed to act on behalf of the crown seldom thought it necessary to appear, as if, in pressing their accusations against its enemies, they were reluctantly performing a painful duty; and far from endeavouring to mitigate by the mildness of their deportment the actual severity they were called upon to exercise, it was not unusual with them to aggravate it by expressions of personal hostility towards the prisoners on trial. The common prevalence of this practice might, perhaps, in some measure excuse (though it certainly cannot justify) Sir Edward Coke for conforming to it. But he carried this fault even farther than his contemporaries. In the prosecution of the Lords Essex and Southampton, whether from the natural violence and irritability of his temper, or from a desire of showing his obsequiousness to the queen by his treatment of her enemies, he behaved towards the two accused noblemen with a malignity and want of forbearance that not only tarnished his own reputation, but rather injured than strengthened the case which had been put into his hands. It is well known that the insurrection, which formed the chief ground of accusation against them, was too public and too notorious not to be fully capable of

being proved by the most unexceptionable testimony; yet Coke, not satisfied with the depositions of the witnesses, interrogated the accomplices of the treason, and even went so far as to examine the avowed enemy of the Earl of Essex, Sir Walter Raleigh, concerning what he had indirectly heard on the subject of the alleged conspiracy. Each of the peers, in his defence, alluded to the marked animosity which the attorneygeneral had displayed throughout the trial; and Lord Southampton, addressing him, said: "You urge the matter very far, and you wrong me therein; my blood be upon your head."

But violent and intemperate as was the bearing of Coke in prosecuting this charge, the manner in which he treated Sir Walter Raleigh on a similar occasion, reflects much greater disgrace on his character. The trial of that justly celebrated man took place in 1603, in the first year of the reign of James I. He was accused of high treason, in compassing and imagining to depose and destroy the king, and of treating with the Spanish government for assistance in the execution of his purpose. It is not necessary to enter into a detail either of the accusation or of the evidence that was adduced to support it. What foundation ever existed for the charge, it is now, as indeed it appeared at the time, to be impossible to ascertain; but at all events the testimony, by means of which Sir Walter was condemned, was entirely illegal. The only direct deposition that affected his innocence, was that of Lord Cobham, who was not openly produced in court as a witness, and who had made a solemn recantation of his former evidence. The law required that the accused party should not be convicted but on the testimony of two credible witnesses brought face to face; on this the prisoner insisted in his defence; but this clear and explicit rule of law was thought to give an inconvenient protection to the life and liberty of the subject, and was accordingly overruled through the influence of the attorney-general, who, however, could not, and did not attempt to show that the statutes, (5 and 6 Edward III. cap. 11,) by which it is expressly enacted that there shall be two witnesses in cases of high treason, had ever been repealed. He merely affirmed in general, that the law was altered; and endeavoured to account for the change, by declaring "that the crown could not

stand a year upon the king his master's head, if a traitor could not be condemned by circumstances." By this corrupt and disgraceful artifice, Sir Edward Coke not only succeeded in procuring the condemnation of Raleigh, but furnished a precedent, by means of which at after periods many other persons accused of high treason were unjustly and unlawfully convicted. His deportment towards his illustrious victim during the trial, was not less derogatory to the dignity of his own office, than offensive to decorum, and even insulting to the court. He loaded this accomplished gentleman and scholar with abuse and scurrility; called him the most notorious traitor that ever came to the bar: a monster, a viper, a spider of hell, a damnable atheist, one who had an English face, but a Spanish heart; and carried the licence of speech, which the custom of that time in some degree authorized, to an extent that had never before been attempted. The calmness and self-possession of the accomplished individual to whom these epithets were applied, served to make the overbearing conduct of the attorney-general appear more odious by the contrast. The following specimen of a dialogue that took place between the accuser and the accused, places the difference in a sufficiently strong light. After calmly listening to a long strain of scurrility and invective, Sir Walter observed:

"You speak indiscreetly, barbarously, and uncivilly."

Coke. "I want words to express thy viperous treasons."

Raleigh. "I think you want words indeed; for you have spoken one thing half a dozen times."

Coke. "Thou art an odious fellow : thy name is hateful to all England for thy pride."

Raleigh. "It will go nigh to prove a measuring cast between you and me, Mr. Attorney."

The conduct of Sir Edward Coke throughout this trial must have been recollected by Bacon, when, at a later period, he observed to him: “As in your pleadings you were wont to insult over misery, and to inveigh bitterly at the persons, which bred you many ene mies, whose poison yet swelleth, and the effects now appear; so you are still wont to be a little careless in this point, to praise or disgrace upon slight grounds, and that sometimes untruly,

so that your reproofs or commendations are for the most part neglected and condemned; when the censure of a judge, coming slow but sure, should be a brand to the guilty, and a crown to the virtuous. You will jest at any man in public, without respect of the person's dignity or your own: this disgraceth your gravity, more than it can advance the opinion of your wit; and so do all actions which we see you do directly with a touch of vain-glory, having no respect to the true end."

