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int beyond all doubt >wever it shall be dishe insults of adver
chapter of the before
'ye against this justice,
nion, it is opposed to
and builds upon this
if his treatise, both in
I acknowledge that he
s blunder from Cove
who improperly and in
e is opposed to mercy,
but we have formerly
ially, nor actually, nor
n are the very perfection
only distinguished as to
iject. In all the sophisms
eavours to prove, that the
justice in God, as is op
a perpetual mistake of the
hich we mean, he says, is
s he says, ' is that by which
wicked and ungodly, that is,
ere in wickedness, and who are
I their sins to have recourse to
at, by which, even those whom in
roves as just, were he so to will it,
s in the same chapter, 'that the jus
M, that one kind he always uses when
onedly wicked and obstinate sinners,
ing to his law; the other kind when he
i neither obstinate, nor altogether desperate,
ntance is not expected.' And of both these
e he brings some proofs from Scripture.
tory justice is one alone and individual, we
hat it is variously exercised, on account of the
the objects about which it is employed, we ac
but this, by no means proves it to be twofold;
not, among men, to be said to be endowed with cinus, though doubtl. fertile genius, could d for sinners without a s; outone.orevenfeignc have wanted the effro the credulous and fan attempted.
But on the other removed this justio entirely settled, an<:
stroyed, he highly
justice, had we no
■e not opposite. We have likewise demonstrated *ofs adduced before, that the rectitude of supreme
■ of the divine nature, is often called justice in but this, I am sure, is by no means of advantage, h hurt to the cause of Socinianism. Let him n.
that,' says he, 'which is opposed to mercy, is not •slice by the sacred writers; but is called severity, . in jury, or vengeance, or by some such name.'
■ ar opponent avails himself nothing by this asser» that which is false proves nothing. By that, which
is opposed to mercy, he understands that virtue in j which he punishes sins and sinners according as oerve. But that this is never called justice in Scrip. that God is not thence said to be just, is so manialse, that no body would dare to affirm it, but one ■tied to say any thing in support of a bad cause. Let ler but consult the passages adduced on this head in rd chapter, and he will be astonished at the impuof the man. But all are agreed, that anger, fury, and denoting such troubled affections, ought not properly ascribed to God, but only in respect of their effects; sill analogically and reductivelyb they belong to correciustice; because, in exercising his judgments, God is •\ to use them; but they do not denote any perfection inrent in God, any farther than they can be reduced to jus'N? ; but only a certain mode of certain divine actions; for ■od doth not punish sins because he is angry, but because >p is just; although in the punishment of them, according to our conception of things, he discovers anger.
He next proceeds to produce some passages, in order to prove that the justice of God, in the sacred writings, viz. that universal justice, which we have before described, is often used for the infinite rectitude of the divine nature (what nobody ever denied), where, in mentioning the justice of faithfulness and remunerative justice, agreeable to his faithfulness, which always hath respect to the covenant of grace, ratified and established in the blood of Christ, God is said to pardon sins, and to reward those that believe according to his justice; and thence he concludes,' that a justice opb i. e. by consequence.
a twofold justice, who renders those who merit differently. Bu beginning to end, is disgraceful falsely assumed principle: for he shall not receive its just recompense justice; but that God punishes so others only if he please. From ex elude all consideration of the satisf in the matter of inflicting punishment against this stone: for God most nish the impenitent to all eternity; because there is no sacrifice for t true, that God casts out and i strangers to the covenant of grace pentance; but that he effectually ance; not because he exerciseth a cause his justice hath been satisfied by Christ, whereas it is not so wi See Rom. iii. 25. But because he the foundation for that distinction, acts or exercise of the divine just be laid in the blood of Christ, 1 justice, and a twofold mercy oppu is not the most distant mention i tures; and which ought not 1 the divine nature, which i But coming to himsel writings there is any n justice that is opi said that justice is Q pears, that it is h kind of justice be said to be from the vd not toca argurnaB essent:
The arguments ofSocinus against punitory justice weighed. A false hypothesis of his. Sins, in what sense they are debts. The first argument of Socinus, inwhich he takes for granted what ought to have beenproved. A trifling supposition substituted for a proof. Whether that excellence, by virtue of which God punishes sins, be called justice in the Scriptures. The severity of God, what. Our opponent's second argument. It labours under the same deficiency as the first. It is not opposite to mercy to punish the guilty. There is a distinction between acts and habits. Our opponent confounds them. The mercy of God infinite, so also is his justice. A distinction of the divine attributes. In pardoning sins through Jesus Christ, God hath exercised infinite justice and infinite mercy. The conclusion of the contest with Socinus.
In the third part, and first chapter of his treatise, being determined to contend, to his utmost, against the satisfaction of Christ, he maintains,'that God, consistent with his right, could pardon our sins, without any real satisfaction received for them.' And he endeavours to support the assertion, chiefly by the following argument, viz. ' That God is our creditor, that our sins are debts, which we have contracted with him; but that every one may yield up his right, and more especially God, who is the supreme Lord of all, and extolled in the Scriptures for his liberality and goodness. Hence, then, it is evident, that God can pardon sins without any satisfaction received; and that he is inclined to do so, he uses his best endeavours afterward to prove.'
But because he foresaw that his first supposition, the foundation of his whole future reasoning, was too much exposed and obnoxious to the divine justice, he labours hard, in the first chapter, to remove that out of the way entirely. Let us attend then to his reasoning, and follow him step by step; for if he have not insuperably, and beyond all confutation proved, that God can forgive sins without a satisfaction, what he afterward argues concerning the will, liberality, and mercy of God, will become of no weight or consideration; yea, the foundation being destroyed, the whole edifice, or Babylonish tower, must instantly tumble to the ground. He thus proceeds:
'But you will say, It is necessary that God should take