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juost -imf known to all by nature :8 if his avenging justice ate Tmhi. that he will by no means clear the guilty :h If, as Soc rates* sm, so he will destroy all the workers ofiniquity; when it is natural to God to punish sin, and he cannot let it pass unpunished; for he can do nothing contrary to his natural attributes, exercised about their proper objects: but the former part of the argument is true,k so also must the latter.

But Lubbertus likewise reasons by an argument taken from the common definition of justice; to which Twiss also refers: 'Vindicatory justice,' says he, 'is the eternal will of God, to give to every one his own; therefore it belongs truly or naturally to God.' Twiss cites these words from Lubbertus; for his writings against Vossius I have not by me at present. Now although this justly celebrated man sometimes agrees to this conclusion, yet as he twitches the arguuieut various ways, we shall, as briefly as possible, bring it in regular order to a point. 'First of all,' says he,'allow ■k to put you in mind, that that definition of justice holds good Imix with regard to justice in general; but not with regard W vindicatory justice in particular; for the whole of justice 'j> employed in giving to every one his own.' I have said before, that that definition of the civilians was not quite agreeable to me; nor in every respect satisfactory: but the objection of Twiss's is of no weight; for vindicatory justice is set distinguished from universal justice, or justice genepjjjy so called, as to its habit; but only in respect of its 4£ksjs to its proper object: and therefore, nothing ought to >te -ttcluded in the definition, which is not found also in the ;}-vfcj itself. Although, then, the learned opponent throws >c^£icWs in the way, he cannot deny that vindicatory justice v^ will to give to every one his own, or what is due to him.' '®*t let Lubbertus bethink himself,' says Twiss,' whether Jl* jfctitte bounty is not likewise the eternal will of the ^ *> $ive to some, beyond what is their own? Would it ^jj^. justly follow that it is necessary, and even from abjya-yctssity, that he should exercise his bounty towards

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11 See Exod. xxxiv. 4. ■ Psal. v. 4—6.

lig founded on the words of Scripture.

milar of the smallest advantage to our adversary caufefe; for, 1. The objects themselves, about vvhittT these atttibutes are employed, are very different: for who does not see that there cannot be any comparison formed between the giving to every one according to his right, and giving to some beyond their right. That, to give to any one beyond his right, is a most free act of the will, the thing itself declares: but to give to every one his own, or what is due to him, the very thing itself requires. All acknowledge that it depends on the mere good pleasure of the Deity, whether he may will to be bounteous towards any: but who, but an impious wretch, would be bold enough to dispute whether he may will to be just towards any? But besides, supposing a constant will in the Deity, of giving to some beyond their right, or of bestowing on them more than they deserve, in what respect it would not be necessary (the question does not respect absolute necessity) to him to exercise that bounty towards these some, I absolutely do not comprehend. But, with regard to the divine bounty, and in what sense that is ascribed to God, and what kind of habitude of the divine will it denotes, this is not the place to inquire;

He again says, 'If hence it follow, that it is necessary that God should give to each his due, it will certainly be necessary that he should give to each of us eternal dam- nation.'

Thus, that punishment belongs not to us, but to God himself, the learned gentleman will afterward acknowledge: but God may give to every one his own, or what is due to every one, in the infliction of punishment, although he do not inflict it on the sinners themselves, but on theif surety, substituted in their room and stead. Thus he gives glory to his justice, and does no injury to us; for no one can demand it as his right to be punished ; for ho one haih' a right to require punishment, which is an involuntary evil; but rather becomes subject to the right of another.

To these he replies, ' If justice be only the will of giving to every one his own, it is not the necessity of giving it.'

But here the learned gentleman trifles; for will and necessity are not opposed, as a thing itself may be prior, and the mode or affection of it posterior to some other things,

VOL. IX. 2 I

nifest and known to all by nature :8 if his avenging justice be such, that he will by no means clear the guilty :h If, as he hates sin, so he will destroy all the workers of'iniquity; then it is natural to God to punish sin, and he cannot let it pass unpunished; for he can do nothing contrary to his natural attributes, exercised about their proper objects: but the former part of the argument is true,k so also must the latter.

But Lubbertus likewise reasons by an argument taken from the common definition of justice; to which Twiss also refers: 'Vindicatory justice,' says he, 'is the eternal will of God, to give to every one his own; therefore it belongs truly or naturally to God.' Twiss cites these words from Lubbertus; for his writings against Vossius I have not by me at present. Now although this justly celebrated man sometimes agrees to this conclusion, yet as he twitches the argument various ways, we shall, as briefly as possible, bring it in regular order to a point. 'First of all,' says he, 'allow me to put you in mind, that that definition of justice holds good only with regard to justice in general; but not with regard to vindicatory justice in particular; for the whole of justice is employed in giving to every one his own.' I have said before, that that definition of the civilians was not quite agreeable to me; nor in every respect satisfactory: but the objection of Twiss's is of no weight; for vindicatory justice is not distinguished from universal justice, or justice generally so called, as to its habit; but only in respect of its egress to its proper object: and therefore, nothing ought to be included in the definition, which is not found also in the thing itself. Although, then, the learned opponent throws obstacles in the way, he cannot deny that vindicatory justice is, 'a will to give to every one his own, or what is due to him.'

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then, it be no less necessary to him to punish sins, than it is to fireio burn the combustible matter applied to it: the same manner of operation, however, accords not to him as to fire, for he worketh as an intelligent agent; that is, with a concomitant liberty in the acts of his will, and a consistent liberty in the acts of his understanding. We agree, then, with Piscator in his conclusion, though not in his manner of leading his proof: the objections made to it by the learned Twiss, we shall try by the standard of truth.

First, then, he maintains, and with many laboured arguments, that God doth not punish sin from a necessity of nature, which excludes every'kind of liberty. But whom do these kind of arguments affect? they apply not at all to us: for Piscator himself seems to have understood nothing else by a natural necessity, than that necessity which we have so often discussed, particularly modified. For he says, 'That God doth some things by a natural necessity, because by nature he cannot do otherwise.' That is, sin being supposed to exist, from the strict demands of that justice, which is natural to him, he cannot but punish it, or act otherwise than punish it; although he may do this, without any encroachment on his liberty, as his intellectual will is inclined to happiness, by a natural inclination, yet wills happiness with a concomitant liberty; for it would not be a will, should it act otherwise, as freedom of action is the very essence of the will. But the arguments of Twiss do not oppose this kind of necessity, but that only which belongs to animate, merely natural agents; which entirely excludes all sorts of liberty, properly so called.

Let us particularly examine some of this learned gentleman's arguments. 'If,' says he, ' God must punish sin from a necessity of nature, he must punish it as soon as committed/ Granted; were he to act by such a necessity of nature, as denotes a necessary principle and mode of acting; but not if by a necessity that is improperly so called, because it is supposed that his nature necessarily requires that he should so act: as for instance, suppose that he wills to speak, he must by necessity of his nature speak truly, for God cannot lie; yet he speaks freely, when he speaks truly.

Again,' If,' says he, 'God punished from a necessity of nature, then, as often as he inflicted punishment, he would

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