promise." The inheritance of God's kingdom, and its blessings, therefore, are obtained by promise; not by the law, which was rather intended to instruct in duties, and to annex punishments to disobedience. The next important question is: " Wherefore then SERVETH the law? or, more literally, What then is the law? (ri οὖν (ἔστιν) ὁ νόμος ; not τί οὖν ἦν πότε ὁ νόμος; not, What was the law once, or, For what purpose had it then only authority?) The Apostle himself answers: "It was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come to whom the promise was made:" that is, the law was given for purely moral purposes, until the seed should come, respecting whom the promises had been made; being ordained, set up, or arranged, by angels, through a mediator (Moses). See Exod. iii. 2; xix. 20, &c. I must here warn the reader against supposing, that the word till (axgis o) necessarily implies, that the authority of the law should terminate when this promised seed should appear; nothing being more certain, than that the oriental, or Hebrew, usage of this particle, necessarily implies no such thing. (See Noldius's Concordance of Hebrew Particles, edit. 1734, p. 534, Nota, &c.) We may conclude, then, I think, that this particle will not avail in determining our question here. Let us now proceed to the 21st verse. "Is the law then against the promises?" asks the Apostle; and his answer is, "God forbid." By which he seems to imply, that there is no impossibility in the law and promises standing together; and, what is still more remarkable, he adds, " For if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness would have been by the law;" i. e., had it been possible for man to be saved by the law (which, however, it is not), then would the justification of the sinner have been obtained by that means, and no other would probably have been offered. But the truth is, as intimated in the next verse, the Scripture,―i. e. the written law,- has positively condemned all; and, for this end, that they may be driven to avail themselves of the benefits of the promise, by faith in Christ Jesus. To this end, therefore, serveth the law. Again, at verse 23: "Before faith (i. e. the object of faith) came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed;" i. e. we, who were Jews, were, during the times of the promise, kept under the law, and taught to look to the promise, by faith of the Redeemer to come.* (Moses himself having prophesied of his appearance.) But, now (v. 25) that the object of faith is come, we are no longer in that situation: we are not now under a system of types and shadows combined with moral precepts: Christ himself has been openly crucified among us ; and thus has the one been superseded, and the other disarmed. The law is no longer our only teacher with regard to him, or our judge independent of him. In these respects, then, we have obtained liberation and additional light. The law, too, is now set on a nobler basis; it is, as it ought ever to have been considered,—the regulator of the mind, of the affections, the schoolmaster to bring us to Christ; and not only of the actions, as the Jews had erroneously supposed. : This sort of pupilage is evidently pointed out in the third verse of the 4th chapter. "Even so we," it is said, "when we were children, were in bondage under the elements of the world." And the new state, at verse 7 Wherefore thou art no more a servant, but a son; and if a son, then an heir of God through Christ." In verse 9, they are warned against returning to the weak and beggarly elements; which, at verse 10, is explained to signify ceremonial observances: "Ye observe days, and months, and times, and years." At the 21st verse, their desire to be thus placed under the law is reproved; and we are there informed, that this consisted in taking the commandment, to the exclusion of the promise: the common error argued against, almost throughout the Epistle to the Romans; and with this subject the chapter ends. The first four verses of the next chapter go plainly to shew the inefficacy of legal observances, now that the end of ... *Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 43. "Cùm autem venerit tempus, et evenerit quod prophetatum est, tunc prophetiæ habent liquidam et certam expositionem Non enim habent expositionem omnium rerum pertinentem ad adventum Filii Dei, qui est secundùm hominem: à Christianis verò cùm legitur, thesaurus est absconsus in agro, cruce verò Christi revelatus est, et explanatus, et ditans sensum hominum, et ostendens sapientiam Dei, et eas quæ sunt erga hominem dispositiones ejus manifestans, et Christi regnum præformans, et hæreditatem sanctæ Hierusalem præevangelizans, et prænuntians," &c. the law had been manifested: and, accordingly, justification by faith alone is inculcated, at verse 5. At verse 14, we are told, "All the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." This is just what our Lord had formerly taught the disciples: nor can there be the least doubt, his intention was to embody in a few words the great scope of the moral law; but not to enact a new one.* Then, at the 18th verse, it is said, "If ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law," — i, e. under its curse. -- From what has been said, I think we may conclude, that no intimation whatever has escaped the lips of Paul, as to the abrogation of the moral law; but, on the contrary, an openly professed and acknowledged attachment to it, allowing it at once to be that in which he exercised himself, and had done so even from his childhood; and affirming, that it was the joy of his heart, just, holy, good, and spiritual. That any flesh, such as it is, could be justified by the law, however, he positively denies; and, that the ceremonies had any efficacy, now that their antitype had appeared, he just as positively denies; arguing that faith in the Son of God, or,which is the same thing,-in the promised seed, was the .... The reasoning of Irenæus (lib. iv. cap. 27. adversùs Hæreses) is so much in point on this subject, that I cannot forbear transcribing a considerable part of it :-" Et quia Dominus," inquit ille, "naturalia legis, per quæ homo justificatur, quæ etiam ante legisdationem custodiebant, qui fide justificabantur, et placebant Deo, non dissolvit, sed extendit, sed et implevit, ex sermonibus ejus ostenditur. Dictum est enim, inquit, antiquis, Non machaberis. Ego autem dico vobis, Quoniam omnis qui viderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, jam machatus est eam in corde suo. Et