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to so little as an hundred pages, will of necessity greatly increase the expense of the work; and every reader who, like myself, is neither prepared nor perhaps calculated for the study of so abstruse a subject so abstrusely treated, will, as I have before hinted, be almost entitled to accuse you of a sort of imposition on him.
For who, he might truly observe, could from your titlepage, to wit, “ My Literary Life and Opinions,” published too as introductory to a volume of miscellaneous poems, have antici. pated, or even conjectured, a long treatise on Ideal Realism, which holds the same relation in abstruseness to Plotinus, as Plotinus does to Plato ? It will be well, if already you have not too much of metaphysical disquisition in your work, though as the larger part of the disquisition is historical, it will doubtless be both interesting and instructive to many to whose unprepared minds your speculations on the esemplastic power would be utterly unintelligible. Be assured, if you do publish this Chapter in the present work, you will be reminded of Bishop Berkeley's Siris, announced as an Essay on Tar-water, which begin. ning with Tar ends with the Trinity, the omne scibile forming the interspace. I say in the present work. In that greater work to which you have devoted so many years, and study so intense and various, it will be in its proper place. Your prospectus will have described and announced both its contents and their nature; and if any persons purchase it, who feel no interest in the subjects of which it treats, they will have themselves only to blame.
“I could add to these arguments one derived from pecuniary motives, and particularly from the probable effects on the sale of your present publication ; but they would weigh little with you compared with the preceding. Besides, I have long observed, that arguments drawn from your own personal interests more often act on you as narcotics than as stimulants, and that in money concerns you have some small portion of pig-nature in your moral idiosyncrasy, and, like these amiable creatures, must occasionally be pulled backward from the boat in order to make you enter it. All success attend you, for if hard thinking and hard reading are merits, you have deserved it.
“Your affectionate, &c."
In consequence of this very judicious letter, which produced complete conviction on my mind, I shall content myself for the present with stating the main result of the chapter, which I have reserved for that future publication, a detailed prospectus of which the reader will find at the close of this volume.
The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM." The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, 00-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation." It dissolves, 'diffuses, dissi. pates, in order to re-create : or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. 16
Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word Choice. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association.
13 [This last clause“ and as a repetition, &c,.” I find stroked out in a copy of the B. L. containing a few MS, marginal notes of the author, which are printed in this edition. I think it best to preserve the sentence, while I mention the author's judgment upon it, especially as it has been quoted. S. C.]
14 [Compare this distinction with that of the Productive and Reproductive Imagination given in the section on the Transcendental Synthesis of the Imagination (synthesis speciosa) in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Works, vol. ii., p. 14, 1, 2.)
15 [For what is said of objects in the last sentence see Transsc. Id., p. 69 Abhandlungen Phil. Schrift., p. 224.]
The following marginalia of Mr. Coleridge, which were spoken of in a note to chap. ix. were transcribed for a new edition of the Biographia by Mr. C.'s late editor, with the passages referred to in the original German. These passages are here given upon the whole a little more at large, and in English, but with a clear understanding that entire justice cannot in this way be done to the notions of Schelling, which, to be perfectly estimated, must be considered in the disquisitions to which they belong, as plants and flowers must be viewed in their native situations in order to be fully understood and admired.* S. C.
MS. note on Schelling's Philosoph. Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freyheit und die damit Zusammenhängenden Gegenstànde. Phil. Schrift., p. 397.
There are indeed many just and excellent observations in this work of Schelling's, and yet even more than usual over-meaning or un-meaning quid pro quos—thing-phrases, such as “ Licht,” Finçlerniss,"
Feuer," "centre," “ circumference," " ground,” and the like—which seem to involve the dilemma, that either they are mere similes, where that which they are meant to illustrate has never been stated, or that they are degrees of a kind, which kind has not been defined. Hence Schelling seems to be looking objectively at one thing, and imagining himself thinking of another; and after all this mysticism, what is the result? Still the old questions return, and I find none but the old an
This ground to God's existence either lessens, or does not * I wish the reader to know, before perusing these notes, on the authority of Archdeacon Hare, that " for the last twelve years Schelling has been strongly contending against Hegel, and has made, or at all events professes to make, the idea of personality, and of a personal God, the central principle of his system.” Quoted from the Archdeacon's admirable defence of Luther, Mission of the Comforter. Vol, ii., note 10, p. 800,
lessen, his power. In the first case it is, in effect, a co-existent God, evil, because the ground of all evil;—in the second it leaves us as be· fore. With that “ before” my understanding is perfectly satisfied ; and, vehemently as Schelling condemns that theory of freedom, which makes it consist in the paramountcy of the Reason over the Will, wherein does his own solution differ from this, except in expressing with uncouth mysticism the very same notion ? For what can be meant by the “individuality, or Ichheit, becoming eccentric, and usurping the circumfe. rence,” if not this? He bimself plainly says that moral evil arises not from privation-much less negation—but from the same constituents losing their proper ordination, that is, becoming C. B. A. instead of A. B. C. But wherein does this differ from the assertion, that the freedom of man consists in all the selfishness of his nature being subordinated to, and used as the instrument and materia of, his Reason, that is, his sense of the universal Will ?
