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• The worm of workers passes three days in the egg, five in the vermicular state, and then the bees close up its cell with a wax covering. The worm now begins spinning its coccoon, in which operation thirty-six hours are consumed. In three days, it changes to a nymph, and passes six days in this form. It is only on the twentieth day of its existence, counting from the moment the egg is laid, that it attains the fly state.
• The royal worm also passes three days in the egg, and is five a worm; the bees then close its cell; and it immediately begins spine ning the coccoon, which occupies twenty-four hours. The tenth and eleventh day it remains in complete repose, and even sixteen hours of the twelfth. Then the transformation to a nymph takes place, in which state four days and a third are passed. Thus it is not before the sixteenth day that the perfect state of queen is attained.
• The anale worm passes three days in the egg, six and a half as a worm, and metamorphoses into a fly on the twenty-fourth day after the egg is laid.'
In the course of his examinations, M. Huber discovered that the worms both of workers and males fabricate complete coccoons in their cells; whereas the royal larve, from the figure of their cells, are obliged to leave their covering open behind, and thus permit the first royal nymph that is transformed to attack the rest, and sting them to death, which it never fails to do. That this singular provision in favour of monarchy results from the form of the cells, and not from blind instinct, is obvious from the following simple experiment: when royal worms were put into cylindrical glass cells, or portions of glass tubes resembling common cells, they spun complete coccoons; and when common worms were put into very wide cells, they left the coccoon open.
The author's observations on the formation of swarms mostly coincide with those of Réaumur. The latter had suspected that the old queens sometimes conduct the young swarms; and, from M. Huber's experience, it appears incontestible that
the old queen always conducts the first swarm : but never quits the hive before depositing eggs in the royal cells, from which other queens will proceed after her departure.' These cells appear to be an object of very particular care to the remaining bees, who prevent the young queens successively harched from leaving them, unless at an interval of several days between each. It is also worthy of remark that young queens conducting swarms from their native hive are still in a virgin state.
Without greatly exceeding our limits, we cannot enter into the illustration of these inportant particulars in the history of the bee; neither can we dwell on the extraordinary effects of the royal food and treatment, which invite to new views of
animal economy.--Amputation of the wings was not found to affect the fruitfulness of queens, but a privation of hoth the ne teune produced consequences which could scarceiv have been divined.
On the fifth of September, í says the author) I cut both off a queen that laid the eggs of males only, and put her into the hive im. mediately after the operation. From this moment there was a grat alteration in her conduct. She traversed the combs with extraordinary vivacity. Scarcely had the workers time to separaie ansi recede hetoie her; she dropped her eggs, without attending to deposit them in
The hive not being very populous, part was without comb. Either she seemed particularly earnest to repair, and long remained motionless. She appeared io avoid the bees; howruit, several workers followed her into this solitude, and treated her wild the most evident respect. She seldom required honey from them, but, when that occurred, directed her trunk with an incertain kuid of fecling, sometimes on the head and sometimes on the limbs of the workers, and if it did reach their mouths, it was by cliance. doler times she returned upon the combs, then quitted them to traver e the glass sides of the bive; and always dropped eggs during her various motions. Sometimes she appeared tormented with the desire of leaving her liabitation. She rushed towards the opening, and entered the glass tube adapted there; bui the external orifice being lov omall, after fruitless exertion, she returned. Notwithstanding these symptoms of delirium, the bees did not cease to render her the same alteltion as they ever pay to their queens, but this one received it wida indifference.'
In his concluding letter, M. Huber recommends the use of leaf hives, and a moderate participation in the produce of the labours of bees, as the most infallible means of preserving the stock. A certain quantity of honey and wax, he observes, 1 be best secured by a number of hives, rather than by plumu re ing a few of a great proportion of their treasures. He is likewise of opision that more hives may be kept in a country abounding in meadows, and where black grain is cultivated, than in a district of vint yards or corn.
The tranlator has thrown some of the anatomical details into an Appendix; particularly one passage, which states the discovery of a singular fact in the procreative commerce of these animals. Such discussions, however, are adapted solely to the contemplation of the physiologist. We shall only add that the volume offers to the reader, in a small compass, a consle derable quantity of important information; and that the author's conjectures, whenever they occur, are characterized by good sense and modesty.
ART. 93. Boards.
AT IV. Elements of Intellectual Philosophy; or, an Analysis of
the Powers of the Human Understanding ; tending to ascertain the Principles of a Rational Logic. By R. E. Scott, A.M., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University and King's College, Aberdeen. 8vo. PP 491.
Constable and Co., Edinburgh ; Cadell and Davies, London. WTH
ITH the primary intention of forming only a text-book
for part of a course of Academical Lectures, Mr. Scott enlarged his plan and augmented his materials until the result has been the present volume. We infer, therefore, that, as it is now offered to us, it contains all the elucidation and explanation which the Professor has been accustomed orally to bestow on the abstruse subject of Intellectual Philosophy. He found reason to believe, he says, that a short Treatise, which should contain an Analysis of the Powers of the Human Un. derstanding, tending to illustrate the Principles of sound Reasoning and scientific Investigation, might be a desirable acquisition to Students in general : because the Elementary Sys tems of Logic which have yet appeared, are almost all founded upon the metaphysical subtleties of the schoolmen; and have little reference to the present advanced state of Intellectual Philosophy. Actuated by these considerations, the Author presumes to offer to the Public the following attempt to supply a desideratum in Elementary Science ; which may prove of some use to the Student, till an abler hand shall undertake the execution of the task.'
