tained that any habit exists in God freely, and not from a necessity of nature. We have before accounted in what sense habits are ascribed to God: even the more sagacious Socinians do not fall into such a blunder; but they deny such a habit to exist in God at all, and entirely divest him of this justice. Twiss, indeed, maintains, that the exercise of that justice is free to God, but grants that justice itself is a natural attribute of God; the Socinians, that it is only a free act of the divine will: which party this learned author favours, appears not from his words. If by justice he means the habit, he sides with the Socinians; if the act and exercise, he is of the same opinion with Twiss, although he expresses his sentiments rather unhappily. But let us consider this learned writer's arguments.

The first, which he acknowledges to be taken from Twiss (the same thing may be said of most of his others) and which he pronounces unanswerable, is this: 'God gave up his most innocent Son, our Lord Jesus Christ to death, in consequence of his punitory justice, and it was certainly in his power not to have devoted him to death; for from no necessity of nature did God devote his Son to death; for if so, then God would not have been God, which is absurd; for of his free love he gave him up to death;' John iii. 6. Rom. viii. 32.

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As there is no need of a sword to cut this indissoluble knot, as he calls it, let us try by words what we can do to untie it. I answer then, The devoting of Christ to death is taken in a twofold sense: 1. For the appointment of Christ to the office of surety, and to suffer the punishment of our sins in our room and stead. 2. For the infliction of punishment upon Christ, now appointed our surety; and our delivery through his death being now supposed.'

The devoting of Christ to death, considered in the first sense, we deny to be an act of punitory justice, or to have arisen from that justice. For that act by which God destined his Son to the work of mediation, by which, in respect of their guilt, he transferred from us all our sins, and laid them upon Christ, are acts of supreme dominion, and breathe love and grace rather than avenging justice. But the punishment of Christ, made sin for us, is an act of punitory justice. Nor upon the supposition that he was received in

our room as our surety, could it be otherwise; and although in drawing such consequences, I think we ought to refrain as to what might be possible, I am not, however, afraid to affirm, that God could not have been God, that is, just and true, if he had not devoted to death his Son, when thus appointed our Mediator.

What shall we say, when we consider that even this learned man was aware of this twofold sense of the phrase 'the devoting of Christ to death,' he even had thoroughly weighed that distinction, or else he is inconsistent with, and shamefully contradicts himself; for in the beginning of the argument he asserts, that the devoting of Christ to death has its rise from punitory justice:' but in the end, he says, it was from free love;' but certainly punishing justice is not free love; he must then either acknowledge a twofold appointment of Christ to death, or he cannot be consistent with himself. But the passages of Scripture that he quotes, evidently mean the appointment of Christ to death, as wé have explained it in the first sense of the phrase.

What reason this learned man had for so much boasting of this argument, as unanswerable, let the reader determine: to me it appears not only very easily answerable, but far beneath many others, that one, disputing on such a subject, must encounter.

But he introduces some as making answers to his argument, who affirm that Christ was not innocent, but a sinner by imputation, and made sin for us, and that it was necessary, from the essential justice of God, and his authority, as enjoining, that he should make atonement for sin, in himself, and in his own person.'

I applaud the prudence of this learned man, who from no kind of necessity, but freely, frames answers to his own arguments here he has exhibited such a one, as nobody but himself would have dreamed of. For, although what your disputants, or this learned divine, fighting with himself, say be true, he must however be a fool, who can believe that it has any relation to the present subject. To those adversaries who urge, that God freely punishes sin because he punished his Son, who knew no sin, and who contend that God may equally not punish the guilty, as punish the innocent,' we answer, that Christ, though intrinsically and pèr

sonally innocent, yet, as he was by substitution, and consequently legally guilty, is no instance of the punishment of an innocent person; for he was not punished as the most innocent Son of God. Passing over these things, then, and indeed they are of no import to the present subject, he endeavours to prove, by several arguments, that God laid our sins upon Christ, by constituting him surety, and from no necessity of nature: but even this effort is of no service to his cause, for this we by no means deny, so that his labour is entirely superfluous. At length, however, in the progress of the dispute, this learned gentleman advances some arguments that seem suitable to his purpose.

'We readily grant,' says he, 'upon supposition, that Christ was made our surety by the decree of God, that he could not be but punished by God, and yet freely, as God created the world of mere free will, though necessarily, in respect of his immutability; for it cannot be that a free action should impose on God a natural or physical necessity of doing any thing.'