In short nothing seems gained. To creation-Werden—he himself admits that we must resort; he himself admits it, in even a much higher sense, in the Logos, or the alter Deus el idem. Other creations were still possible, from the will of God, and not from His essence, and yet partaking of His goodness. A mere machine could be made happy, but not deserving of happiness; but if God created a Being with a power of choosing good, that Being must have been created with a power of choosing evil; otherwise there is no meaning in the word Choice. And thus we come round again to the necessity arising out of finiteness, with Leibnitz and Plato. For it is evident that by Matter Plato and Plotinus meant Finiteness ;-or how else could they call it to me in ov, without any qualities, and yet capable of all ? The whole question of the origin of Evil resolves itself into one. Is the Holy Will good in and of itself, or only relative, that is, as a mean to pleasure, joy, happiness, and the like? If the latter be the truth, no solution can be given of the origin of Evil compatible with the attributes of God; but (as in the problem of the squaring of the circle) we can demonstrate that it is impossible to be solved. If the former be true, as I more than beliere, the solution is easy, and almost self-evident. Man cannot be a moral being without having had the choice of good and evil, and he cannot choose good without having been able to choose evil. God, as infinite and self-existing, is the alone One, in whom Freedom and Necessity can be one and the same from the beginning: in all finite beings it must have been arrived at by a primary act, as in Angels, or by a succession of acts as in Man.
In addition it seems to me that Schelling unfairly represents Kant's system as the mere subjecting of the appetites to the Reason. Whereas
, p. 413.
Kant makes the enjoyment of freedom, not freedom itself, consist in the subjection of the particular to the universal Will, in order to their identification : and does not Schelling use Freedom often when he means no more than others mean by Life-that is, the power of originat. ing motion ? S. T. C.
Ibid., p. 403. “ Through Freedom, a power is asserted, in principle unconditioned, without and by the side of the divine power, which according to those conceptions is inconceivable. As the sun in the Firmament extinguishes all heavenly lights, even so, and far more does the Infinite Might (extinguish) every tinite, absolute Causality in one Being leaves to all others unconditioned Passibility as their only portion.”
Vote. But is not this still a carrying of the physical Dynamic into the moral ? Even admitting the incongruous predicate, Time, in the Deity, I cannot see any absolute incompossibility of Foresight with Freedom. S. T. C.
Jbid, “ It is not absurd,” says Leibnitz, “that he who is God should nevertheless be produced, or conversely: no more than it is contradictory that he who iş the Son of a Man should himself be Man.”
Yole. I do not see the propriety of the instance; unless “God” is here assumed as an Ens genericum even as “ Man.” If this be a mere nominalism it proves nothing ;-if it be meant as a realism, it is a petitio principii sub lite ; just as the following instance of the eye ; but this is a far better illustration. S. T. C.
Ibid., p. 421. “ But it will ever be remarkable, that Kant, when he had at first distinguished things in themselves from phenomena only negatively, through independence of Time, and subsequently, in the metaphysical investigations of his Critique of the Practical Reason, had treated independence of Time and Freedom as really correlate conceptions, did not proceed to the thought of extending to the things also this only possible positive conception of the in themselves, whereby he would have raised himself immediately to a higher standing-point of contemplation, and above the negativity, which is the character of his theoretic philosophy.” Schell.
Note. But would not this have been opposite to Kant's aim ? His purpose was a «abaptıkòv tis 4xñs. In order to effect this thoroughly, Within this he, by an act of choice, confined himself. S. T.C.
bid., p. 422. “For whether there are single things conceived in an Absolute Substance, or just so many single wills, conceived in one Arch Will (or original will Urwille) for Pantheism, as such, is all one.” Note. The question is, do not these single wills, so included in the “ Urwille" become
Things ?” S. T. C.