Certainly, this work ought to be highly valued by the public, if it can occupy the place and discharge the duties of an eleAventary system of logic. We concede to the author, that fora mer treatises are founded on the metaphysical subtleties of the schoolmen: that is, are generally either false or fanciful, or both. Many of these subtleties were verbal, general terms bee ing used without precise signification, or, which is the same thing, without preceding definition. These faults, then, ought most carefully to be avoided in a treatise which professes to be formed in direct opposition to such a system of subtleties : yet, without meaning to say that Mr. Scott endeavours to perplex his readers with false refinements or imposing terms, we must remarks that he leaps at once in medias res, and, in his first half page, distributes the objects of human knowlege into material and intellectual, and gives the distinguishing character: istics of matter and of mind. It is not our intention to controvert the justness of the distribution, nor to question the ucility of general terms: but, when such distributions and terms occur in the beginning of an elementary treatise, the young
student who is solicitous to acquire votions, and not words, must find himself in as great a dilemma as if he suddenly plunged into the forms, accidents, and essences of the metaphysical schoolmen. – The evil of which we complain is very common, and demands a remedy. Are we never to have a Horn-book of Metaphysics, or a Grammar of Intellectual Philosophy ? Such an introductory work is very necessary; and no Professor, whatever be his abilities, should despise the construction of it as beneath his exertion. If difficulties rouse ambition, we apprehend that no inconsiderable difficulties await the composition of a plain and perspicuous Grammar of the human mind.
Of metaphysical science, Reid and Dugald Stewart have familiarized and simplified the study, and have laid down most excellene rules for its cultivation. These writers, however, suppose their readers to possess some knowlege of metaphysics, and write principally to the learned: but a student requires a treatise springing from lower brginnings; in which many pages should be turned over before a faculty or mental power was Dentioned. Almost all authors who write on Mind are too prone to talk of powers and faculties, and suddenly to parcel out the intellect into conception, perception, abstruction, &c.in faci, to take a theory for granted which it is their business
In Metaphysics, as in Physics, a just pliilosophy teaches us 10 atiend first to facts, or mental phænomena : in our farther progress, those mental phænomena which appear mixed are to be separated into simpler phenomena, and the laws of their cumposition are to be observed; and since it will be necessary 10 class them, terms of claisification must be invented. The introduction of such terms, however, ought to be made with che greatest caution, and most scrupulously : because terms, havisg associated meanings, are apt to introduce foreign notions; and, in their new alliance, to impart those which are derived from subjects to which they had previously been applied. Lord Bacon finely illustrates the nature of the operation of words, when he says that, “ like to the Tartar's Bow, they shoot back on the Understanding."
The exact observation and register of the phænomena of the Mind, and their subsequent classification, forin not an easy task : in what treatise is it completely effected ? Writers find greater facility in constructing sentences with general and abstract terms : but this is not to explain. The invention of terms may assist and expedite explanation, but explanation can never be involved in a term. That which is simple, and that which is to be proposed as an elementary truth, may, whatever be the subject of discussion, be stated in ordinary words. We feel at once embarrassed and indignant when a treatise, in its very outset, speaks of the qualities of matter and the faculties of mind, and informs us that Consciousness is the faculty by which we know the powers or faculties of the mind; that Perception is the faculty by which we know the qualities of matter, &c.
The result of proof should not be prematurely introduced into the demonstrative process. If the terms Consciousness, Perception, Conception, &c. be not mere terms of classifica. tion, and if they be made to stand for mental powers and fa-, culties, the existence of such powers and faculties should be rendered evident or probabie, before their agency is employed in the solution of phænomena. We feel, hear, think, wish: thege acts, if any, are real: but that these acis arise from the operation of powers is either an hypothesis, or a figurative or illustrative mode of expression, or it is the result of reasoning. If the first interpretation be admitted, the author who employs such terms should distinctly explain why he uses them: if ihe latter interpretation, then much ground of discussion ought to be passed over, before the mention of such terms is introduced.
Few, if any, metaphysical treatises are exempt from the preceding reprehension, and the present work suggested the necessity of inflicting it. Science is said to be advanced by the increasing perfection and dextrous combination of general terms : but Metaphysical Science, in our judgment, would be tending to improvement, if it condescended to use words of ordinary occurrence, of precise meaning, and above all not figu. rative.
Professor Dugald Stewart, in his Philosophy of the Human Mind, noticing a difference between the mere acts of wishing, thinking, &c. and an observance and attention to the order and Jaws of such acts, introduced a distinction between Consciousness and Attention, which, for the reasons alleged by that eminent writer, appears to us to be just. Of phænomena classed together, one part differs from another; and of this difference there ought to be some note. Philosophizing, or using lanQuage offered to us in analogical subjects, we may say that this difference of phænomena arises from different faculties. Mr. Scott, however, dissents from the necesaity of making this distinction :
• Mr. Stewart (he remarks) considera intellectual processes of this nature as objects, not of consciousness but of attention ; but co me there appears no necessity for calling in the aid of this new facully. That ingenious philosopher has given a variety of interesting illustrations