such as they are: and, while they never forbid endeavour to be made for the acquirement of useful science, or of arts likely to multiply the comforts of life, they introduce nothing calculated either to perplex or distract the inquirer; but, in the most even and unbroken tenour, and in language the most encouraging, exhibit all the gracious purposes of mercy, as revealed for the salvation of man, and this in a way the best suited to cut off every possible approach either to presumption or despair. Our Scriptures, therefore, deal in nothing like knowledge merely theoretical, but in the soundest lessons of practical wisdom; they afford us none of the knowledge which puffeth up, but only the wisdom which cometh from above, which is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits; and such confessedly is that which must make wise the simple.

Objections may, however, be made to some of these statements. It may be said, that God is, nevertheless, in the language of Scripture, sometimes made the author of evil, and that it is unequivocally affirmed that he hardened Pharaoh's heart,*-that he deceived the people,+-that he occasionally put lying spirits into the mouths of the prophets, and the like; § all of which directly and plainly ascribe these evils to God as the primary cause. My reply is: It is true the language of the common translations of the Scriptures does usually speak in this manner; and, that hence it has often been supposed, these acts at least are to be ascribed immediately to God. It is, however, no less clear, that the language of the original says no such thing. By a mode of expression very commonly indeed in use among

* Exod. iv. 21, &c. † Jer. iv. 10. Ezek. xiv. 9. 1 Kings, xxii. 23. § On these forms of expression, see my Hebrew Grammar, pp. 112-119, where the equivalent Arabic forms are given and explained: see also the last discourse. With the passage in 1 Kings compare Job, xxxvi. 3. Gen. xlii. 30. Ps. lxviii. 35. Jer. xiii. 16, &c. where the verb is used in the sense of esteeming, ascribing, &c.

ourselves, we may be said to vilify, magnify, or justify, any one, without, at the same time, actually making him vile, great, or just, but only by ascribing these properties to him: so, in the Hebrew usage, to harden or deceive any one, or to put a lying spirit into his mouth, will only mean, that we ascribe these properties to the person had in view, but nothing more. In like manner, the prophets are commissioned to hew down, to build, to plant, and to perform a thousand other such acts, without intimating any thing more than that they are sent to declare them. Our Lord is said, in similar phraseology, to have made himself the Son of God, when nothing more could be meant, than that he declared or intimated that he was so. The greatest care ought, therefore, to be taken not to mistake and misapply language like this; a practice, which, as already remarked, has frequently and extensively prevailed.

Many other passages supposed to favour this doctrine might be adduced: we shall now notice only one, namely, Prov. xvi. 4, where it is said, "The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." As the passage is here given, nothing can be more direct and positive than an ascription of evil to the creative power of God; and, hence the place is often cited as decisive on this question. My remark is Nothing can be more certain, than that the translations do generally and plainly inculcate this doctrine here; while it is equally certain, at least to my mind, that the original speaks very differently. We have, it should be observed, in Hebrew as in English two verbs, one signifying to make or fabricate, and nearly synonymous with to create,—another signifying to make or to do, in the sense of performing any thing.* Now, in the passage under

* The verb signifies generally to fabricate or make, which when ascribed to God becomes synonymous with 73, and with the Arabic, create or make: while, which is used here in the Proverbs, is synonymous with the Arabic, the precise and usual signi

وخلق

or

consideration, the verb used is not that which signifies made or fabricated, in the sense of created, but made or did, in the sense of performed; and it will then stand: Jehovah hath done or performed all things for himself; and also the wicked for the day of evil (or calamity). That is, supplying the ellipsis in the second member of the verse by the verb in the first, we shall have: Jehovah hath done all things for himself (or for his own purposes), and also the wicked have done all things for (i. e. to end in) the day of calamity. In the first member we have the great work of creation ascribed to Jehovah's sovereign will, and said to have been brought about for his purposes of mercy; we are taught in the second, that the efforts of the wicked, however wisely planned or prudently carried into effect, shall nevertheless end in disappointment and misery. How any other sense could ever have been ascribed to this passage, it is impossible for me to say; unless the verbs already alluded to were mistaken the one for the other at a very early period, and the mistake thus made unwarily persevered in to the present day. There certainly is nothing like obscurity in the construction of the passage itself, nor any word occurring in it of doubtful signification. It is indeed elliptical; but the ellipsis is natural and easy, and may be supplied, as is mostly the case in such places, from the preceding context. We may conclude then, in this instance, that we have nothing here at all bordering upon an ascription of evil to the creative or overruling power of the Deity; but, on the contrary, a doctrine as glorious as it is practical, and as necessary to the believer as it is good and true.