iterum, &c. ... Omnia enim hæc non contrarietatem et dissolutionem præteritorum continent, sicut qui à Marcione sunt vociferantur; sed plenitudinem et extensionem.” And again: "Hæc autem non quasi contraria legi docebat, sed adimplens legem, et infigens justificationes legis in nobis .... Et hoc autem quod præcepit, non solùm vetitis à lege, sed etiam à concupiscientiis eorum abstinere, non contrarium est, quemadmodum prædiximus; neque solventis legem, sed adimplentis, et extendentis, et dilatantis. Etenim lex, quippe servis posita, per ea quæ foris erant corporalia, ANIMAM ERUDIEBAT, velut per vinculum attrahens EAM ad obedientiam præceptorum Hæc autem omnia, quemadmodum prædiximus, non DISSOLVENTIS ERANT LEGEM, sed ADIMPLENTIS, et EXTENDENTIS, et DILATANTIS in nobis... Quia igitur naturalia omnia præcepta communia sunt nobis et illis, in illis quidem initium et ortum habuerunt, in nobis augmentum et adimpletionem perceperunt." (Edit. 1570, pp. 252, 3; Grabbe's edit. pp. 314, 15.) See some admirable remarks on this subject by Eusebius, Demonst. Evang. lib. i. cap. 6. .... only means whereby a man could be justified from his transgressions; and this he affirms has now been laid open to all Innumerable other passages may be cited to the same effect; but, as there can be no necessity to do so, we now leave this part of our subject. men. Dr. Whately endeavours to shew, in the sequel of his Essay, that his view of the question will not tend to relax Christian morality; because, as he argues, morality, as such, is of universal obligation, and independent of all enactment. His words are: "To say, therefore, that no part of the Jewish law is binding on Christians, is very far from leaving them at liberty to disregard all moral duties; for, in fact, the very definition of a moral duty implies its universal obligation, independent of all enactment."* p. 148. I will merely remark on this statement, that however promising it may appear, it will be found to be defective in two points of view at least, and those two fatal ones, as to the effects likely to be produced on society. First, it takes for granted, that all moral duties either are known, or may be discovered, independent of the revealed moral law; which I deny. A few, -the infraction of which are punishable by the statute laws were. Again, in page 147: "For it is evident that the natural distinctions of right and wrong, which conscience points out, must remain where they These distinctions," adds he, "not having been introduced by the Mosaic law, cannot, it is evident, be overthrown by its removal, any more than the destruction of the temple at Jerusalem implied the destruction of the Mount Sion, whereon it was built." And a little lower down, St. Paul himself is cited as saying, "The Gentiles, which have not the law," being capable of "doing by nature the things contained in the law .... their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing or else excusing one another;" and of their knowing (in cases where they committed sin) "that they who do such things are worthy of death." I would not be understood as controverting this statement in every point of view; for it is well known, that the very existence of civil society will teach the necessity of abstaining from the performance of certain actions, and that it is good and honourable to persevere in others: and this, I suppose, is what St. Paul means, when he speaks of the Gentiles. They knew, no doubt, enough of moral right and wrong to enable them to accuse and excuse one another; and, perhaps, to believe that in their best estate they were in reality far worse than they ought to have been. Yet, from what St. Paul also says of them, it is quite clear, that the little knowledge they had, had scarcely any influence over their conduct; and, as to the honour due to God, they as a body had entirely given it up. See chap. i. from verse 20 to the end. This, I think, is a fair specimen of what natural conscience and reason is likely : of the realm, all who have any thing to lose will subscribe to and support; while, on the other hand, many, who have every thing to gain, will, notwithstanding all the philosophy and philanthropy ever preached about, deny the validity even of these and the practical consequence will be, as it formerly was among the heathen, there will be no want of lawmakers, but a universal dearth of obedient subjects. Experience seems to say, all will profess to be in possession of the truth, which all will as positively deny to be in that of his neighbour. In the second place, all such laws, or rules, however good or bad, will necessarily be destitute of authority. Doubtful or questionable rewards and punishments (and these will go no further), will have but little effect in controlling the impetuosity of passion, or in stimulating into action the torpor of idleness, poverty, or wretchedness. One, perhaps, in a hundred millions, may, like Socrates, be found hardy enough to stem popular error and prejudice; while, like him, he may, nevertheless, give in to many vices which would put the most ignorant Christian to the blush. Dr. Whately's appeal to reason in questions of this kind, is, in my opinion, quite beside the point (p. 149): he argues very justly, that it will depend upon the human judgment to sever the moral from the ceremonial part of the law of Moses: he then concludes, "So far, consequently, from the moral precepts of the moral law being to the Christian necessary to determine what is right and wrong; on the contrary, this moral judgment is necessary to determine what are the moral precepts of Moses," which is in my judgment a fallacy. Suppose, for example, I have two MS. copies of Herodotus before me, out of which I am required to form as pure a text as I can. How ought I to proceed in this case? I ought, of necessity, to exercise my judgment; and, with this, in con always to come to. This will not, indeed, alter the nature of truth, or the obligation to follow it, as the author of the Essays truly observes: but I think it will shew us, that however indisputable this may be, the practical result will be any thing but that which he anticipates. The distinction made a little lower down (p. 148), that a precept's being moral gives it its obligatory power, rather than its being commanded, is, whatever else it may be, certainly in opposition to the sentiments of Scripture, which teach us, that obedience is better than sacrifice; and then exhort us to follow the examples of Abraham and Paul, who believed and obeyed. (Heb. xi. Gal. i.) |