From the tenour of these remarks, which were addressed to Coke under the form of 66 an expostulation," it will be perceived that he was not upon terms of friendship with the illustrious personage who afterwards became Lord Chancellor. Though the want of amity between them may, no doubt, in some measure be attributed to the insolent and haughty bearing of the attorneygeneral, it must be admitted, that a feeling of jealousy, wholly unworthy of such a character as Bacon's is usually represented, was probably the chief cause of it. But, to whichever of the two the original wrong be imputed, it is certain that their dislike of each other shortly became mutual, and was at length increased to undisguised animosity. After the specimen which has been just given of the language employed by Coke, in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, it will not excite much surprise to find him on another occasion forgetful of decorum (at least as decorum is at present understood) towards his own personal enemy; and to perceive that the same ungovernable warmth of temper which he had before exhibited in so disgraceful a manner, should again give a calm opponent a decided advantage over him. Bacon has left among his works a short tract, entitled, "A true remembrance of the abuse I received of Mr. Attorney-General, publicly in the exchequer, the first day of term; for the truth whereof I refer myself to all that were present:" and if this document state the circumstances correctly, it will not be disputed that the attorney-general would, in every point of view, have done wisely if he had refrained from provoking such an adversary to an open contest.

Bacon, who was then at the bar, had occasion to move for the reseizure of some lands, "and this," says he, "I did in as gentle and reasonable terms as might be."

"Mr. Attorney kindled at it, and said: Mr. Bacon, if you have any tooth against me, pluck it out; for it will do you more hurt than all the teeth in your head will do you good. I answered coldly in these very words: Mr. Attorney, I respect you; I fear you not; and the less you speak of your own greatness, the more I will think of it.'

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He replied: I think scorn to stand upon terms of greatness towards you, who are less than little; less than the least; and other such strange light terms he gave me, with that insulting which cannot be expressed.

"Herewith stirred, yet I said no more but this: Mr. Attorney, do not oppress me so far; for I have been your better, and may be again, when it please the queen.'

"With this he spake, neither I nor himself could tell what, as if he had been born attorney-general; and in the end bade me not meddle with the queen's business, but with mine own and that I was unsworn, etc. 1 told him, sworn or unsworn was all one to an honest man; and that I ever set my service first and myself second; and wished to God that he would do the like."

It was probably in reference to this quarrel that Bacon addressed the following letter to the attorney-general:

"I thought best, once for all, to let you know in plainness what I find of you, and what you shall find of me. You take to yourself a liberty to disgrace and disable my law, my experience, my discretion. What it pleaseth you I pray think of me; I am one that know both mine own wants and other men's, and it may be, perchance, that mine mend, when others stand at a stay. And surely I may not endure, in public place, to be wronged without repelling the same to my best advantage, to right myself. You are great, and therefore have the more enviers, which would be glad to have you paid at another's cost. Since the time I missed the solicitor's place, the rather I think by your means, I

cannot expect that you and I shall ever serve as attorney and solicitor together; but either to serve with another at your remove, or to step into some other course; so as I am more free than ever I was from any reason of unworthy conforming myself to you, more than general good manners, or your particular good usage shall provoke; and if you had not been short-sighted

in your own fortune, as I think, you might have had more of me. But that time is passed. I write not this to show my friends what a brave letter I have written to Mr. Attorney; I have none of those humours. But that I have written is to a good end, that is, to the more decent carriage of my master's service, and to our particular better understanding one of another. This letter, if it shall be answered by you in deed, and not in word, I suppose it will not be worse for us both; else it is but a few lines lost, which for a much smaller matter I would have adventured."

It will be collected from these passages, that Bacon had been foiled in his endeavour to become solicitor-general; and that he attributed the disappointment of his expectations to the influence of the attorney-general. As this circumstance would, according to his own statement, have prevented him from holding the post of solicitor while Coke remained in his office, Bacon, who was always keenly alive to his own interest, suppressed his personal dislike of his enemy so far as to exert himself to procure his advancement. Previous to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, that is, almost immediately after the accession of James I., Coke had received the honour of knight hood; and it is to be supposed that the active exertions which he subsequently made (1605) in the prosecution of the persons connected with the gunpowder treason, had ingratiated him in the favour of that monarch. The zeal for the cause of the government, and the great professional knowledge which he displayed throughout the whole of the proceedings connected with the conspiracy, but particularly on the trial of the jesuit, Garnet, marked him as a fit subject for promotion. Accordingly in 1606, (having been previously admitted to the rank of serjeant at law,) he was appointed chief justice of the court of Common Pleas. The vacant place of attorney-general was at the same time filled by Sir Henry Hobart, and Bacon became solicitor.

Sir Edward Coke retained his situation of chief justice of the Common Pleas during upwards of seven years. It was a place for which his profound knowledge of the law eminently qualified him; and though he was, probably with justice, reproached for his haughty and unconciliating deportment on the bench, it appears that, upon the whole,

the manner in which he acquitted himself of the duties of his office gained him the highest credit. Bacon, indeed, has accused him of making the law lean too much to his opinion, and using it as a double-edged weapon; but however his conduct in the prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh may seem to justify such an imputation, there is certainly no proof of it on record, and the general charge, coming from such a quarter, cannot be entitled to implicit credit when unsupported by any corroborative testimony.

