IN

THE

PREFACE.

N the Contest carried on for fome Years past between the Defenders of Chriftianity and Deifts, the latter always appealed to Philofophy, and under that Shelter fpeciously defended themselves: their Procedure obliged the Champions of Christianity to follow and attack them within the Verge of Philofophy; but by the occafional shifting of Principles and Systems, and a dexterous Ufe of equivocal Language, the Difpute became a Kind of Chafe through a Labyrinth, in which the Retreats were endless, and the Victory always incompleat: this Obfervation made me with the Principles of Philofophy that enter into the Dispute were more clear, limited, and decifive. It feemed reasonable to me to conclude, that true Religion cannot be inconfiftent with true K 4 Philofophy;

Philofophy; that if Men be obliged to any Duties in a State of Nature, fuch Duties are the indubitable Laws of God, and they cannot differ ef'fentially from the Duties the Deity is pleased to require of us by Revelation. Hence I imagined that the Plan of the Mind of Man, if attentively obferved, and faithfully delineated, muft give Light into the Intention and End of his Creation; at least the eager Defire of each Party to reconcile Philofophy to their own religious Opinions, demonstrates the fecret Senfe Mankind have of the Neceffity that true Philosophy fhould witness for Religion. Full of thefe Reflections, I fet out in an Enquiry into the Nature of the human Mind, with a View, if poffible, to discover fome Traces of Duty and natural Religion; and to try if any Principles may be folidly established in public View, which may prove decifive in the Dispute between Christians and Deifts.

Chriftians may object to the Trial of Religion by Philofophy, on Account of the Weakness and Incertainty of human Reafon; but Deifts can have no Objections to it, without bidding Defiance to all equitable Principles of Decifion; for Philofophy is their only Luminary to direct them, and their only Refource for the Defence of their Opinions: in fact, this is bringing the Difpute to that Tribunal they themselves fet up against Revelation.

Having given fome Account of my general Defign, my prefent Business with my Reader is to inform him, that when I made fome little Progress in my Obfervations on the human Mind, I found myfelf involved in Objections and Difficulties that arofe from Ambiguities, and from a fraudulent Use of Language, peculiar to modern Philofophy: I found general Expreffions paffed current for Names of fimple Ideas that come to the Imagination from Senfation; and this Cheat made ufe of to favour

falfe

falfe Principles, of the most pernicious Influence to Virtue and Reafon; and I found metaphorical Expreffions adopted in Philofophy, for the Sake of making a deceitful Tranfition from the metaphorical to a proper Sense. The Confufion and perverse Train of Reasoning occafioned by thefe Abuses of Language, obliged me, before I could proceed in the Theory of Man, to clear away the Rubbish of Equivoque, by Way of Introduction; which I have attempted in the two firft Sections of the following Sheets. I afterwards added a few Thoughts on human Instincts, which make the third Section; but having obferved upon a Review that I unhinged many fettled Opinions, and broke up fo much of the Foundations of modern Philofophy, I thought proper to stop there, and publifh the Introduction apart, in order to take the Senfe of my Cotemporaries upon these my Reflections, before I proceed any further.

There is one Poftulatum I expect to be acknowledged by my candid Reader, at our setting out; it is, That there is a Poffibility that the Body of the Learned may be impofed upon by the present Mode of Philofophy; and that falfe Principles in this Age we live in, may have their Currency 'from the Stamp and Fashion of the Times.' The various Revolutions in the Syftems of the Learned, have abundantly proved the Poffibility I spoke of; in Confequence of which, I hope my impartial Reader will grant me without Difficulty, that no Names, or Systems, however refpectable, thould be allowed any Weight against Evidence or Demonftration. I cannot indeed help owning, that the Obfcurity of the Writer, and the great Names I have to contend with, make a Contraft, that with a little Irony may be wrought into a smart and humourous Critique: but this is the very Thing I proteft against, fince that Mode of Argument can never be fatisfactory,

that

that may be urged equally against every Author who ever ventured to think in a new Tract, and that may serve to defend every Syftem however fantastic, that happens to be in fashion.

A N

INTRODUCTION, &c.

I.

SECT. I.

Of Pleafure, Pain, Self-Love, and Self-Intereft,

PLEASURE and Pain are general Terms,

confequently they have no fenfible or deter mined Idea annexed to them, no more than the Terms Vegetable, Tree, Fruit, Colour, or any other Word of general Import. To explain this Matter a little, I need only repeat fome common-place Principles, that are to be met with in every Writer who has treated of the Conceptions of the human Understanding. They obferve, that the Imagination is only capable of conceiving the Ideas that have been impreffed on it by the Senfes, or by a Perception of the Operations of the Mind itfelf; whence it is evident, that the whole Stock of its Ideas must confift in Particulars, that have been fixed upon the Memory by Experience.

2. In the Formation of Language, it was eafy to give proper Names to Objects mutually known, to William and Thomas, to Cooper's-Hill and the Thames. But it often became neceffary, to treat of Objects with which the Hearers had no Acquaintance. Here then would lie an infuperable Obstacle to the further Progrefs of Language, if general Similarities in the Objects of Nature, that are obvious at the first Glance, had not fmoothed the Dif

ficulty,

ficulty, by parcelling them out into distinct Claffes to the Imagination, and thus giving a Foundation to general Terms. This Advance in Language required little Trouble or Invention; for in looking over the particular Objects that occured, it was impoffible to pafs, without Notice, the ftriking Similarity or Likeness that fubfifts between feveral Individuals, and that ferves to caft them into feparate Tribes or Species. This general Similitude found in Nature became a Model to Men, according to which they formed fpecific Names, each of which, on that Account, comprehends a Sort or Species, and distinguishes them from all others, fuch as the Words Cow, Horfe, Sheep, Oak, Ash, Elm; One Oak Tree is fo like to another in its Leaves, Fruit, Bark, Timber, and Growth, and fo unlike to an Afh or Elm, as to give Occafion to the general Name Oak, under which that whole Species are diftinguished; and thus fpecific Names were formed for the different and feparate Tribes of Nature. After the Invention of general Names, the Communication between Men became eafy; the Carpenter could fend his Servant to the Wood, and tell him what Kind of Tree to fell for his Purpose; and the Traveller, fpeaking of the Alps and the Euphrates, is well understood, when he tells you that the first is a Chain of Mountains, and the last a River. If Language had ftood at the first Step, and only expreffed particular Objects, human Knowledge must have been for ever in an infant State; but by the Help of fpecific Terms, Men are enabled to tranfmit to Pofterity, Maxims and Obfervations that shall hold good, as long as the Species continue on Earth.

3. Man was fo far directed in the Formation of Language by the obvious Plan of the Creation; but his fruitful Invention carried him yet further, where his Directions were loofer, and less diftin&t.

He