If it be said, that we have under every view of the

fication of which in both languages is, to perform, do, not to make. The

Word - כָּל פָּעַל יְהוָה לַמַּעֲנֵהוּ וְגַם־רָשָׁע לְיוֹם רָעָה,entire passage is

for word: The whole hath Jehovah done or performed for his (own) purpose: and also (the) wicked man (or taking the word as generic, wicked men or the wicked) for the day of calamity: and, in this sense, it falls in well with the preceding and following context.

case, an instance of Jehovah predicting vengeance, which must, after all, make him the author of evil; I answer: We certainly have here, as in innumerable other places, vengeance ascribed to God; but then, both here and elsewhere, this is uniformly threatened and carried into effect, in consequence of the wilful commission of sin. In other cases, He is universally represented as faithful in sustaining that character which proclaims him to be a God of mercy, who pardoneth transgression, iniquity, and sin,-who nevertheless desireth not the death of a sinner, but that all should be converted and live.

An objector may, however, go much further here, and affirm (as it is sometimes done) of all the predicted purposes of mercy or of vengeance, that they involve an arbitrary interference of the Deity, unconditionally disposing of favours or dealing out judgments, which, as they result from the counsels of infinite wisdom and power, must, therefore, be unavoidable; and, that God must, in every point of view, ultimately be considered as the author of evil.

This, I reply, may perhaps seem to be a very logical inference, and be considered as satisfactory by many to me, however, it appears in a very different light. The Scriptures no where threaten punishment, but as a consequence of known sin; and, if this punishment is predicted, the intention appears only to have been, to deter men from the perpetration of crime. If Nebuchadnezzar, or Pharaoh, or any other power, is threatened with punishment or destruction, it is because he has refused to attend to a reasonable request, or has exercised such cruelty towards others as he knew, even without the light of Revelation, was unjust, oppressive, and base. We have uniformly a reason assigned for the judgments; and, if it appear difficult to account for these, in connection with the all-wise and all-powerful character of the Deity, it is because we have not knowledge equal to the question: which should induce us rather to rely on the declarations of His word, than on our

limited powers of investigation. It is the undoubted province, as it is the privilege, of the Almighty to make predictions as to the particular purposes which it may be his intention to bring about, independent of man, or, of the manner in which he will deal with man under any given circumstances. With the first of these, human reason or human power had better not concern itself; they are the spontaneous acts of the Deity, planned and brought about in the exercise of His consummate wisdom, and are in every case intended to further the good of the creature. With the second, in which man is certainly concerned as an intelligent agent, concurrence and a cordial co-operation are every where demanded; and, upon these being tendered, assistance, approval, and, indeed, every temporal and spiritual good, are positively promised; but, on a contrary conduct being evinced, disapprobation and chastisement are as positively threatened. And, we may conclude, that, omitting metaphysical inquiries on these subjects, which can in no case conduct us to any safe result, we have nothing more than what any consummately wise and potent prince, or father of a family, would decree and bring about for the purpose of governing those committed to his charge. In every case, therefore, God is infinitely wise and good: those conclusions which have spoken a different language, have been the results, not of a careful and patient investigation either of his word or his works, but of a philosophy which has been founded in ignorance, and carried on in mistake.

We may now offer a very few remarks on this sort of reasoning in matters relating to religion, because it has always possessed a very considerable influence on the opinions and conduct of society, wherever it has been entertained; and, that its prevalence has been extensive, no one can for a moment doubt. Men have, when perplexed and harassed by difficulties which their own ingenuity alone has unhappily been allowed to raise, been anxious to dispose of these in the most expeditious way possible; and hence, they have in one case, had recourse to the doctrines