It does not appear that Sir Edward Coke ever expressed, or even entertained, a wish to be removed from the court of Common Pleas, unless indeed there might have been an opportunity of raising him to the Woolsack. But Bacon, who was high in favour at court, had his own reasons for wishing that his enemy should be preferred to the chief justiceship of the King's Bench, as by this change Sir Henry Hobart might be advanced to his vacant place in the Common Pleas, and the office of attorney-general would thereby be accessible to himself. In order to bring about these changes, he had recourse to an expedient such as, according to our present notions, must appear equally at variance with discretion and with delicacy. This was no other than drawing up a tract, of which the purport may be learned from the title: "Reasons why it should be exceeding much for his Majesty's service to remove the Lord Coke from the place he now holdeth, to be chief justice of England, and the attorney to succeed him, and the solicitor the attorney." It is remarkable that this document contains an indirect eulogium on Coke's behaviour as a judge, since it admits that he had more than once opposed the views of the king; a line of conduct for which it is impossible to suppose any other motive than fearless and uncompromising integrity in the discharge of his duties. Among the reasons urged for the propriety of appointing him to the King's Bench, it is said that: "The remove of my Lord Coke to a place of less profit, though it be with his will, yet will be thought abroad a kind of discipline to him for opposing himself in the king's causes; the example whereof will contain others in more awe." And in another place it is remarked, that the proposed changes "will strengthen the king's causes

greatly amongst the judges; for both my Lord Coke will think himself near a privy counsellor's place, and thereupon turn obsequious; and the attorney-general, a new man, and a grave person, in a judge's place, will come in well to the other, and hold him hard to it, not without emulation between them, who shall please the king best." It is to be supposed that these reasons had their weight with James I, since we find Coke actually appointed chief justice of the King's Bench, (October 25th, 1613,) and the other suggestions of Bacon also complied with, by the promotion of Sir Henry Hobart and himself, Sir Henry Yelverton being preferred to the vacant solicitorship. Shortly afterwards, Sir Edward was sworn a member of the privy council.

However, this change of place had not the effect which Bacon affected to anticipate, of rendering the new chief justice of the King's Bench more pliant and obsequious. He never suffered his complaisance for the king to betray him into a step that was inconsistent with the duty or might detract from the dignity of his judicial office. On one particular occasion, a prosecution for treason being in contemplation against a minister named Peacham, who had written certain libellous pas sages in one of his sermons, the king wished to have the private opinions of all the judges on the case, before it was officially brought under their notice. Bacon was employed to sound them on the subject, and he encountered little or no opposition from any of them except the lord chief justice. It was Coke's favourite maxim, that he was a judge in a court and not in a chamber; and on this principle he refused to comply with the wish of his majesty; maintaining that such a mode of taking private opinions was contrary to the custom of the realm. The letters which Bacon wrote to the king on this occasion contain some curious information, as to the dexterity he employed to gain his master's ends; but it was with out effect. He at length succeeded in persuading Coke to look over the papers connected with the prosecution, and afterwards, by dint of importunity, extorted from him an answer to the questions he had put; but it was so unsatisfactory, that he declared to the king he was glad for his own exculpation to be able to send it in the chief justice's own hand-writing. This and

other spirited demonstrations of many integrity are the more likely to attract our admiration, when contrasted with the many specimens of servility displayed by other distinguished characters during the same reign. The difference plainly shows, that Coke was rising superior to the willing obsequiousness which was the vice of his time; a vice that has left something of its stain on the history of his own early career, whatever the general independence of his conduct in his maturer years may have done towards obliterating it. It is to be recollected, that at this period he had perhaps stronger inducements than most of his contemporaries to court the favour of his sovereign. The continuance of his office was dependent solely on the king's will; and, as the chancellorship might be expected shortly to be vacant, there was on one hand a prospect of further preferment as a reward for obedience, on the other, the risk of disgrace as a punishment for refractory behaviour. To the honour of Coke, however, he disregarded every consideration but that of duty. One instance, indeed, is recorded of his having judicially promulgated an opinion in favour of those unjust and arbitrary expedients for raising supplies which went by the very inappropriate name of benevolences; and it is to be supposed that his conduct in this particular, whatever might be the real motive of it, was in effect excellently calculated to propitiate the good graces of James; but there are several other circumstances which go to prove that his general behaviour on the bench was any thing but that of a courtly sycophant. He never descended in this respect so low as Bacon, whose subserviency to the will of the king was indeed unbounded; and it is singular that the arts which this intriguing courtier was constantly and successfully employing to injure Coke in the king's estimation, were such as cannot but have a directly contrary effect with regard to the estimation of disinterested judges. This has been already exemplified by the arguments which he used to procure the removal of his enemy from the Common Pleas to the King's Bench; and a letter which he wrote to King James (in 1615) in order to dissuade him from appointing Sir Edward to succeed Lord Ellesmere on the woolsack, affords another instance of the same kind. In this letter, after enume