We have shewn before what kind of a necessity we ascribe to God, in punishing sins. It is not an inanimate or merely physical necessity, as if God acted from principles of nature in a manner altogether natural, that is, without any intervening act of understanding or will; for he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will.' But it is such a necessity as leaves to God an entire concomitant liberty in acting; but which necessarily, by destroying all antecedent indifference, accomplishes its object, viz. the punishment of sin, the justice, holiness, and purity of God, so requiring. But this necessity, though it hindereth not the divine liberty, any more than that which is incumbent on God of doing any thing in consequence of a decree from the immutability of his nature; yet it arises not from a decree, but from things themselves, particularly constituted, and not as the other kind of necessity from a decree only and therefore, in those things which God does necessarily, merely from the supposition of a decree, he has a regard to the decree, accomplishes the thing to be done, antecedently to the consideration of any necessity incumbent on him; but in those whose necessity arises from the demand of the divine nature, a decree only supposes a certain condition of things,

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which being supposed, immediately and without any consideration of any respect to a decree, it is necessary that one or another consequence should follow. As for instance, after God decreed that he would create the world, it was impossible that he should not create it, because he is immutable: and the decree immediately respected that very thing, viz. the creation of it. But the necessity of punishing sin arises from the justice and holiness of God; it being supposed that in consequence of a decree, a rational creature existed, and was permitted to transgress: but he punishes the transgression which he decreed to permit, because he is just, and not only because he decreed to punish it. The necessity then of creating the world arises from a decree; the necessity of punishing sin from justice.

'But it is impossible,' says Rutherford,' that a free action can impose a natural or physical necessity of doing any thing upon God.'

But by a free action it can be proved, that certain things may be placed in such a condition, that God could not but exercise certain acts towards them, on account of the strict demand of some attribute of his nature, though not from a physical and insensible necessity, which excludes all liberty of action for it being supposed, that in consequence of a free decree God willed to speak with man, it is necessary from the decree that he should speak; but that he should speak truth is necessary from the necessity of his nature. Supposing then a free action, in which he hath decreed to speak, a natural necessity of speaking truth is incumbent on God, nor can he do otherwise than speak truth. Supposing sin to exist, and that God willed to do any thing with regard to sin (although perhaps this is not in consequence of a decree), it is necessary, by necessity of nature, that he should do justice; that is, that he should punish it: ́ for the righteous judgment of God is, that they who do such things,' viz. who commit sin, are worthy of death.' There are certain attributes of the Deity, which have no egress but towards certain objects particularly modified; for they do not constitute or create objects to themselves, as other divine attributes do; but these objects being once constituted by a free act of the divine will, they must necessarily, for such is their nature and manner, be exercised.

these to be punished by men, because they are sins, why cannot he for the same reason manage matters so in his own internal court, and suspend all punishment; and nevertheless forbid the same transgressions?'

A fine shew of reasoning; but there is no real solid truth in it; for all is false.

In what sense sin deserves punishment from the necessity of the divine nature, we have already shewn at large. Neither, however, do we think ourselves bound to teach, that God could not forbid sin but under the penalty of eternal death: for we hold that not one or another kind of punishment is necessary; but that punishment itself is necessary, and the punishment, according to the rule of God's wisdom and justice is death. Moreover, a rational creature, conscious of its proper subjection and obediential dependance, being created and existing, God did not account it at all necessary to forbid it to sin by a free act of his will, under one penalty or another; for both these follow from the very situation of the creature, and the order of dependance, viz. that it should not transgress by withdrawing itself from the right and dominion of the Creator; and if it should transgress, that it should be obnoxious, and exposed to coercion and punishment. But it being supposed that God should forbid sin by an external legislation, the appointment of punishment, even though there should be no mention made of it, must be coequal with the prohibition.

'But God,' says he,' in his human court, forbids sin by a modification of the punishment annexed; as for instance, theft, under the penalty of a quadruple restitution; why may he not do likewise in his own internal court, and consequently suspend all punishment?'

There is no need of much disputation, to prove that there is nothing sound or substantial in these arguments. The modification of punishment respects either its appointment or infliction. Punishment itself is considered either in respect of its general end, which is the punishment of transgression, and has a regard to the condition of the creatures with respect to God; or in respect of some special end, and has a respect to the condition of the creatures among themselves. But whatever modification punishment may undergo, provided it attains its proper end, by accom